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FLORIDA TAX REVIEW
Volume 15 2014 Number 5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE YEAR 2013
"Recent developments are just like ancient history, except they happened less
long ago."
Martin J McMahon, Jr.!
Ira B. Shepara"
Daniel L. Simmons***
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand
the sigificance of the most important judicial decisions and administrative
rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service and
Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months - and sometimes a
little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or
outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they
cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read
them all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles are
highlighted - unless one of us decides to go nuts and spend several pages
writing one up. This is the reason that the outline is getting to be as long as it is.
Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to
the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to
administrative rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued
rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they provide
Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected representatives; again,
sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up the most trivial of
legislative changes. The outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general
interest (to us, at least) - income tax accounting rules, determination of gross
income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate
and partnership taxation, exempt organizations, and procedure and penalties. It
deals summarily with qualified pension and profit sharing plans, and generally
does not deal with international taxation or specialized industries, such as
banking, insurance, and financial services. Please read this outline at your own
risk; we take no responsibility for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned
by our advancing ages or our increasing indifference as to whether we get any
particular item right. Any mistakes in this outline are Marty's responsibility; any
political bias or offensive language is Ira's; and Dan is just irresponsible.
Bruce A. McGovern, Vice President, Associate Dean, and Professor of
Law, South Texas College of Law, contributed to this article. Bruce's
contribution is (relative) youth.
* James J. Freeland Eminent Scholar in Taxation and Professor of Law,
University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.
Professor Emeritus, University of Houston Law Center.
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California Davis School of
Law.
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I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Yes, but when is the income recognized when, as
often happens, the customer never redeems the gift card? Rev. Proc.
2013-29, 2013-33 I.R.B. 141 (7/24/13). This revenue procedure allows a
taxpayer to defer recognizing in gross income certain advance payments
received from the sale of gift cards that are redeemable for goods or services
by an unrelated entity. Where a gift card is redeemable by an entity whose
financial results are not included in the taxpayer's applicable financial
statement, the taxpayer will recognize the payment in income to the extent
the gift card is redeemed. For a taxpayer without an applicable financial
statement, the taxpayer will recognize the payment in income when it is
earned, which, in this situation, is when the gift card is redeemed. Any
payment received by the taxpayer that is not recognized in income in the year
of receipt, must be recognized in the subsequent year. The revenue procedure
modifies and clarifies Rev. Proc. 2011-18, 2011-5 I.R.B. 443, modifing and
clarifying Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 991. It is effective for taxable
years ending on or after 12/31/10.
B. Inventories
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
C. Installment Method
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
D. Year of Inclusion or Deduction
1. Does this case stand for the proposition that if you
care enough about the treatment of a deduction item to try to change
your accounting method regarding the year of deduction it's "material"
for tax purposes even if it's not "material" for financial accounting
purposes? Veco Corp. v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 14 (11/20/13). The
accrual method taxpayer claimed current expense deductions for a variety of
liabilities under a number of contracts performance under which straddled
taxable years. On its GAAP financial it accrued the deductions over more
than one year. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) first held that the mere
execution of the contract does not necessarily establish the fact of liability.
However, the terms of the agreements are relevant in deciding whether and
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when the liabilities became fixed under the all events test. Where the
taxpayer had not by the end of its year requested that services be performed
and amounts were not unconditionally due, the fact of the liability had not
been established. Furthermore, the economic performance requirement of
§ 461(h) foreclosed certain deductions. The taxpayer conceded that it had not
satisfied the 3Y2-month rule of Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(6)(ii) for any of the
deductions in issue. Turning to the recurring item exception in § 461(h)(3),
the IRS argued that the taxpayer failed to satisfy the economic performance
requirement and the materiality or matching requirement of the recurring
item exception for all of the disputed deductions. The taxpayer's position
was that economic performance with respect to each expense item occurred
within 8 2 months after the close of its taxable year, as required by
§ 461 (h)(3)(A)(ii)(II), and that each expense item was not material within the
meaning of § 461 (h)(3)(A)(iv)(I). (The taxpayer conceded that, with one
exception, it had not satisfied the matching requirement for any of the
disputed deductions.) Section 461(h)(3)(B) provides that the treatment of an
item on financial statements should be taken into account in determining if
an item is "material." An example in the conference report, H.R. Conf. Rept.
No. 98-861, at 874 (1984), 1984-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1, 128, explains that if a
calendar-year taxpayer enters into a one-year maintenance contract on July 1,
1985, and the amount of the expense is prorated between 1985 and 1986 for
financial statement purposes, it also should be prorated for tax purposes. But
if the full amount is deducted in 1985 for financial statement purposes
because it is not material under generally accepted accounting principles, it
may (or may not) be considered an immaterial item for purposes of the
exception. Drawing on this example, Judge Marvel concluded that the
liabilities giving rise to the disputed deductions were "material" because the
taxpayer prorated the liabilities between two years on its financial statements
and took an inconsistent position with respect to the liabilities for financial
statement and tax reporting purposes. Furthermore, even if the amount of the
liabilities was immaterial for financial statement purposes, under Reg.
§ 1.461-5(b)(4)(iii) "[a] liability that is immaterial for financial statement
purposes under generally accepted accounting principles may be material"
for purposes of the recurring item exception. "The disputed items resulted
from a change of accounting method, which was disclosed on petitioner's
financial statement, and the disputed items were treated inconsistently for
financial accounting and tax reporting purposes. In addition, the liabilities
giving rise to the deductions were accrued over more than one taxable year.
Under these circumstances, the liabilities generating the accelerated
deductions were material for tax purposes."
2. The IRS continues successfully to flex the
awesome power of § 461(h). Suriel v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 16
(12/4/13). The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of an accrual method S
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corporation that was a cigarette importer. The corporation settled tobacco
related claims with 46 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and 4 U.S. territories by entering into the Tobacco Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA). It agreed to pay $242,314,534 in 12 annual
instalments from 2005 through 2016. Even though none of the amount was
paid, the corporation took the entire amount into account in computing the
cost of goods sold. It also deducted $4,661,190 as interest owed on its
obligation; none of the interest was paid. The IRS disallowed the
$242,314,534 deduction on the grounds that economic performance had not
yet occurred. The IRS's position was that because the payments were to a
qualified settlement fund (QSF), based on § 468B(a) economic performance
therefore did not occur until the payments were made. (Section 468B(a)
specifically provides: "For purposes of section 461(h), economic
performance shall be deemed to occur as qualified payments are made by the
taxpayer to a designated settlement fund." See also Reg. § 1.468B-3(c)(1).)
The taxpayer argued that the obligation arose from the provision of cigarettes
to the taxpayer by the manufacturer and that pursuant to § 461(h)(2)(A)(ii)
economic performance therefore occurred as the manufacturer provided the
cigarettes to the taxpayer. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) agreed with the IRS.
As far as the interest deduction was concerned, Judge Goeke held that where
the interest is owed to a QSF, the more specific timing rule in § 468B(a) took
precedence over the more general timing rules in §§ 163(a) and 461(a) and
disallowed the deduction.
II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. El Nifio has not yet won a major, but he claims a
partial victory in the Tax Court. Garcia v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 141
(3/14/13). Professional golfer Sergio Garcia, a resident of Switzerland,
derived income from an endorsement agreement with TaylorMade Golf Co.
The agreement required Garcia to "exclusively wear and use golf products
produced by TaylorMade and associated brands (TaylorMade products), and
TaylorMade . . . receive[d] the right to use [Garcia's] image, likeness,
signature, voice, and any other symbols associated with his identity to
promote TaylorMade products." Garcia also was required to make a
specified number of personal appearances and to play in a specified number
of tournaments each year. An amendment to the endorsement agreement
allocated 85 percent of Garcia's compensation to royalties for use of his
image rights and 15 percent to his personal services. The government argued
that the vast majority of Garcia's income was attributable to his personal
services. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) considered expert reports submitted
by the parties and judicial precedent, including a prior decision of the Tax
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Court on the same issue in connection with golfer Retief Goosen's
endorsement agreement with TaylorMade, Goosen v. Commissioner, 136
T.C. 547 (2011) (where Judge Kroupa found a 50%-50% split). The court
concluded that 65 percent of Garcia's compensation was royalties and
35percent was compensation for personal services. The court also held that
Garcia's royalty income was not, as the government argued, income derived
as an entertainer and therefore taxable in the United States under article 17 of
the U.S.-Swiss tax treaty, but rather was royalty income that is not taxable in
the United States under article 12 of the treaty. The court held that all of
Garcia's U.S.-source personal service income was taxable in the United
States and rejected as untimely Garcia's argument, raised for the first time in
a post-trial brief, that a portion of his service income was not taxable in the
United States.
2. Cash value life-insurance through off-shore
insurance companies and LLCs don't produce deductible premiums.
Salty Brine 1, Ltd. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d, 2013-2308 (N.D. Tex.
5/16/13). In a marketed insurance tax shelter arrangement that even Jenkens
& Gilchrist would not bless with an opinion, the court denied § 162
deductions for premiums paid for business protection insurance issued by
off-shore affiliates of Fidelity and Citadel Insurance companies. The policies
included cash value life insurance and related annuities that the court found
did not protect the business from risk and merely represented an attempt to
funnel cash from the businesses to families of the owners. Section 6662
penalties were upheld.
3. Pay me now or pay me later. The 2009 ARRA,§ 1231(a), added Code § 108(i), which defers and then ratably includes
income arising from business indebtedness discharged by the reacquisition of
a debt instrument. This provision allows a taxpayer to irrevocably elect to
include cancellation of debt income realized in 2009 and 2010 ratably over
five tax years, rather than in the year the discharge occurs, if the debt was
issued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or by a
corporation. For partnerships and S corporations, the election is made by the
partnership or corporation, not by the individual partners or shareholders.
I.R.C. § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii). Under the § 108(i) election, income from a debt
cancellation in 2009 is recognized beginning in the fifth taxable year
following the debt cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of
2014 through 2018. Income from a debt cancellation in 2010 is recognized
beginning in the fourth taxable year following the debt cancellation; the
income is recognized ratably in each of 2014 through 2018. If a taxpayer
elects to defer debt cancellation income under § 108(i), the § 108(a)
exclusions for bankruptcy, insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, and
qualified real property business indebtedness do not apply to the year of the
2014] 239
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election or any subsequent year. I.R.C. § 108(i)(5)(C). Thus, the election
cannot be used to move the year of inclusion to a year in which it is expected
that one of the exceptions will apply. Once the election is made, inclusion is
inevitable; the statute requires acceleration of inclusion to the taxpayer's
final return in the event of the intervening death of an individual or
liquidation or termination of the business of an entity. § 108(i)(5)(D). The
acceleration rule also applies in the event of the sale or exchange or
redemption of an interest in a partnership or S corporation by a partner or
shareholder.
a. Many of the questions have been
answered. Rev. Proc. 2009-37, 2009-36 I.R.B. 309 (8/17/09). This revenue
procedure provides the exclusive procedure for taxpayers to make § 108(i)
elections. Debt cancellation in connection with a property transfer is included
in § 108(i). Section 4.04(3) permits partial elections, with the partnership
permitted to determine "in any manner" the portion of the COD income that
is the "deferred amount" and the portion of the COD income that is the
"included amount" with respect to each partner. Section 4.11 permits
protective elections where the taxpayer concludes that a particular
transaction does not generate COD income but fears that the IRS may
determine otherwise. A partner's deferred § 752(b) amount, arising from a
decrease in his share of partnership liabilities, will be treated as a current
distribution of money in the year that the COD income is included.
Taxpayers are allowed an automatic one-year extension from the due date to
make the election, and taxpayers who made elections before the issuance of
the revenue procedure will be given until 11/16/09 to modify (but not
revoke) their existing elections. Corporate taxpayers making a § 108(i)
election are required to increase earnings and profits for the year of the
election.
b. Temporary Regulations allocate deferred
cancellation of debt income. T.D. 9498, Application of Section 108(i) to
Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 49380 (8/13/10). Section 108(i)
provides an election to include cancellation of indebtedness income resulting
from a reacquisition (broadly defined in § 108(i)(4)) of a debt instrument,
issued by a C corporation or other person engaged in a trade or business,
ratably over five years beginning with the fifth year following reacquisition
occurring in 2009, and the fourth year following reacquisition in 2010. Under
§ 108(i)(5)(B)(iii) an election is made by the partnership, not the partners
individually. Section 108(i)(6) requires a partnership to allocate the COD
income to partners according to partnership share on the day immediately
preceding reacquisition and provides that the discharge will not trigger
§ 752(b) recognition under § 731 because of a reduction in a partner's share
of partnership liabilities.
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* Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(1)
provides five safe harbors where debt instruments issued by a partnership or
S corporation will be treated as issued in a trade or business: (1) The gross
fair market value of the trade or business assets of the partnership or S
corporation represent at least 80 percent of the fair market value of all of its
assets on the date of issuance, (2) trade or business expenses of the
partnership or S corporation represent at least 80 percent of all expenditures,
(3) at least 95 percent of the interest paid on the debt instrument is allocable
to trade or business expenditures under the interest allocation rules of Temp.
Reg. § 1.163-8T, (4) at least 95 percent of the proceeds from the debt
instrument were used to acquire trade or business assets within six months of
the issue of the debt, or (5) the partnership or S corporation issued the debt
instrument to the seller of a trade or business to acquire the trade or business.
Absent anchoring in one of the safe harbors, qualification of a trade or
business debt is a matter of facts and circumstances.
* While § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii) requires the
election to be made at the partnership level, Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(1)
allows the partnership to allocate both deferred and included portions of
COD income to the partners. The temporary regulations first require that
COD income be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately
before the reacquisition in the manner the income would be included in
distributive shares under § 704, then the partnership must determine the
amount of COD income from the applicable instrument that is the deferred
amount includible in the partner's share and the amount that is immediately
includible. With respect to deferred COD income of an S corporation, Temp.
Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(1) requires that on an election by the S corporation,
deferred income must be shared pro rata on the basis of stock ownership
immediately prior to the reacquisition.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(2)
provides that a partner's basis is not adjusted under § 705(a) to account for
the partner's share of partnership deferred COD income until the deferred
item is recognized by the partner. Likewise, Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(2)
provides that neither an S corporation shareholder's basis under § 1367 nor
the shareholder's accumulated adjustment account is adjusted for deferred
COD income until the shareholder recognizes the deferred COD income.
* Following the rules of Rev. Proc. 2009
37, and applying the rules of § 108(i)(6), Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(3)
provides that reduction in a partner's share of partnership liabilities is
determined under § 752(b) when a debt instrument is reacquired, but that the
reduction in liabilities is not treated as a distribution of money until deferred
COD income is recognized by the partner. The temporary regulations
provide additional rules for determining a partner's deferred amounts where
the partner would recognize § 731 gain in the year of the reacquisition.
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* Partners' capital accounts are adjusted
as if no § 108(i) election were made.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(3)
provides that gain attributable to a reduction in a partner's or S corporation
shareholder's amount at-risk under § 465(e) will not be taken into account in
the year of reacquisition and will be deferred to the date the COD income is
recognized.
* In the case of an acceleration event
under § 108(i)(5)(D) that requires a partnership or S corporation to recognize
deferred items, under Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(3) the partners or S
corporation shareholders must account for deferred COD income in the year
that the accelerating event takes place. In addition, the temporary regulations
describe various circumstances in which a partner or S corporation
shareholder terminates the interest in the entity that will require acceleration
of deferred COD income, including death, liquidation, sale or exchange,
redemption, or abandonment.
* Identical proposed regulations were
issued simultaneously. REG-144762-09, Application of Section 108(i) to
Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 49427 (8/13/10).
c. Significant guidance on a soon to expire
beneficial Code section that leaves a nasty hangover. T.D. 9497, Guidance
Regarding Deferred Discharge of Indebtedness Income of Corporations and
Deferred Original Issue Discount Deductions, 75 F.R. 49394 (8/13/10). The
IRS and Treasury have promulgated Temp. Reg. §§ 1.108(i)-OT through
1.108(i)-3T providing detailed rules for C corporations regarding the
acceleration of deferred COD income and deferred OID deductions under
§ 108(i)(5)(D), and the calculation of earnings and profits as a result of an
election under § 108(i). The regulations also provide rules applicable to all
taxpayers regarding deferred OID deductions under § 108(i) as a result of a
reacquisition of an applicable debt instrument by an issuer or related party.
* Identical proposed regulations were
issued simultaneously. REG-142800-09, Guidance Regarding Deferred
Discharge of Indebtedness Income of Corporations and Deferred Original
Issue Discount Deductions, 75 F.R. 49428 (8/13/10).
d. Final guidance on an expired Code
section. T.D. 9622, Guidance Regarding Deferred Discharge of Indebtedness
Income of Corporations and Deferred Original Issue Discount Deductions,
78 F.R. 39984 (7/2/13). The Treasury Department has finalized the proposed
regulations (REG-142800-09, 75 F.R. 49428 (8/13/10)) regarding deferred
COD income of corporations and deferred OID deductions and replaced the
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Temporary Regulations promulgated in T.D. 9497, 75 F.R. 49394 (8/13/10),
without significant changes.
e. More final guidance on an expired Code
section. T.D. 9623; Application of Section 108(i) to Partnerships and S
Corporations 78 F.R. 39973 (7/2/13). The Treasury Department has finalized
the proposed regulations (REG-144762-09, 75 F.R. 49427 (8/13/10))
regarding application of § 108(i) to partnerships and S corporations, and has
replaced the Temporary Regulations promulgated in T.D. 9498, 75 F.R.
49380 (8/13/10), with some changes.
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1. Temporary and proposed regulations provide
extensive rules for the acquisition, production, or improvement of
tangible personal property. T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060
(12/27/11), and REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11). The Treasury Department has promulgated temporary
regulations, generally effective for tax years beginning on or after 1/1/12,
addressing capitalization requirements for expenditures to acquire and
improve tangible property.
a. IRS specifies the procedures for adopting
new accounting methods under the Temporary Regulations. Rev. Proc.
2012-19, 2012-14 I.R.B. 689 (3/7/12), modifying Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1
C.B. 330. The IRS has provided lengthy and detailed rules regarding
automatic changes in methods of accounting under Temp Reg. §§ 1.162-3T
and 4T (materials and supplies), 1.263(a)-iT (capital expenditures in
general), 1.263(a)-2T (transaction costs), and 1.263(a)-3T (improvements),
all added by T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11). These
changes are for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2012.
b. LB&I provides guidance under Rev.
Proc. 2012-19. LB&I-4-0312-004 (3/15/12). This directive to the field
applies to taxpayers who adopted a method of accounting relating to the
conversion of capitalized assets to repair expense under § 263(a).
c. Have your clients been wasting time
trying to comply with the Temporary Regulations in 2012? Yes, they
have. Further guidance announcing that pending final regulations will
apply only in years beginning in 2014 and thereafter. Notice 2012-73,
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2012-51 I.R.B. 713 (11/20/12). The IRS announced that pending final
regulations will apply to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/14, but that
taxpayers will be permitted to apply the final regulations to taxable years
beginning on or after 1/1/12. The notice also indicates that the temporary
regulations may be revised with respect to the de minimis rule of § 1.263(a)-
2T(g); dispositions under §§ 1.168(i)-iT and 1.168(i)-8T; and the Safe
Harbor for Routine Maintenance under § 1.263(a)-3T(g).
d. Technical amendments to revise the
Temporary Regulations. More important, the effective date of the
12/27/11 temporary regulations is delayed to years beginning on or after
1/1/14, with optional retroactive applicability. T.D. 9564, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible
Property, 77 F.R. 74583 (12/17/12). These include the following explanation:
"[T]he IRS and the Treasury are concerned that taxpayers are expending
resources to comply with temporary regulations that may not be consistent
with forthcoming final regulations."
e. An announcement amending regulations
- really!!?? Announcement 2013-7, 2013-3 I.R.B. 308 (1/14/13). This
announcement amends the temporary regulations (T.D. 9564), regarding the
deduction and capitalization of expenditures under §§ 162(a) and 263(a)
relating to tangible property to apply the temporary regulations to taxable
years beginning on or after 1/1/14, while permitting taxpayers to apply the
temporary regulations for taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/12, and
before the applicability date of the final regulations.
f. A minor fix. Announcement 2013-4, 2013-
4 I.R.B. 440 (1/18/13). The IRS corrected the temporary regulations to
provide in § 1.168(i)-l(1)(2) rules for making general asset account elections
on Form 4562. The amendment corrects paragraph numbering mistakes.
g. Finally, final regulations providing
extensive rules regarding capitalization of expenses for the acquisition,
production, or improvement of tangible personal property, and bright-
line distinction of deductible repairs. T.D. 9636, Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property,
78 F.R. 57686 (9/19/13). The Treasury Department and IRS have
promulgated final regulations under § 263(a) addressing capitalization
requirements for expenditures to acquire and improve tangible property that
were proposed in REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11), and replacing the temporary regulations promulgated in T.D.
9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures
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Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11).' The temporary
regulations originally were to be effective for tax years beginning on or after
1/1/12, with an expiration date of 12/23/14, but T.D. 9564, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible
Property, 77 F.R. 74583 (12/17/12), delayed the effective date to years
beginning on or after 1/1/14, with optional retroactive applicability to taxable
years beginning on or after 1/1/12. The final regulations generally are
effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2014. The§ 263(a) regulations provide detailed capitalization rules and several bright-
line standards under §§ 162(a) and 263(a) regarding the acquisition,
improvement or repair of tangible real and personal property. The 2011
temporary regulations also revised rules under § 168 regarding disposition of
and maintenance of general asset accounts for MACRS property. Except for
Reg. § 1.168(i)-7, dealing with multiple asset accounts, these provisions of
the temporary regulations (Temp. Regs. §§ 1.168(i)-1T, 1.168(i)-8T), have
not been finalized and are still in force. In general, the § 263(a) regulations
adopt the provisions of the 2011 and 2008 proposed regulations, but with
multiple modifications, including not insignificant redesignation of
subsections. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 provides rules for amounts paid for the
acquisition or production of tangible property, and § 1.263(a)-3 provides
rules for amounts paid for the improvement of tangible property. However,
these new regulations provide many additional rules. The final regulations
define material and supplies to treat as deductible (1) the cost of any property
with a useful life that does not exceed one year and (2) any item that costs
not more than $200 (the temporary regulations had a $100 ceiling). They add
a book-conformity de minimis rule, a safe-harbor for routine maintenance,
and an optional simplified method for regulated taxpayers. The regulations
contain provisions defining a unit of property as a key concept and address
capitalization of expenditures that improve or restore a unit of property. The
final regulations do not provide for or authorize a detailed repair allowance
rule, and unlike the temporary regulations do not provide for future I.R.B.
guidance regarding industry-specific repair allowance methods.
* Acquisition and Production Costs. Reg.§ 1.263(a)-2 provides that a taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to acquire or
produce a unit of real or personal property (as determined under Reg.§ 1.263(a)-3(e)), including leasehold improvement property, land and land
improvements, buildings, machinery and equipment, and furniture and fixtures.
1. The temporary regulations adopt provisions of regulations proposed in
2008 (REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 73 F.R. 12838 (3/7/08)), which were in
turn based on a 2006 proposal that was substantially modified by the 2008 proposed
regulations (REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 71 F.R. 48590 (8/21/06)).
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Amounts paid to create intangible interests in land are treated as capital
expenditures. Reg. § 1.263(a)-i(d)(5). Amounts paid for work performed on a
unit of property prior to the date the property is placed in service must also be
capitalized. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(d)(1). Transaction costs to facilitate the
acquisition of property are expressly required to be capitalized, Reg. § 1.263(a)-
2(f), but facilitative expenditures do not include employee compensation or
overhead unless the taxpayer elects to capitalize such expenditures or if
capitalization is required under § 263A. Expenditures to defend or protect title
must be capitalized. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e).
* Selling Expenses. Reg. § 1.263(a)-i(e)
provides for the capitalization of selling expenses as an offset against sales
proceeds (except in the case of dealers).
* Materials and Supplies. As under the
prior rules, Reg. § 1.162-3 allows a deduction for incidental material and
supplies in the year an expenditure is made. Materials and supplies are
incidental when they are carried on hand and for which no record of
consumption is maintained or when not carried in inventory. A deduction for
non-incidental materials and supplies is allowed in the year the property is
consumed. Materials and supplies include tangible property that is (1) a
component acquired to repair or improve a unit of tangible property that is
not acquired as part of a unit of property, (2) fuel, lubricants, water and
similar items that are reasonably expected to be consumed within 12 months,
(3) tangible property that is a unit of property with (a) an economic useful
life to the taxpayer of not more than 12-months, or (b) that costs not more
than $200 (an embedded de minimis rule), and (4) certain rotable spare parts.
Reg. § 1.162-3(c). Unlike the temporary regulations, which allowed
taxpayers to elect to capitalize the cost of each item of material or supply, the
final regulations allow an election to capitalize only rotable, standby, or
temporary spare parts (as defined). Items used in the production of other
property remain subject to the uniform capitalization rules of § 263A. Reg.
§ 1.263A-1(b). On sale or disposition, materials and supplies are not treated
as capital assets. Reg. § 1.162-3(g).
* Rotable Spare Parts. Rotable spare parts
are components treated as materials and supplies that are installed in a unit of
property, are removable from the unit of property, and are generally repaired
and improved for installation in a unit of property or stored for later use. The
cost of rotable spare parts is deductible in the year of the disposition of the
part. Reg. § 1.162-3(a)(3). Reg. § 1.162-3(e) provides an elective optional
method of accounting for the treatment of rotable and temporary spare parts
under which (1) the taxpayer deducts the amount paid for the part in the year
the part is first installed on a unit of property, (2) in each year the part is
removed from a unit of property the taxpayer includes the fair market value
of the part in gross income, (3) includes in the basis of the part the value
taken into income plus amounts paid to remove the part, (4) includes in the
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basis of the part any amounts expended to maintain the part, (5) then deducts
the basis and any cost incurred to reinstall the part in a unit of property, and
finally (6) deducts the basis of the part on final disposition.
* Financial Accounting De Minimis
Rules. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(f)(1) allows a taxpayer to elect to deduct
expenditures to acquire or produce property (other than land or property
produced for resale) if the taxpayer expenses the cost on a certified audited
financial statement (including audited financial statements prepared by an
independent CPA and used for non-tax purposes and certain financial
statements filed with regulatory agencies) pursuant to a written accounting
procedure adopted by the taxpayer that treats as expenses amounts paid for
(1) property costing less than a specified dollar amount, or (2) property that
has an economic useful life of 12 months or less, as long as the amount per
invoice (or item) does not exceed $5,000.2 Notwithstanding these de minimis
rules, any amounts paid for property that is, or is intended to be, incorporated
into inventory, or that will be used to manufacture inventory, must be
capitalized pursuant to § 263A. Property subject to the de minimis rules
cannot be treated on sale or other disposition as a capital or § 1231 asset. A
taxpayer who elects to apply the de minimis rule of Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(f) must
apply the same de minimis rule to materials and supplies, including rotable
spare parts, which are then not treated as materials or supplies under Reg.
§ 1.162-3.
* Unit of Property. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(e).
The unit of property concept is central to the proposed regulations'
requirement that improvements to a unit of property must be capitalized.
* Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(e)(2) provides that a
building and its structural components (as defined in Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2)) are
treated as a unit of property. However, the improvement rules must be
2. The $5,000 limit replaces the limit in the 2011 temporary regulations,
which was an aggregate amount that did not exceed the lesser of 0.1 percent of the
taxpayer's gross receipts or 2 percent of the taxpayer's total depreciation and
amortization expense reflected in its financial statement; the 2011 temporary
regulations removed a provision in the 2008 proposed regulations requiring that the
aggregate amount deducted not materially distort the taxpayer's income for purposes
of § 446.
3. Under Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2), structural components of a building include
such parts of a building as walls, partitions, floors, and ceilings, as well as any
permanent coverings therefor such as paneling or tiling; windows and doors; all
components (whether in, on, or adjacent to the building) of a central air conditioning
or heating system, including motors, compressors, pipes and ducts; plumbing and
plumbing fixtures, such as sinks and bathtubs; electric wiring and lighting fixtures;
chimneys; stairs, escalators, and elevators, including all components thereof;
sprinkler systems; fire escapes; and other components relating to the operation or
maintenance of a building.
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separately applied to components of a building including heating, ventilation
and air conditioning systems, plumbing systems, electrical systems, elevators
and escalators, fire protection and security systems, gas distributions
systems, and other systems identified in published guidance. Condominium
units and cooperative units are each treated for the owner as a unit of
property. Similarly, a leasehold interest in a portion of a building is treated as
a unit of property.
* Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(e)(1) defines a unit of
property for property other than buildings as including all the components
that are functionally interdependent. Components of property are
functionally interdependent if the placing in service of one component is
dependent on the placing in service of the other component. However, a
component that is recorded on the taxpayer's books as having a different
economic useful life or which is in a different class of property for MACRS
depreciation would be treated as a separate unit of property. Thus, for
example, all of the component parts of a railroad locomotive constitute a
single unit of property, as does a truck trailer and its tires (unless the
taxpayer's financial statements treat them as separate property). A special
rule applies to "plant property," which is a functionally integrated collection
of equipment and machinery used to perform an industrial process; each
component (or group of components) that performs a discrete and major
function or operation within the functionally interdependent machinery or
equipment constitutes a separate unit of property. Determinations of a unit of
property with respect to network assets are based on the taxpayer's facts and
circumstances unless otherwise provided in published guidance. Network
assets include property such as railroad tracks, oil, gas, water and sewage
pipelines, power transmission lines, and cable and telephone lines that are
owned or leased by taxpayers in those industries.
* Capitalization of Improvements.
Expenditures to improve a unit of property must be capitalized. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(d). Amounts expended for repairs and maintenance of tangible
property are deductible if they are not required to be capitalized under Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3. Reg. § 1.162-4. Expenditures that improve tangible property
and that are required to be capitalized include expenditures that:
(1) Result in a "betterment" to a unit of
property;
(2) Restore a unit of property; or
(3) Adapt the unit of property to a new or
different use.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(f) provides special rules requiring a lessee to capitalize
expenditures for improvements to a unit of leased property. A lessor is
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required to capitalize the cost of improvements to leased property paid
directly or through a construction allowance to the lessee. (The preamble to
the 2011 temporary regulations states that the recovery period for an
improvement or addition to the "underlying property" begins on the placed-
in-service date of the improvement or addition. See I.R.C. § 168(i)(6); Temp.
Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(c)(4)(ii)(E).)
* Bettennent. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j). An
expenditure must be capitalized if it results in the "betterment" of a unit of
property. An expenditure meets this standard only if it - (1) "[a]meliorates a
material condition or defect that either existed prior to the taxpayer's
acquisition of the unit of property or arose during the production of the unit of
property ... ," (2) "[r]esults in a material addition ... to the unit of property," or
(3) "[i]s reasonably expected to materially increase the productivity, efficiency,
strength, quality or output of the unit of property." Determination of whether
an expenditure results in a betterment is factual and requires a comparison of
the condition of the property immediately prior to the circumstance
necessitating the expenditure (or the condition of property the last time the
taxpayer corrected for normal wear and tear) with the condition of the property
after the expenditure. An expenditure that results in a betterment of a
component of a building is treated as a betterment to the unit of property
consisting of the building and its structural components. If an expenditure is
made to counter the effects of normal wear and tear, the betterment
determination is made by comparing the condition of the property immediately
after the expenditure with its condition after the last time the taxpayer corrected
the effects of normal wear and tear, or with its condition when placed in service
by the taxpayer (if the taxpayer has not previously corrected the effects of wear
and tear). Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(j)(3)(iii)(B). If an expenditure is made in response
to a particular event that damaged the property, the betterment determination is
made by comparing the condition of the property immediately after the
expenditure with its condition immediately before the particular event. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(j)(3)(iii)(C). Although the 2011 temporary regulations provided
that the betterment determination was to be made on the basis of "all the facts
and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the purpose of the expenditure,
the physical nature of the work performed, the effect of the expenditure on the
unit of property, and the taxpayer's treatment of the expenditure on its
applicable financial statement," former Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(h)(3)(i), this
provision was eliminated in the final regulations; nevertheless the preamble
states that the "IRS and the Treasury Department believe that an analysis of a
taxpayer's particular facts and circumstances is implicit in the application of all
4. Former Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(h)(iii) applied a different standard for
the third criterion, finding a betterment if the expenditure "[r]esults in a material
increase in capacity ..., productivity, efficiency, strength, or quality of the unit of
property or the output of the unit of property."
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the final regulations governing improvements and need not be specifically
provided in the application of the betterment rules."
* Restoration. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k). An
expenditure must be capitalized as a restoration if it (1) replaces a component
for which the taxpayer has deducted a loss, (2) replaces a component the
adjusted basis of which has been accounted for in realizing gain or loss on a
sale or exchange of the component, (3) repairs damage for which the taxpayer
has deducted a casualty loss under § 165, (4) returns the property to its ordinary
operating condition after the property has fallen into a state of disrepair and is
no longer functional, (5) results in rebuilding the property to a like-new
condition at the end of its class life under the § 168(g) alternative depreciation
system, or (6) is for the replacement of a major component or structural part of
the unit of property. Expenditures to repair damage to a unit of property for
which the taxpayer has claimed a casualty loss for the damage must be
capitalized only to the extent that (1) the basis of the property for which a loss
deduction was allowed exceeds (2) the amounts paid that represent an
improvement to the property measured by its condition prior to the casualty.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(4). In other words, repair costs in excess of the casualty
loss deduction that merely restore the property to its pre-casualty condition are
deductible, but repair costs equal to the casualty loss must be capitalized. See
Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(7), Exs. 3-5. Whether there has been a replacement of a
major component or structural part is determined under the facts and
circumstances and includes replacement of a major component or structural part
that comprises a large portion of the physical structure of the unit of property or
that performs a discrete and critical function in the operation of the unit of
property. Again, the restoration of a component of a building is treated as a
restoration of the unit of property consisting of the building and its structural
components.
* New Use. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(1). A unit of
property is treated as adapted to a new or different use if the adaptation is not
consistent with the taxpayer's "ordinary use of the unit of property at the
time originally placed in service by the taxpayer." An expenditure to adapt a
building system to a new use must be capitalized.
* Removal Costs. The 2011 temporary
regulations treated component removal costs as an indirect cost that had to
be capitalized if the removal costs directly benefited or were incurred by
reason of an improvement. The final regulations have changed this rule. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(g)(2) provides that if a taxpayer disposes of a depreciable asset
(including a partial disposition under Prop. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1(e)(2)(ix) or
Prop. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8(d)) and has taken into account the adjusted basis of
the asset or component of the asset in realizing gain or loss, the costs of
5. This differs from the Temporary Regulations under which the full
amount of the casualty restoration costs would have been subject to capitalization.
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removing the asset or component are not required to be capitalized. If a
taxpayer disposes of a component of a unit of property and the disposal is not
a disposition for tax purposes, then the taxpayer must deduct or capitalize the
costs of removing the component based on whether the removal costs
directly benefit or are incurred by reason of a repair to the unit of property or
an improvement to the unit of property.
* Rehabilitation doctrine is no more. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(g)(1) eliminates the judicially created rehabilitation doctrine by
providing that, "[I]ndirect costs that do not directly benefit or are not
incurred by reason of an improvement are not required to be capitalized
under section 263(a), regardless of whether they are made at the same time
as an improvement." Although the temporary regulations specifically
provided that if otherwise deductible repairs benefit or are incurred by reason
of an improvement, the cost of the repairs had to be capitalized under
§ 263A, the final regulations omit this sentence. However, some added
examples illustrate when § 263A requires capitalization.
* Routine Maintenance Safe Harbor. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(i)(1) provides safe harbor rules for routine maintenance of a
unit of property that is not treated as improving the property. For property
other than a building or a structural component of a building, routine
maintenance is defined as "the recurring activities that a taxpayer expects to
perform as a result of the taxpayer's use of the unit of property to keep the
unit of property in its ordinarily efficient operating condition." Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3(i)(1)(ii). Examples include inspection, cleaning, and testing of
the unit, and replacement of parts of the unit. The safe harbor applies to
activities that the taxpayer reasonably expects to perform more than once
during the class life of the property, as determined under the MACRS
alternative depreciation schedule of § 168(g). Routine maintenance includes
maintenance with respect to and the use of rotable spare parts. Routine
maintenance excludes activities that follow a basis recovery event similar to
the items that are described as restorations.
* Routine Maintenance Safe Harbor for
Buildings. The 2011 temporary regulations did not provide a routine
maintenance safe harbor for buildings, but the 2013 final regulations provide
two safe harbors for buildings. For buildings and structural components of
building, routine maintenance is defined as "the recurring activities that a
taxpayer expects to perform as a result of the taxpayer's use of any of the
properties ... to keep the building structure or each building system in its
ordinarily efficient operating condition." Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(i)(1)(ii).
Examples include the inspection, cleaning, and testing of the building
structure or each building system, and the replacement of damaged or worn
parts with comparable and commercially available replacement parts.
However, the activities are routine only if the taxpayer reasonably expects to
perform the activities more than once during the 10-year period beginning at
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the time the building structure or the building system upon which the routine
maintenance is performed is placed in service. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(i)(1)(ii).
* Routine Maintenance Safe Harbor for
Buildings of "qualifying small taxpayers." The 2013 final regulations also
provide an additional safe harbor election for building property held by
taxpayers with gross receipts of $10,000,000 or less ("a qualifying small
taxpayer"). Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(h). A qualifying small taxpayer may elect to
not apply the improvement rules to an eligible building if the total amount
paid during the taxable year for repairs, maintenance, improvements, and
similar activities with respect to the building does not exceed the lesser of
$10,000 or two percent of the unadjusted basis of the building. Eligible
building property includes a building that is owned or leased by the
qualifying taxpayer, provided the unadjusted basis of the property is
$1,000,000 or less.
* Repairs. Reg. § 1.162-4 allows as a
deductible repair expense any costs that are not required to be capitalized
under Reg. § 1.263(a)-3. The final regulations do not provide for a repair
allowance. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(1) provided that taxpayers would be
permitted to use a repair allowance method authorized by published guidance
in the Federal Register or the Internal Revenue Bulletin. This provision was
deleted in finalizing the regulations.
* Examples. The regulations are full of
examples that seem to cover most of the litigated cases and rulings
addressing capitalization versus repair. The examples are necessary to
understand the substantive provisions, which, although intended to provide
clarity, are not so clearly applied.
* Effective Dates. In general, the final
regulations apply to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/14. However,
certain rules apply only to amounts paid or incurred in taxable years
beginning on or after 1/1/14. The various effective dates are in Regs.
§§ 1.162-3(j), 1.162-4(c), 1.162-11 (b)(2), 1.165-2(d), 1.167(a)-4(b),
1.167(a)-7(f), 1.167(a)-8(h), 1.168(i)-7(e), 1.263(a)-l(h), 1.263(a)-2(j),
1.263(a)-3(r), 1.263(a)-6(c), 1.263A-1(1), and 1.1016-3().
2. Electricity and hot air - the IRS defines unit of
property for generators of steam and electricity. Rev. Proc. 2013-24,
2013-21 I.R.B. 1142 (4/30/13). Under Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T, which
requires capitalization of expenditures to improve, better, or restore a unit of
property, interdependent major components are treated as a part of a unit of
property. Temp. Reg. § 1.162-4T allows as a deductible repair expense any
costs that are not required to be capitalized under Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T.
In the case of power plants generating steam or electricity, the Revenue
Procedure provides a list of properties that will be treated, at the taxpayer's
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election, as separate units of property within a power station and identifies
major components of the units of property. The revenue procedure adds that
a taxpayer's method for determining whether an expenditure must be
capitalized or is deductible, including the taxpayer's definitions of a unit of
property or major components of a unit of property, is a method of
accounting under § 446 and will be subject to § 481 adjustments and the
automatic consent rules for adopting the unit of property definitions provided
in Appendix A of the revenue procedure. In general, the Appendix lists
numerous systems within a generating facility (such as turbines) as separate
units of property and identifies major components of the units of property.
The definitions of Rev. Proc. 2013-24 are limited to determinations for
purposes of the capitalization/repair rules and may not be used for other
purposes such as depreciation.
3. Law firm advances of litigation expenses were
loans, not deductible expenses. Humphrey, Farrington & McClain v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-23 (1/17/13). The cash method taxpayer
plaintiffs law firm maintained a classification system for litigation costs
advanced to clients in contingent fee cases. If the firm considered the
likelihood of reimbursement to be high, the advanced costs were capitalized.
In riskier cases where the firm considered the likelihood of reimbursement to
be low, the firm deducted the advanced expenses, and reported
reimbursement as income as advances were repaid. The Tax Court (Judge
Morrison) held that the advanced litigation costs were loans in all cases, even
if eventual recovery of the advances was contingent, and disallowed the
deductions. The court found that there was a significant possibility of
reimbursement, a factor that supported treating the advances as loans. The
court also agreed with the IRS that the treatment of the advances as loans
was a change in the taxpayer's method of accounting, which did not clearly
reflect income, and, therefore, allowed adjustments under § 481 with respect
to prior years. Nonetheless, the court found that the taxpayer's classification
method was a reasonable attempt to ascertain the tax treatment of advanced
expenses which qualified for the reasonable cause exception to § 6662
penalties.
4. Protecting directors from cement shoes in a
shareholder class-action arising from a merger subject to capitalization.
Why apply modern regulations when old case law will do the trick? Ash
Grove Cement Company v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-767 (D.
Kan. 2/6/13). The taxpayer settled a class action lawsuit by minority
shareholders against itself and its directors arising out the acquisition of
another corporation in a reorganization. The District Court (Judge Murguia)
granted summary judgment for the government, holding that both the
settlement payment and litigation expenses incurred by the taxpayer in
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resolving the class action lawsuit were capital expenditures under § 263. The
origin of the claim for which the taxpayer incurred the expenses arose from a
capital transaction. Even though the payments related to the taxpayer's 2005
return, the court applied the case law based "origin of the claim" test, e.g.,
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970), rather than Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-5, which was promulgated in 2003. The court held that the
litigation expenses arose out of the acquisition transactions and were thus
capital expenses under the origin of the claim test. The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that expenses incurred to indemnify directors from legal
claims were deductible. The court pointed out that under the taxpayer's
approach, "companies could always deduct litigation expense any time a
director acting in good faith is sued in connection with a capital transaction
so long as the company has an indemnity obligation."
5. With global warming these plants are growing
faster. Notice 2013-18, 2013-14 I.R.B. 742 (2/19/13); Rev. Proc. 2013-20,
2013-14 I.R.B. 744 (2/19/13). The IRS has revised the categories of "berries"
as plants that do not have a pre-productive growth period in excess of two
years to segregate blueberry, blackberry, and raspberry plants, and removed
papaya plants from the list. Under § 263A(d)(1) and Reg. § 1.263A-4(d)
farmers who are not required to use the accrual method of accounting (and
who are not tax shelters) are not required to capitalize the costs of raising
animals or the costs of producing plants with a pre-productive period of two
years or less. The IRS maintains a list of qualifying plants based on the
nationwide pre-productive period for plants. The accompanying revenue
procedure provides procedures for a taxpayer to obtain automatic consent to
not apply § 263A to the production of plants removed from the list of plants
that have a nationwide weighted average pre-production period in excess of
two years.
6. Research to eliminate uncertainty is deductible
under proposed regulations. What about the uncertainty of tax advice?
REG-124148-05, Research Expenditures, 78 F.R. 54796 (9/6/13). Section
174 allows either deduction or 60 month amortization of research and
experimental expenditures, but under § 174(c) the § 174 deduction is not
applicable to expenditures for the acquisition or improvement of land or
depreciable property. Reg. § 1.1 74-2(a)(1) defines research and experimental
expenditures as expenditures that represent "research and development costs
in the experimental or laboratory sense" and provides in § 1.174-2(b)(1) that
depreciation allowances on depreciable property used in research are § 174
expenditures. The proposed regulations would provide that expenditures may
qualify under § 174 regardless of whether a resulting product is sold or used
in the taxpayer's trade or business and that the depreciable property rule is an
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application of the general definition of research and experimental
expenditures.
* Prop. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) would
provide that the ultimate success, failure, sale or use of a product is not
relevant to a determination of eligibility of expenditures as research or
experimental expenditures under § 174.
* As an application of the general definition
of research expenditures, the depreciable property rule should not be applied to
exclude otherwise eligible expenditures.
* Under Reg. § 1.174-(a)(2) research
expenditures to develop a product include development of a pilot model.
Prop. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(4) would define a pilot model as "any representation
or model of a product that is produced to evaluate and resolve uncertainty
concerning the product."
* The proposed regulations would amend
Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) to "clarify" that production costs after uncertainty is
eliminated are not eligible under § 174 by providing that "[c]osts may be
eligible under section 174 if paid or incurred after production begins but
before uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of the
product is eliminated."
* Prop. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(5) would adopt
a "shrinking back rule" that would provide that research and experimental
expenditures for the improvement of a component of a larger design may be
eligible under § 174, but uncertainty with respect to a component does not
necessarily indicate uncertainty with respect to the product as a whole.
* Although the proposed regulations will
be effective on publication of final regulations in the Federal Register, the
proposed regulations indicate that the IRS will not challenge expenditures
that conforn to the proposed regulations.
7. Custom homes are no different from spec houses,
both are subject to the uniform cost capitalization rules. Frontier Custom
Builders, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-231 (9/30/13). The
taxpayer corporation constructed custom homes. It argued that its business
model was centered around sales and marketing rather than production
related services and asserted that employee salaries and other indirect
expenses were not subject to capitalization under § 263A. The Tax Court
(Judge Goeke) disagreed. The court stated that the taxpayer's creative design
of homes "is ancillary to the physical work and is as much a part of a
development project as digging a foundation or completing a structure's
frame." Thus the court found that the taxpayer was a producer of property
subject to § 263A's capitalization requirements. The court also held that the
IRS did not abuse its discretion by treating the taxpayer's deduction of
production expenses as an accounting method and requiring the taxpayer to
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adopt the simplified production and simplified service cost methods of
accounting under Reg. §§ 1.263A-2(b)(1) and 1.363A-1(h)(1). The court
required an allocation of salaries, bonuses and other expense items between
indirect expenses subject to capitalization and operating expenses currently
deductible.
8. Tax expenditures for movies and television. The
Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 744, extends the election under Code
§ 181 to expense up to $15 million of qualified film and television
production costs if 75 percent of total compensation is for services performed
in the U.S. The limit is $20 million for production costs incurred in low-
income or distressed communities through 2011.
a. Final regulations come out just in time
for the expiration date of the statute. T.D. 9551, Deduction for Qualified
Film and Television Production Costs, 76 F.R. 60721 (9/30/11). Section 181
provides for an election to deduct qualified film or television production
costs incurred in productions commenced prior to 1/1/12, as an expense not
chargeable to capital account in an amount up to $15 million for each
production, or $20 million for production expenses incurred in certain low
income or distressed county areas. A production qualifies for the election if
at least 75 percent of the total compensation for the production is for services
performed in the United States by actors, directors, producers, and
production personnel. Final regulations §§ 1.181-1 through -6, replacing
temporary and proposed regulations, clarify the owner of production costs,
the definition of aggregate production costs for purposes of the election and
limitations, and provisions applicable to participations and residuals.
b. Temporary and proposed regulations
update the rules. REG-146297-09, Deduction for Qualified Film and
Television Production Costs, 76 F.R. 64879 (10/19/11). The temporary
(Temp. Regs. §§ 1.181-OT, 1.181-1T) and proposed regulations clarify that
the $15 million (or $20 million) limitation under amendments to § 181
applies to limit the aggregate deduction for production costs paid or incurred
by all owners of a qualified film or television production for each qualified
production, rather than limit the aggregate production costs.
c. And now, "final" final regulations after
the provision expired. T.D. 9603, Deduction for Qualified Film and
Television Production Costs, 77 F.R. 72923 (12/7/12). The final regulations
(Reg. §§ 1.181-0, 1.181-1) remove the temporary regulations, and provide
that whether production costs qualify for pre- or post-1/1/08 limitations,
compensation to actors is allocated to first unit principal photography.
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d. Thank Dodd that special expensing rules
for film and television productions were extended to 2012 and 2013. The
2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act, § 317,
extends through the end of 2013 the election under Code § 181 to expense up
to $15 million of qualified film and television production costs if 75 percent
of total compensation is for services performed in the U.S.
* The limit is $20 million for production
costs incurred in low-income or distressed communities. Are any members of
the film crew residents of those communities?
e. No deduction under this terminated
provision without a proper election. Staples v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
2013-262 (11/18/13). Section 181 allowed a current deduction of otherwise
capital expenses incurred for U.S. production of movie or television
programing pursuant to an election in the form specified by the IRS. The
provision applies to production expenses incurred before 12/31/13. The
taxpayer, an attorney, deducted research expenses incurred in developing a
series on U.S. history by claiming the expenses on Schedule C, but failed to
file the Form 3115 required by Temp. Reg. § 1.181-2T(c)(1). Although the
court (Judge Wherry) was willing to consider the doctrine of substantial
compliance in attempting to make the § 181 election, the court indicated that
since the taxpayer had not begun principal photography in the years at issue,
the taxpayer was not entitled to the deduction in any event.
9. "Candy, Cigarettes, and .... ?" City Line Candy
& Tobacco Corp. v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 13 (11/19/13). Section
263A(b)(2)(B) provides a small reseller exception to the § 263A uniform
capitalization rules, which applies to businesses acquiring goods for resale if
the firm's average annual gross receipts for the three-year period
immediately preceding the taxable year do not exceed $10 million. The Tax
Court (Judge Marvel) held that for purposes of determining eligibility for the
§ 263A(b)(2)(B) small reseller exception the gross receipts of a cigarette
wholesaler was required to include the entire sale proceeds from the sale of
cigarettes, including the costs of the state cigarette tax stamps the wholesaler
was required to purchase. As a result, the wholesaler's gross receipts
exceeded the $10 million ceiling. The cigarette stamp tax costs were indirect
costs under Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(i), properly characterized as handling
costs, not selling expenses, which Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii)(A) exempts
from the capitalization requirement.
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. You can save the failing nursing home, but don't
pay yourself too much. Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home I, Inc. v.
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Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-10 (1/14/13). The husband and wife
shareholders (the Fletchers) took over a failing retirement home and turned it
into a profitable operation. In the years at issue the Fletchers each received
approximately $200,000 of compensation plus contributions to a defined
benefit plan for each of approximately $191,000 for services respectively as
the overall manager and head nurse. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) agreed
that the compensation to the taxpayers was catch-up compensation for years
when the corporation provided little compensation, that the compensation
levels were below national norms, that the corporation's cash-flow was
marginally sufficient to pay its bills including acquisition indebtedness, but
that the Fletchers as the shareholders used all of the profits to pay salaries
and never received a dividend. The deciding factor for the court's holding
that the compensation was unreasonable was that independent investors
would have demanded at least a 10 percent return on their investment and
that the compensation packages "did not leave enough of the corporation's
assets to be paid back to the hypothetical investor as a return on investment."
The court also held that compensation paid to the Fletchers' daughter was
unreasonable. The court further declined the IRS's invitation to impose
additions to tax under § 6651 and § 6662 accuracy related penalties, finding
that the taxpayer reasonably relied on the advice of its accountant (with the
exception of penalties related to the compensation paid to the Fletchers'
daughter).
a. And don't press your luck by seeking costs as a
prevailing party. Thousand Oaks Residential Care Home I, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-156 (6/20/13). The taxpayers moved for
reasonable administrative and litigation costs pursuant to § 7430, which
permits the award of such costs to a prevailing party. The IRS "conceded that
. . . petitioners ha[d] 'substantially prevailed with respect to the most
significant issues or set of issues in . . . [their] case[s] . . . ."' Nevertheless,
the court (Judge Wherry) denied the taxpayers' motion on the ground that the
position of the IRS in the case was reasonable and substantially justified.
"The testimony of [the IRS's] expert, the numerous factual issues
surrounding the decision, and the total disallowance of all compensation paid
to the owner-employees' daughter ... demonstrate that [the IRS] acted
reasonably given the facts and circumstances." Therefore § 7430(c)(4)(B)
precluded awarding attorney's fees.
2. IRS experts prevail on reasonable compensation
issues - surprise! And the court found taxpayer's position on equitable
recoupment to be somewhere between "Dalm and Dahmer." K&K
Veterinary Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-84 (3/25/13).
The taxpayer, a wholesaler of animal health products, was wholly owned by
John Lipsmeyer, who was employed as its chief executive and worked as a
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principal sales representative. The taxpayer employed John's wife, Melissa,
as vice president, secretary and assistant financial officer, John's brother
David as senior vice president of sales, co-chief executive officer and co-
chief operative officer who also handled 50 accounts, and David's daughter
Jennifer as the chief financial officer. Accepting the IRS expert's evaluation,
the Tax Court (Judge Cohen) reduced the corporation's deductions for
compensation paid to the sole shareholder/employee and related parties. The
court considered nine factors in evaluating reasonable compensation. Among
those factors, the court determined that although John and David had
significant experience with the corporation's operations and were important
to its success, the record did not establish that either of them was the primary
reason for the taxpayer's growth. The court acknowledged Jennifer's
importance to the corporation's success, but stated that the record fell short
of establishing that she was exceptionally qualified or the primary reason for
the corporation's growth. The court also stated that the record fell "far short"
of establishing Martha's exceptional qualification or contribution to growth.
Rejecting the taxpayer's expert analysis, the court accepted the prevailing
salary comparison figures offered by the IRS expert and the IRS expert's
conclusion of reasonable compensation from comparable companies at the
75th percentile.
The court also rejected the taxpayer's
assertion of an "equitable recoupment" to reduce the corporation's tax liability
by the amount of lower taxes payable by shareholders if the excess
compensation had been distributed to the shareholder as a dividend rather than
reported by them as compensation income. The court listed four elements
required for equitable recoupment to apply: "(1) the overpayment or deficiency
for which recoupment is sought by way of offset is barred by an expired period
of limitation; (2) the time-barred overpayment or deficiency arose out of the
same transaction, item, or taxable event as the overpayment or deficiency
before the Court; (3) the transaction, item, or taxable event has been
inconsistently subjected to two taxes; and (4) if the transaction, item, or taxable
event involves two or more taxpayers, there is sufficient identity of interest
between the taxpayers subject to the two taxes that the taxpayers should be
treated as one." United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596 (1990). The court held that
equitable recoupment was not available to the corporation because the denial of
the corporate level deduction and the tax on dividends involved two or more
taxpayers with insufficient identity of interest to be treated as a single taxpayer.
The court observed that a corporation formed for legitimate business purposes
and its shareholders are separate entities.
3. Increasing the value of the company deserves
some bonus, but not all of it. Aries Communications, Inc. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2013-97 (4/10/13). In another case appealable to the Ninth
Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) applied the five factors of Elliotts,
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Inc. v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1983), plus additional
consideration of whether an independent investor would compensate the
employee at the claimed amount, to reduce the taxpayer's corporate
deduction for compensation to its sole shareholder. The taxpayer sold its
radio stations in the year at issue for a price that was $6 million higher than
an initial offer. The taxpayer's development of the stations and the higher
purchase price were attributable to the efforts of the shareholder/CEO,
Arthur Astor, who received annual compensation plus a bonus totaling
approximately $6.9 million.
* The court concluded that Astor was the
most important employee of the taxpayer and agreed that compensation
attributable to prior years' service as catch-up compensation allowed
compensation that need not be reasonable in the year paid. The fact that Astor
played a pivotal role in both operating the taxpayer and negotiating the higher
price for the sale of assets functioning as an employee of the taxpayer was a
factor favoring the taxpayer's deduction of the compensation.
* The court considered the linear regression
analysis of dueling experts regarding comparison with salaries of similar
companies, but had difficulty with applying comparisons with publically held
companies. The court ultimately concluded that a bonus equivalent to one-third
of the negotiated increased sales price was reasonable.
* The court described the character of the
company as a large asset-laden complex business with a negative net income
and bleak financial picture, a factor that favored the IRS evaluation of
reasonable compensation.
* The court indicated that Astor's conflict
of interest in protecting the company as a going concern and his interest as
owner in garnering the highest price for the assets and receiving the reward as
deductible salary favored the IRS.
* The corporation's internal inconsistency
in treatment of payments to employees as bonuses at the end of the year when it
could predict profits and potential federal income tax liability favored the IRS.
* Finally, as a factor added to the Elliotts
list, the court determined that since the corporation retained sufficient earnings
to satisfy an independent investor at 20 percent compound annual return on
equity, the independent investor test supported the corporation's level of
compensation.
* At the end of the day, the court
determined, based on the experts' testimony that Astor's fixed compensation
was underpaid but the bonus was unreasonable and allowed a deduction of
$2,660,889. The court also imposed an accuracy related penalty under
§ 6662(a) finding that the Astor's conversation with the corporation's
accountants was not reasonable reliance on a tax professional.
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D. Miscellaneous Deductions
1. IRS values noncommercial flight. Rev. Rul. 2013-
20, 2013-40 I.R.B. 272 (9/26/13). The value of noncommercial flights on
employer owned aircraft is determined by multiplying the cents-per-mile for
the applicable period by the appropriate aircraft multiple and adding the
applicable terminal charge. The mileage rates for the second half of 2013 are
$0.2654 per mile up to 500 miles, $0.2024 for 501-1500 miles, then $0.1946
over 1500 miles. The terminal charge for the second half of 2013 is $48.53.
These are little changed from the rates for the first half of 2013: $0.2655 per
mile up to 500 miles, $0.2024 for 501-1500 miles, then $0.1946 over 1500
miles. The terminal charge for the first half of 2013 was $48.54.
2. Really bad timing in the real estate appraisal
business does not the debt make bad. Bishop v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-98 (4/10/13). In April 2006, shortly before leaving his position
as President of IMPAC Mortgage Holdings, Inc., where he bought and sold
pools of loans, the taxpayer advanced $300,000 (which he borrowed from a
commercial lender) to Landmark Equities Group to assist in developing a
public offering of Landmark. Landmark had developed an "Automated
Valuation Model" product designed to quickly value mortgage loans for
investment banks by aggregating title insurance information. The written
note required monthly interest payments and was due in April 2007.
Landmark failed to make payments on the note when due in 2006. The
taxpayer indicated in testimony that he reviewed the financial health of
Landmark and concluded that it should have been able to pay the interest,
even though the real estate market was showing signs of trouble in 2006, but
that Landmark would not be able to pay principal in 2006 if the taxpayer had
invoked an acceleration clause in the note on default of the interest
payments. Judge Laro concluded that the note was a bona fide indebtedness
rejecting the IRS assertion that the advance was not a bona fide debt because
the note was unsecured, Landmark was unable to borrow from a commercial
lender, and the taxpayer did not demand payment in full when Landmark
defaulted on interest payments. The court determined, however, that the
taxpayer's unsubstantiated testimony regarding Landmark's financial health
was insufficient to carry the burden of proof that the loan became worthless
in 2006. Because Landmark remained a going concern into 2007, the court
indicated that some evidence of Landmark's ability or inability to turn the
business around and generate income to pay the note was crucial. The court
also sustained the IRS assertion of § 6662(a) penalties indicating that the
taxpayer's failure to provide documentary evidence of Landmark's financial
health to the taxpayer's CPA who prepared the return claiming the deduction
prevented the taxpayer's reasonable reliance on the tax professional.
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3. The threat of impending death does not reduce
substantiation requirements. Striefel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-
102 (4/11/13). The taxpayer worked as an independent contractor performing
field engineering services for an engineering company. The taxpayer's work
required travel away from home. The taxpayer received a "traumatic medical
diagnosis" and was told that he would likely die soon. On his release from
the hospital the taxpayer destroyed all of his old business records that he kept
in a file cabinet. While expressing some sympathy regarding the
hospitalization, the Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) refused to accept the
taxpayer's testimony and limited bank records as substantiation for
automobile travel, meal, and lodging expenses. The court did allow
deductions for some lodging expenses where the taxpayer's bank records
matched his calendar entries and allowed deduction of per diem for meals on
those dates. The court also sustained a § 6662(a) accuracy penalty stating
that, "[a]lthough petitioner was understandably upset at the time, his actions
were not justifiable, reasonable, or prudent under the circumstances. We find
that petitioner acted negligently."
* Query whether his doctor told him to stop
buying green bananas, or merely to stop taking out multi-year magazine
subscriptions?
* Query whether taxpayer may recover for
physician malpractice?
4. Stock valuation settlement produces imputed
interest. Colorcon, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 650 (4/30/13). To push
out a minority shareholder, DB Trust, the taxpayer undertook a short-form
merger of an 84 percent owned subsidiary under Pennsylvania law, which
did not require a shareholder vote. After offering the minority interest holder
an $82 million promissory note in 1999 at the time of the merger, the
taxpayer in 2002 settled a suit claiming dissenter's rights and other claims
with a payment of $191 million. The taxpayer filed a refund claim asserting
that $31 million of the payment was deductible as imputed interest under
§ 483. Section 483 requires a taxpayer to impute unstated interest on account
of a sale or exchange of property under a contract under which some or all of
the payments are due more than one year after the sale or exchange. The IRS
conceded that the 1999 merger was a sale or exchange. The IRS argued,
however, that the payment was made pursuant to the 2002 settlement
agreement in an action that sought to rescind that 1999 merger transaction,
rather than payment for the stock in 1999. Looking to Pennsylvania law, the
Court of Federal Claims (Judge Firestone) held that the 1999 short-form
merger transaction transferred property as a matter of law and that at least a
part of the $191 million settlement was paid for the shares. Granting
summary judgment to the taxpayer, the court also held that the IRS did not
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raise a genuine factual dispute as to whether any portion of the $191 million
payment was attributable to other claims.
5. A judge lets the jury decide how much of
$126,796,262 of a $385,147,334 settlement payment under the False
Claims Act is compensatory and how much is a nondeductible penalty.
Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d
2013-1938 (D. Mass. 5/9/13). The taxpayer deducted the full amount of a
$385,147,334 settlement with the government under the False Claims Act
(for Medicare and Medicaid fraud), which provides for a penalty of not less
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the amount of
damages the government sustains. The settlement agreement was silent
regarding the allocation of the payment between compensatory and punitive
amounts, although it did allocate $65,800,555 to qui tam relators' awards.
The agreement expressly disclaimed any resolution of the tax treatment of
the payment. The IRS allowed a portion of the deduction but disallowed as a
fine or similar penalty, which is nondeductible under § 162(f), $126,796,262
of the claimed deduction. The District Court denied cross motions for
summary judgment because "real disputes remained about the purpose of the
payments," and on a motion for entry of judgment held that the jury properly
determined that $95,000,000 of the disputed amount of the settlement paid to
the government was compensatory and therefore deductible. The court
explained that "a manifest agreement is not necessary for [the taxpayer] to
establish that all or some portion of the payments at issue were made in
settlement of non-punitive FCA liability." It concluded that "to determine
whether the payments made by [the taxpayer] to the government in excess of
the amount already deemed deductible by the IRS were compensatory
damages, it was necessary to consider both the language of the settlement
agreements and non-contractual evidence regarding the purpose and
application of the payments."
6. Its quest for § 199 deductions was not to be
harried by the IRS. Houdini seals a wine bottle in a basket and escapes
with domestic production deductions. United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp.
2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 5/7/13). The court granted summary judgment to the
taxpayer in the IRS's § 7405 suit to recover amounts erroneously refunded.
The IRS had granted refunds to the taxpayer shareholders of an S corporation
claiming § 199 deductions for domestic production activities. The S
corporation, Houdini, Inc. ("Houdini") packages and markets gift baskets
with wine and food items. Houdini purchases baskets manufactured to its
specifications in China, plus fill materials and wine and food items from
various suppliers. Houdini designs and packages gift baskets in its facilities
in California. Section 199 provided a deduction for qualified production
activities income of 3 percent for the years at issue and provides a deduction
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of 9 percent currently. "Qualified production activities income" is defined in
§ 199(c)(1) as the taxpayer's "domestic production gross receipts" ("DPGR")
minus the related cost of goods sold and other expenses, losses, or
deductions. DPGR is defined, in relevant part, as the taxpayer's gross
receipts derived from "any lease, rental, license, sale, exchange, or other
disposition of ... qualifying production property which was manufactured,
produced, grown, or extracted by the taxpayer in whole or in significant part
within the United States." Reg. § 1.199-3(e)(1) defines manufacturing, etc. as
"manufacturing, producing, growing, extracting, installing, developing,
improving, and creating [qualified production property ("QPP")]; making
QPP out of scrap, salvage, or junk material as well as from new or raw
material by processing, manipulating, refining, or changing the form of an
article, or by combining or assembling two or more articles," but Reg.
§ 1.199-3(e)(1) adds that if a taxpayer "performs minor assembly of QPP and
the taxpayer engages in no other MPGE [manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted] activity with respect to that QPP [qualified production property],
the taxpayer's packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly does not
qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP." The District Court (Judge Selna)
rejected the IRS's argument that Houdini's assembling gift baskets was
merely assembly or packaging activity by noting that, "Houdini makes
products suitable for use as gifts using machinery, according to an organized
plan and with division of labor. Therefore, Houdini's production process
may qualify as manufacturing or producing." Also noting that Houdini's
activities may also qualify as packaging the court stated that, Houdini's
"complex production process relies on both assembly line workers and
machines. The final products, gift baskets and gift towers, are distinct in
form and purpose from the individual items inside. The individual items
would typically be purchased by consumers as ordinary groceries. But after
Houdini's production process, they are transformed into a gift that is usually
given during the holiday season." The court refused to interpret Reg.
§ 1.199-3(e), Ex. 6, indicating that customizing automobiles with purchased
parts is not a manufacturing or production activity, as barring Houdini's
§ 199 deduction.
a. Direct mail is not manufacturing, just a pain
in the mailbox. Advo, Inc. v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 9 (10/24/13). The
issue before the court was the application of the § 199 domestic production
deduction to materials manufactured through agreements with contract
manufacturers. The taxpayer distributed advertising material both prepared
by clients and developed by the taxpayer. Taxpayer developed material was
printed for the taxpayer by third party printers. The taxpayer claimed the
§ 199 domestic production deduction for paper and printing supplies that
were manufactured in the United States. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry)
agreed with the IRS that the taxpayer's gross receipts attributable to its
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printed direct mail advertising did not qualify as domestic production gross
receipts. Citing Reg. § 1.199-3(f) the court held that where one taxpayer
performs qualifying U.S. production activity with another taxpayer, only the
taxpayer that has the "benefits and burdens" of the ownership of qualifying
production property may claim the deduction. Applying a multifactor test to
identify who had ownership of the qualifying property based on case law and
with reference to standards under § 936 the court concluded, among other
things, that title to the manufactured paper remained with the printers during
the printing process, the contract called for "manufacturing" by the printers,
the printers had possession of the manufactured material before delivery to
the taxpayer (even though the taxpayer controlled the process through its
supply of PDF and color files to the printer), the printers bore the risk of
damage before delivery of the printed material to the taxpayer, and the
printers bore the economic gain or loss on the fixed-price printing contracts.
Thus, the printers, and not the purchaser of the printed material, were the
taxpayers entitled to the § 199 deduction.
7. These fees are in the bag for the taxpayer who is
in the trade or business of being a whistleblower. Bagley v. United States,
112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-5602 (C.D. Cal. 8/5/13). The taxpayer was awarded
$27,244,000 plus statutory attorney's fees of $9,407,295 as a relator in a
False Claims Act prosecution of TRW that ultimately resulted in the
recovery of $111 million by the U.S. government. In the taxpayer's refund
suit the court concluded that the taxpayer was engaged in a trade or business
of prosecuting the litigation and that the attorney's fees were deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 162(a). The taxpayer was
actively involved with his attorneys in pursuing the claim from 1993 (when
the taxpayer was laid off by TRW) and 2003, the year of the award. The
court accepted the taxpayer's assertion that he performed the services in
order to obtain the award and thus had a good faith expectation of profit from
the venture. The taxpayer was said to conduct himself in much the same
manner as a lawyer prosecuting a lawsuit and the taxpayer's expertise as an
accountant with knowledge of TRW's systems, procedures, and where the
bodies were buried, plus his expertise with Federal Acquisition Regulations,
were critical to the government's recovery. The court observed the size and
amount of the FCA award to the taxpayer "makes it clear that it found his
expertise vital to the prosecution of these claims." The fact that the taxpayer
knew about the fraudulent claims because he participated in them before he
was laid off provided him with the knowledge and skills relevant to the
subsequent trade or business. The court further observed that the taxpayer
devoted significant time and effort to the activity that did not have
recreational or personal aspects, which evidenced an intent to derive a profit.
The court indicated that devoting effort to an opportunity to earn a single
substantial profit (without a history of similar profit and loss activity) can
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constitute a trade or business. Finally, the court concluded that the taxpayer's
activities were regular and continuous in pursuit of profit.
[I]t is indisputable that Bagley's activity as a relator
occurred over a substantial period of time, and during that
time period, Bagley devoted much of his time and energy to
the tasks and responsibilities of investigating and litigating
the FCA lawsuit. He pursued the FCA lawsuit "full time, in
good faith, and with regularity," by performing a multitude
of tasks: attending meetings, reviewing documents that had
been produced, creating and revising documents
(memoranda, summaries, and court filings), doing damage
calculations, and generally assisting his attorneys and the
government in understanding the nature of the fraudulent
claims and where they could find the documents and
witnesses necessary to effectively litigate the case. This was
not a hobby or an activity Bagley engaged in for pleasure or
amusement.
* The court also rejected the IRS's
assertion that under the origin of the claim test the taxpayer's award had its
origin in the taxpayer's role as an informer whose contribution to the qui tam
action is no different from other types of informants. The court concluded that
the origin of the qui tam action is fraud against the government and indicated
that the relator "acts as an agent or private attorney general for the government,
and is provided an award for the 'information and services' provided while
prosecuting that claim" and that the taxpayer's services had the indicia of a
business enterprise.
8. Standard mileage rate rules published in a
revenue procedure while the amounts will be disclosed in a separate
notice. Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883 (12/3/10). The IRS indicated
that beginning in 2011 it will publish mileage rates in a separate annual
notice. The revenue procedure indicated that a taxpayer may use the business
standard mileage rate to substantiate expenses for business use of an
automobile in lieu of fixed and variable costs. Parking fees and tolls are
deductible as separate items. The basis of an automobile used for business is
reduced by a per-mile amount published in the annual notice. Separate rates
are provided both for charitable use of an automobile and medical and
moving use of an automobile. The revenue procedure also provides details
for treating as substantiated a fixed and variable rate allowance for expenses
incurred by an employee in driving an automobile owned or leased by the
employee in performing services for the employer.
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a. Add one cent per mile from 2012 for 2013
(except for charitable service). Notice 2012-72, 2012-50 I.R.B. 673
(11/21/12). The standard mileage rate for business miles in 2013 goes up to
56.5 cents per mile and the medical/moving rate goes up to 24 cents per mile.
The charitable mileage rate remains fixed by § 170(i) at 14 cents.
b. And subtract one-half cent per mile from
2013 for 2014 (except for charitable service). Notice 2013-80, 2013-52
I.R.B. 821 (12/6/13). The standard mileage rate for business miles in 2014
goes down to 56 cents per mile and the medical/moving rate goes down to
232 cents per mile. Of that business mileage amount, 22 cents is treated as
depreciation for purposes of reducing basis. The standard automobile cost for
purposes of computing allowances under a fixed and variable rate (FAVR)
plan will be $28,200, and for trucks and vans, $30,400. The charitable
mileage rate remains fixed by § 170(i) at 14 cents.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. Guidance on expensing qualified real property under
§ 179 - things would be much simpler if Congress enacted legislation in
a timely manner instead of applying rules retroactively. Notice 2013-59,
2013-40 I.R.B. 297 (9/10/13). Section 179(f) permits a taxpayer to treat
"qualified real property" as § 179 property. Accordingly, taxpayers can
deduct the cost of qualified real property in the year it is placed in service,
subject to applicable limits. The American Taxpayer (and not so grand
compromise) Relief Act of 2012 extended the application of § 179(f) from
qualified real property placed in service during any taxable year beginning in
2010 or 2011 to qualified real property placed in service during any taxable
year beginning in 2010, 2011, 2012 or 2013. Although the maximum cost of
§ 179 property that a taxpayer can deduct in each of these years is $500,000
under § 179(b)(1), not more than $250,000 of the taxpayer's deductions in
each year can be attributable to qualified real property. Prior to enactment of
the ATRA of 2012, § 179(f)(4) provided that any portion of a taxpayer's §
179 deduction attributable to qualified real property that was disallowed by
the taxable income limitation of § 179(b)(3) could not be carried over to any
taxable year beginning after 2011 and required that any disallowed portion
remaining after 2011 be treated as property placed in service on the first day
of the taxpayer's last taxable year beginning in 2011 for purposes of
computing depreciation. The ATRA of 2012 amended § 179(f)(4) to provide
that any portion of a taxpayer's § 179 deduction attributable to qualified real
property that is disallowed by the taxable income limitation of § 179(b)(3)
cannot be carried over to any taxable year beginning after 2013. Thus,
taxpayers may be entitled to carry over to taxable years beginning in 2012 or
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2013 § 179 deductions attributable to qualified real property that were
previously disallowed and that the taxpayer is currently depreciating.
* The notice provides that taxpayers can
elect to deduct the cost of qualified real property for any taxable year beginning
in 2010, 2011, 2012 or 2013 by filing an original or amended return in
accordance with procedures similar to those in Reg. § 1.1 79-5(c)(2) and section
7 of Rev. Proc. 2008-54, 2008-2 C.B. 722, 725, and can increase a deduction
previously taken in those years by filing an amended return. An increase in a
deduction taken for a prior tax year is not deemed to be a revocation of the
taxpayer's § 179 election for that year.
* With respect to § 179 deductions
attributable to qualified real property that were disallowed by the taxable
income limitation of § 179(b)(3) and that a taxpayer currently is depreciating,
the notice provides that the taxpayer can continue the current treatment.
Alternatively, a taxpayer can amend the return for the last taxable year
beginning in 2011 to carry over the disallowed deductions to taxable years
beginning in 2012 or 2013, provided that the period of limitations on
assessment is still open for the year of amendment and all affected succeeding
years.
* The notice provides guidance on
allocating disallowed deductions that are carried over between qualified real
property and other § 179 property, and on the tax consequences of dispositions
and other transfers of qualified real property, including permitted
methodologies for determining the extent to which gain is treated as ordinary
income under § 1245.
2. New accounting and disposition rules for
MACRS property. T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060
(12/27/11), and REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11). The capitalization and repair regulations (discussed above)
provide significant new rules for the maintenance of multiple asset accounts
and disposition of property from MACRS single and multiple asset accounts.
* Accounting for MACRS property.
Consistent with prior rules under Reg. § 1.167-7, Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T
allows taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single asset account or
by combining multiple assets in a multiple asset account. Assets in a multiple
asset account must have been placed in service in the same taxable year, have
the same recovery period and convention. Assets that are subject to different
recovery rules or special limitations, such as automobiles, assets subject to
additional first year recovery, or property used partly for personal purposes,
may not be combined with assets subject to different recovery provisions.
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Assets with the same recovery periods and conventions may be combined in a
multiple asset account even if the assets have different uses. In addition, the
taxpayer is permitted to use as many single and multiple asset accounts as the
taxpayer may choose.
* Dispositions. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
8T(d) defines a disposition of MACRS property as occurring when the asset is
transferred or permanently withdrawn from use in the taxpayer's trade or
business or from the production of income. Thus, a disposition includes the
sale, exchange, retirement, abandonment, or destruction of an asset.
Significantly, the definition of disposition is expanded in the temporary
regulation to include the retirement of a structural component of a building.
* Gain or loss. Gain or loss on the sale,
exchange or conversion of an asset is determined under applicable tax
principles. Loss on abandonment is determined from the "adjusted depreciable
basis" of the asset (basis adjusted for depreciation). Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
8T(d). Recognized loss on other dispositions is the excess of the adjusted
depreciable basis of the asset over fair market value. Identification of the asset
disposed of from a multiple asset account, and its basis, is generally determined
from the taxpayer's records. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(e) and (f). The
temporary regulations provide rules for identifying assets if the taxpayer's
records do not do so; a first-in first-out method, a modified FIFO method, a
mortality dispersion table method, or any other method designated by the IRS.
The asset cannot be larger than a unit of property. In case of a disposition of a
structural component of a building, the structural component is the asset
disposed of. An improvement placed in service after the asset is treated as a
separate asset provided that it is not larger than the unit of property. Temp. Reg.
§ 1.168(i)-8T(c)(4)(ii)(E). Disposition of an asset in a single asset account
terminates depreciation for the asset as of the time of the disposition.
Disposition of an asset in a multiple asset account removes the asset from the
account as of the beginning of the year of disposition, requires separate
depreciation for the asset in the year of disposition, and reduction of the
depreciation reserve of the multiple asset account by the unadjusted basis of the
disposed asset as of the first day of the taxable year of the disposition. Temp.
Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(g).
* General Asset Accounts. Consistent with
prior Reg. § 1.168(i)-i, the temporary regulations provide for an election to
group assets into one or more general asset accounts. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
IT(c)(2) provides for grouping assets in a general asset account as long as the
assets have been placed in service in the same taxable year and have the same
recovery period and convention. Assets that are subject to different recovery
rules or special limitations, such as automobiles, assets subject to first year
recovery, or property used partly for personal purposes, may not be combined
with assets subject to different recovery provisions. The temporary regulations
do not include the requirement of prior regulations that general asset accounts
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include only assets in the same asset class. Assets eligible for additional first
year depreciation deductions must be grouped with assets eligible for the same
first year depreciation deductions and may not be grouped with assets not
eligible for additional first year depreciation. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
1T(c)(2)(ii)(D) and (E). The temporary regulations expand existing rules for
dispositions of assets from a general asset account to encompass as a
disposition the retirement of a structural component of a building. As under
existing rules, the temporary regulations treat the basis of any asset disposed of
from a general asset account as zero, and any amount realized results in
ordinary gain. The taxpayer continues to deprecate assets in the general asset
account as if no disposition occurred. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-iT(e)(2).
However, consistent with existing regulations, the temporary regulations allow
a taxpayer to elect to terminate general asset account treatment on disposition of
an asset in a qualifying disposition, in which case gain or loss is recognized
under the rules of Temp. Reg. § 1. 168(i)-8T. The list of qualifying dispositions
is expanded generally to include any disposition. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
1T(e)(3). In addition, general asset accounts are terminated in certain
nonrecognition dispositions and on termination of a partnership under
§ 708(b)(1)(B). Gain or loss may also be recognized on disposition of all of the
assets, or the last asset, in a general asset account. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
IT (e)(3) (ii).
a. IRS specifies the procedures for adopting
new accounting methods under the Temporary Regulations relating to
depreciation of tangible property. Rev. Proc. 2012-20, 2012-14 I.R.B. 700
(3/7/12), modifying Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1 C.B. 330. The IRS has
provided lengthy and detailed rules regarding automatic changes in methods
of accounting under Temp. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-4T (amortizing or depreciating
leasehold improvements), 1.168(i)-1T (rules for general asset accounts),
1.168(i)-7T (accounting for MACRS property), and 1.168(i)-8T (dispositions
of MACRS property), all added by T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property,
76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11). The automatic change of accounting method of
Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1 C.B. 330, is applicable to property placed in
service in a taxable year ending after 12/29/03. With respect to assets placed
in service in a taxable year ending before 12/30/03, adopting the methods of
the temporary regulations requires an amended return for open years
including the placed in service years and all subsequent years. No § 481
adjustment is required or permitted with respect to the amended returns.
b. LB&I provides guidance under Rev.
Proc. 2012-20. LB&I-4-0312-004 (3/15/12). This directive to the field
applies to taxpayers who adopted a method of accounting relating to the
conversion of capitalized assets to repair expense under § 263(a).
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c. Have your clients been wasting time
trying to comply with the Temporary Regulations in 2012? Yes, they
have. Further guidance announcing that pending final regulations will
apply only in years beginning in 2014 and thereafter. Notice 2012-73,
2012-51 I.R.B. 713 (11/20/12). The IRS announced that pending final
regulations will apply to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/14, but that
taxpayers will be permitted to apply the final regulations to taxable years
beginning on or after 1/1/12. The notice also indicates that the temporary
regulations may be revised with respect to the de minimis rule of § 1.263(a)-
2T(g); dispositions under §§ 1.168(i)-iT and 1.168(i)-8T; and the Safe
Harbor for Routine Maintenance under § 1.263(a)-3T(g).
d. Technical amendments so revise the
Temporary Regulations. More important, the effective date of the
12/27/11 temporary regulations is delayed to years beginning on or after
1/1/14, with optional retroactive applicability. T.D. 9564, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible
Property, 77 F.R. 74583 (12/17/12).
e. New, new rules relating to accounting for
MACRS property. T.D. 9636, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 78 F.R. 57686
(9/19/13). The Treasury Department and IRS have promulgated final
regulations under § 168 for the maintenance of multiple asset accounts that
were proposed in REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11), and replacing the temporary regulations promulgated in T.D.
9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures
Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11). Consistent with
prior rules under Reg. § 1.167-7, and Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T, final Reg.§ 1.168(i)-7 allows taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single
asset account or by combining multiple assets in a multiple asset account.
Assets in a multiple asset account must have been placed in service in the
same taxable year, and have the same recovery period and convention.
Assets that are subject to different recovery rules or special limitations, such
as automobiles, assets subject to additional first year recovery, or property
used partly for personal purposes, may not be combined with assets subject
to different recovery provisions. Assets with the same recovery periods and
conventions may be combined in a multiple asset account even if the assets
have different uses. In addition, the taxpayer is permitted to use as many
single and multiple asset accounts as the taxpayer may choose. The new
provisions are effective for years beginning after 1/1/14 with an election to
apply them retroactively to years beginning on or after 1//1/12. A taxpayer
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may choose to apply Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T to taxable years beginning on
or after 1/1/12, and before 1/1/14.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-1T(c), dealing
with general asset accounts and Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(d), dealing with
dispositions, both of which were promulgated in T.D. 9564 (12/27/11), and
proposed in REG-168745-03 (12/27/11) have not been replaced by final
regulations.
3. No chickening out of the allocation agreement in
an applicable asset acquisition - even after a cost segregation study.
Peco Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-18 (1/17/12). The
taxpayer entered into an agreement with the sellers of two poultry processing
plants that allocated a large portion of the purchase price to processing plants
on which the taxpayer claimed depreciation deductions as nonresidential real
property with a MACRS life of 39 years. The agreements separately listed
agreed-upon prices for land, buildings, and machinery and equipment.
Subsequently, after a cost segregation study, the taxpayer attempted to
change its method of accounting to separate out components of the buildings
as equipment and machinery and claim accelerated depreciation on the basis
of shorter MACRS recovery periods. The Tax Court (Judge Laro) held that
under Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967), and
§ 1060, unless the taxpayer could show fraud, undue influence, duress, etc.,
the taxpayer was bound by the purchase price allocation agreement. The
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that nothing in § 1060 precluded the
taxpayer from segregating components of assets broadly described as a
production plant into components consisting of the real property and related
equipment and machinery. The court also refused to accept the taxpayer's
assertion that the agreements with the sellers should be disregarded because
the use of the terms "processing plant building" and "real property
improvements" were ambiguous. Finally the court agreed with the IRS that
the IRS did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting the taxpayer from adopting
depreciation schedules that were inconsistent with the terms of the purchase
agreements.
a. And the Court of Appeals plucks the
taxpayer too. Peco Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner, 522 Fed. Appx. 840 (11th
Cir. 7/2/13). In a decision by Judge Hill, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
Tax Court's decision. The Court of Appeals noted that (1) "both agreements
contain the statement that the original allocation shall be used 'for all
purposes (including financial accounting and tax purposes),"' (2) "[t]he
parties allocated the purchase price among three assets: 'Real Property:
Land,' 'Real Property: Improvements,' and 'Machinery, Equipment,
Furnitures [sic] and Fixtures,"' (3) Peco intended "Processing Plant
Building" to be treated as a single asset when it entered into the agreement,
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and (4) the term "processing plant building" in the agreements was
unambiguous.
4. The taxpayer's basis in the Three Mile Island
nuclear power plant is melted away by the China Syndrome; nuclear
decommissioning liabilities are not included in the purchaser's basis
until there is economic performance. Amergen Energy Co. v. United
States, 113 Fed. Cl. 52 (10/8/13). The taxpayer purchased three nuclear
power plants and assumed liability for decommissioning costs in future
years. In each transaction, the taxpayer received decommissioning trust
funds. In one case the cash purchase price was approximately $23,000,000
(plus $77,000,000 in five annual installments for nuclear fuel) and the
liabilities exceeded $530,000,000; the decommissioning trust fund was
approximately $331,000,000. In a second transaction, the cash price was
approximately $20,000,000 and the liabilities exceeded $600,000,000; the
decommissioning trust fund was approximately $235,000,000. In the third
transaction, the cash price was $10,000,000 and the liabilities exceeded
$550,000,000; the decommissioning trust fund was approximately
$437,000,000. The only issue was whether Amergen could include a portion
of the decommissioning costs to be paid in the future in the depreciable cost
basis of the nuclear power plants. The IRS had previously refused to give
Amergen a private letter ruling that it could take into account in computing
the depreciable cost basis of the nuclear power plants the decommissioning
costs to be paid in the future. Amergen argued that only § 1012 was relevant
and that the liabilities could be taken into account in basis immediately. The
government argued that the all events test of § 461 and the "economic
performance" test of § 461(h) controlled the date on which the liabilities
could be taken into account. On summary judgment, the Court of Federal
Claims (Judge Bush) held for the government. The court reasoned that the
plain language of § 461(h) does not limit its application to deductions, but
provides that it applies to "any item." Thus, § 461(h) "is of general
applicability," and applies to determine when liabilities are incurred for the
purpose of cost basis calculations. The court's conclusion was reinforced by
its reading of the legislative history of § 461(h) in H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, pt.
2, at 1254-55 (1984), which included a reference to "capital items," that the
court concluded "show[ed] Congress' concern with the time value of money
and revenue losses due to attempts by taxpayers to claim the premature
accrual of liabilities, as well as with the administrative challenges of
providing a system for the discounted valuation of liabilities that will be
satisfied in the future. Second, and more importantly, Congress understood
that these concerns were present not only in the timing of deductions for
expenses but also in the timing of the accounting of liabilities relevant to
capital items." Furthermore, the court held that the matrix of applicable
regulations under § § 263, 446, and 461 - particularly Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2)(i),
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which requires economic performance before an item is includable in basis -
were entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and clearly applied the three-
pronged test of § 461 to assumed liabilities for purposes of determining
§ 1012 cost basis. Finally, the court rejected Amergen's last ditch argument
that economic performance had occurred at the time the plants were
purchased because the sellers had "provided property" to it and indicated that
economic performance of decommissioning costs does not occur before the
nuclear plants are shut down and decommissioning costs are incurred.
* Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(c)(1), as amended in
2013, provides that "In the case of a taxpayer using an accrual method of
accounting, the terms amount paid and payment mean a liability incurred
(within the meaning of § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)). A liability may not be taken into
account under this section prior to the taxable year during which the liability is
incurred." Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) provides that "a liability is incurred, and
generally is taken into account for Federal income tax purposes, in the taxable
year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability,
the amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy, and
economic performance has occurred with respect to the liability."
F. Credits
1. Fifty ways to determine when construction begins.
Notice 2013-29, 2013-20 I.R.B. 1085 (4/15/13). The American Taxpayer
(and not so grand compromise) Relief Act of 2012 extended the renewable
electricity production tax credit of § 45 and the elective § 48 alternative
investment tax credit for electricity produced at a qualified facility if
construction of the facility is commenced before 1/1/14. Qualified facilities
include wind facilities, closed-loop biomass facilities, open-loop biomass
facilities, geothermal facilities, landfill gas facilities, trash facilities,
hydropower facilities, and marine and hydrokinetic facilities. The notice
provides that a taxpayer can demonstrate that construction has commenced
by establishing that "physical work of a significant nature" is undertaken, or
by meeting a safe harbor that five percent of the cost of a project is incurred
before 1/1/14. The IRS may determine that construction has not commenced
if the taxpayer does not maintain a continuous program of work. Significant
physical work includes excavating foundations and the manufacture of
components under a binding written contract that are not components held in
inventory by the vendor. Significant physical work includes work on
component parts of multiple facilities that will be treated as single project
that are integral to the project, such as roads, but not fences or buildings.
Significant physical work does not include preliminary work such as
planning, design or licensing activities. The safe harbor is available if the
taxpayer incurs five percent or more of the total cost of a facility before
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1/1/14, and the taxpayer makes continuous progress towards completion of
the facility as indicated by relevant facts and circumstances specified in the
notice.
* Woe to the taxpayer who incurs cost
overruns so that the pre-1/1/14 expenses do not amount to the requisite five
percent. The safe harbor is not satisfied if total costs of the facility cause the
amount incurred before 1/1/14, to be less than five percent of total cost.
However, the credits may be claimed on some but not all of the facilities
constituting a single project.
2. Funded versus unfunded research for the § 41
credit. Geosyntec Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-
5488 (S.D. Fla. 4/15/13). A magistrate judge granted summary judgment to
the taxpayer and IRS on issues relating to whether research was funded or
unfunded for purposes of the § 41 20 percent credit for increased research
expenditures. Under § 41(d)(4)(H) the research credit is not available to a
taxpayer if another party has funded otherwise qualifying research. Reg.§ 1.41-4A(d) provides that, "Amounts payable under any agreement that are
contingent on the success of the research and thus considered to be paid for
the product or result of the research (see § 1.41-2(e)(2)) are not treated as
funding. ..." Reg. § 1.41-4A(d)(1)(iii) provides that an expense is incurred
for qualified research under an agreement with third parties only if the
agreement requires the taxpayer to bear the expense even if the research is
not successful. Fairchild Industries, Inc. v. U.S., 71 F.3d 868, 870 (Fed. Cir.
1995), interprets these regulations to allocate "the tax credit to the person
that bears the financial risk of failure of the research to produce the desired
product or result." The magistrate judge held that research expenditures
incurred under the taxpayer's fixed price contracts were eligible for the
research credit, and that the research was not subject to funded contracts.
Under those contracts the taxpayer was obligated to perform environmental
clean-up activities for a fixed price subject to approval of the client. The
court observed that, "The nature of fixed-price contracts makes them
inherently risky to contractors. Under these types of contracts, to the extent a
contractor's performance is unsuccessful, the contractor must remedy the
performance without additional compensation. Thus, these contracts
generally place maximum economic risk on contractors who ultimately bear
responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss." The magistrate judge
also held that research performed under "capped" contracts was funded
research. The capped contracts provided for reimbursement of costs up to a
capped amount. The court indicated that, "A distinctive feature of the capped
contracts at issue is that each one obligates the client to reimburse [taxpayer]
for pre-defined tasks at pre-defined rates in accordance with a detailed
project budget." The magistrate judge indicated that the capped contracts
were similar to cost plus contracts that placed the risk of failed research on
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the client, and thus were funded contracts that did not cause the taxpayer to
incur research expenditures eligible for the credit.
3. And the IRS gets ready to start administering
national health care. REG-1 13792-13, Tax Credit for Employee Health
Insurance Expenses of Small Employers, 78 F.R. 52719 (8/26/13). The IRS
and Treasury have published Prop Reg. §§ 1.45R-1 through 1.45R-5, which
provide comprehensive guidance regarding the § 45R credit, enacted as part
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, available to certain small
employers that offer health insurance coverage to their employees. The
regulations are proposed to be effective for years beginning after 12/31/13.
However, employers may rely on the proposed regulations for years
beginning after 12/31/13, and before 12/31/14.
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. Hurry to get in line for Qualified Advanced
Energy Project credits. Notice 2013-12, 2013-10 I.R.B. 543 (2/7/13). The
IRS has announced that phase II of § 48C credits for establishing a
manufacturing facility to produce advanced energy property will provide an
allocation of $150,228,397 of credits. Section 48C(a) provides a 30 percent
credit for investment in the taxable year in a qualifying advanced energy
project certified by the IRS on recommendation by the Department of
Energy. The maximum credit for any project is $30 million. A concept paper
must be submitted to DOE (electronically) by 4/9/13. If invited by DOE, the
§ 48C application must be submitted by 7/23/13. The DOE will rank
applications. The highest ranked application will receive the full $30 million
credit, down the list until the amount of available credits is exhausted.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1. Should the IRS tighten banks' bad debt
deductions? Notice 2013-35, 2013-24 I.R.B. 1240 (5/20/13). The IRS is
asking for comments about whether the conclusive presumptions of Reg.
§ 1.166-2(d) regarding worthless bad debts should be revised in light of
changes in banking regulation. Reg. §§ 1.166-2(d)(1) and (3) provide
conclusive presumptions that bank's bad debts are worthless if either (1) a
bank or other regulated corporation charges off a debt in obedience to a
specific order or in conformity with established polices of the regulatory
authority which confirms the charge-off, or (2) under the book conformity
method a bank applies loan loss classification standards that are consistent
with regulatory loan loss classification standards of the bank regulator. The
conclusive presumptions are based on a policy that there is sufficient
similarity between tax standards for the deduction and regulatory standards
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used to identify a loan that should be charged off. However, in 2004 bank
regulators, relying on FASB pronouncements, determined that a security is
deemed impaired if its fair value is less than its amortized costs and allowing
a charge-off if the difference is other than temporary. In addition, under 2009
FASB guidance, with respect to debt held to maturity the portion of loss
related to credit loss is recognized on the income statement while loss
attributable to other factors is reported directly on the balance sheet. Among
other things, the notice requests comments on whether the bank regulatory
standards are sufficiently similar to worthless bad debt standards under § 166
and whether the conclusive presumption standards should be modified or
replaced.
2. To successfully call it a loan, ya gotta prove that
ya expected to be repaid. Shaw v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-170
(7/24/13). The taxpayer was the bookkeeper and chief financial officer of a
family corporation owned by herself, her mother, and her siblings. She
loaned the corporation over $800,000 under a revolving line of credit,
evidenced by an unsecured promissory note, with adequate interest and a
specified due date. The funds were to be used to develop a real estate project.
At the time the line of credit was established and the funds were advanced,
the corporation was encountering financial difficulties, cash flow was tight,
and not all creditors could be paid. By the end of the year in which the funds
had been advanced, the development project had been "cancelled." The Tax
Court (Judge Lauber) sustained the IRS's denial of a worthless debt
deduction, finding that there was no bona fide debt; the advances either
constituted equity or were gifts to the other family-member shareholders.
The taxpayer (1) presented no documentary evidence of the corporation's
creditworthiness, (2) did not request collateral despite the corporation's
"questionable financial status," and (3) did not insist on financial covenants
that would condition future line-of-credit advances on the corporation's
adherence to specified income, net worth, or debt-to-equity benchmarks. The
taxpayer's "behavior over the course of 2009 was likewise inconsistent with
what one would expect from a third-party lender." As the corporation's
"finances became more precarious ... rather than moderate her advances, [the
taxpayer] left the spigot open." Finally, the taxpayer made no serious effort
to obtain repayment of the advances - "she did not send a letter demanding
payment; she did not contact an attorney; and she did not file suit. ... [A]
creditor with a genuine expectation of repayment would have acted more
aggressively." Finally, assuming arguendo that the advances were a loan, the
taxpayer introduced no evidence of identifiable events indicating
worthlessness.
3. Texas professors denied bad debt deductions for
related entity loans. Herrera v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-308
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(11/5/12). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) denied business bad debt
deductions under § 166 for advances by one LLC (HSA) to its sister (MTI),
both of which were owned by two University of Texas El Paso engineering
professors who used the LLCs for consulting and metal fabrication activities.
The LLC independently borrowed funds in its own name that were
transferred to its related manufacturing entity to pay down a letter of credit
originally entered into by both entities. Citing the 13 factors identified by the
Fifth Circuit in Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1984), the court found that advances were not bona fide debt, stressing the
lack of a promissory note, the lack of a definitive maturity date, the lack of a
repayment schedule, de facto subordination of the debt to other creditors, the
absence of a requirement for security, and the fact that the source of payment
was tied to the fortunes of the business. The court stressed the fact that no
interest was paid as being particularly important.
a. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Herrera v.
Commissioner, 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-6858 (5th Cir. 11/11/13). The court
rejected the taxpayer's additional argument, which was not addressed by the
Tax Court, that HSA had agreed to substitute its own note for that of its sister
entity and payment of the debt was deductible as a business bad debt under
Reg. § 1.166-9(e)(2), which provides that payment as a guarantor or
indemnitor under a right of subrogation constitutes a business bad debt.
Reiterating the findings of the Tax Court, the court indicated that there was
no enforceable duty on the taxpayer to make the payment and that HSA's
payments were on its own loan.
4. It's now impossible as a matter of law to abandon
a capital asset. W(h)ither the "sale or exchange" requirement. Pilgrim's
Pride Corp. v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 17 (12/11/13). In 1999, the
taxpayer purchased certain stock and securities issued by Southern States
Cooperative for $98.6 million. In 2004, Southern States offered to redeem
the stock and securities for less than the taxpayer had paid for them. The
taxpayer wanted approximately $39 million, but Southern States was willing
to pay only $20 million. The negotiations ended without an agreement and
the taxpayer "abandoned" the securities and claimed a $98.6 million ordinary
loss deduction. The IRS disallowed the ordinary loss deduction and treated
the loss as capital. The Tax Court (Judge Dawson) upheld the IRS's position.
The stock and securities were capital assets and § 1234A required that the
loss be treated as capital. Section 1234A provides that:
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse,
expiration, or other termination of-
(1) a right or obligation (other than a
securities futures contract, as defined in
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section 1234B) with respect to property
which is (or on acquisition would be) a
capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer, or
(2) a section 1256 contract (as defined in
section 1256) not described in paragraph (1)
which is a capital asset in the hands of the
taxpayer,
shall be treated as gain or loss from the sale of a capital
asset. The preceding sentence shall not apply to the
retirement of any debt instrument (whether or not through a
trust or other participation arrangement).
* Judge Dawson reasoned that "[s]hares of
stock are intangible interests or rights that the owner has in the management,
profits, and assets of a corporation, while the certificate of stock is tangible
evidence of the stock ownership of the person designated therein and of the
rights and liabilities resulting from such ownership," and that Congress
intended "section 1234A to [apply to] terminations of all rights and obligations
with respect to property that is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer or
would be if acquired by the taxpayer, including not only derivative contract
rights but also property rights arising from the ownership of the property."
* The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that an ordinary loss was allowable under Reg. § 1.165-2(a), because
Reg. § 1.165-2(b) disallowed the loss as the surrender of the stock and
securities was deemed to be a loss from a sale or exchange of a capital asset
pursuant to section 1234A. It also noted that Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239,
which allowed an ordinary loss deduction upon the abandonment of a
partnership interest in a partnership that had no debt, was issued four years
before § 1234A was amended in 1997 to apply to all property that is (or would
be if acquired) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer, and thus it did not
carry any weight.
I. AT-RISK AND PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES
1. Section 183 is a more powerful sword for the IRS
than § 469. Disallowance is more powerful than basketing. Pederson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-54 (2/20/13). The Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) upheld the IRS's application of § 183 to disallow losses claimed with
respect to an investment in a marketed horse breeding "program" in which
the taxpayer had no direct involvement. The taxpayer did not have a good-
faith belief that the horse breeding activity would turn an overall profit; the
amount invested was based principally on the amount necessary to produce
the desired tax losses; and participation in the breeding program was almost
entirely motivated by tax benefits purportedly available to the taxpayer
through such participation.
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2. Judge Morrison finds an honest taxpayer.
Montgomery v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-151 (6/17/13). Temp. Reg.
§ 1.469-5T(f)(4) provides that the extent of an individual's participation in
an activity may be established by any reasonable means. "'Reasonable
means' ... include but are not limited to the identification of services
performed over a period of time and the approximate number of hours spent
performing such services during such period, based on appointment books,
calendars, or narrative summaries." However, "contemporaneous daily time
reports, logs, or similar documents are not required if the extent of such
participation may be established by other reasonable means." In the instant
case, however, Judge Morrison held that material participation had been
established without any such documentary evidence being introduced. The
taxpayers established material participation by their credible testimony
providing details of the nature of the activities they conducted in starting and
managing a business. They founded the company, negotiated contracts, hired
250 employees, and conducted daily business, "work[ing] on the business
'day in and day out."'
* This case is notable because in most cases
claims of material participation without written documentation fall on deaf ears
in the courts. See, e.g., Bailey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-296 (2001)
(log book of visits to rental real estate that did not include contemporaneous
record of hours devoted to real estate activity was not sufficient to substantiate
that taxpayer devoted requisite number of hours to real estate business;
uncorroborated estimates of hours required to perform activities were unreliable
because they were prepared years later in anticipation of litigation); D'Avanzo
v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 39 (2005) (taxpayer did not offer contemporaneous
written record of number of hours he spent performing personal services with
respect to rental properties; noncontemporaneous log book of hours claimed to
have been devoted to real estate activities and testimony at trial, alone, are
inadequate evidence to establish that taxpayer devoted requisite number of
hours to real estate business activities), aff'd by order, 215 Fed. Appx. 996
(Fed. Cir. 2007); Lee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-193 (2006) (full-time
physician and full-time IRS employee could not establish that they worked
more than one half of their time in their real estate partnership business;
noncontemporaneous time logs submitted at trial that more than doubled hours
in log books submitted during audit were not credible); Goolsby v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-64 (2010) (activity log purporting to
document hours of management activity was not credible; it was created after
taxpayer's return was selected for audit and solely for purposes of the case;
taxpayer had no contemporaneous records, such as appointment books,
calendars, or narrative summaries to support activity log; "[i]ncredibly, the ...
activity log lists days during which [the taxpayer] allegedly logged more than
24 hours of work").
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a. A "ballpark guesstimate" doesn't let you
sing X' Yankee Doodle Dandy.I. Merino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-167 (7/16/13). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held that the taxpayer
failed to prove that he was a real estate professional who materially
participated in a real property rental activity, thereby escaping the passive
activity loss limitations by way of § 469(c)(7). The taxpayer's only evidence
was his own "summary of hours" that was prepared "using his estimates and
his memory as to how much time he spent on certain tasks with respect to the
real estate rental activity." It "was not created from contemporaneous
documentation, but rather it [was] a postevent reconstruction from memory,"
that was "less of an approximation and more of a 'ballpark guesstimate."'
b. The Tax Court continues to be hard-
nosed regarding contemporaneous records of hours devoted to activities
to avoid section 469. Bartlett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013-182
(8/8/13). The Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) rejected a "guesstimate" of hours
worked on a ranch. The lack of any contemporaneous records or other
records and documentation regarding what the taxpayer specifically did day-
to-day and how much time he spent on matters relating to the activity was
not cured by estimates made years after the fact in writing or by testimony.
3. Borrowed funds contributed to S corporation
cellular company were neither at-risk nor did they create basis for loss
deductions. Broz v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 46 (9/1/11). In a structure
typical for the industry, the taxpayer was the shareholder of two S
corporations, RFB and Alpine, that held FCC licenses to operate cellular
networks in rural areas. RFB held licenses directly and was the original
business. Alpine and Alpine LLC, a single member LLC owned by the
taxpayer, were formed to expand the business. Additional licenses were
obtained and held by a number of LLCs (partnerships) that were owned 99
percent by the taxpayer and 1 percent by his brother. Alpine and the LLCs
were formed at the insistence of creditors to isolate the liabilities of the thinly
capitalized expansion. RFB owned and operated all of the equipment. Alpine
and the LLCs owned only licenses, and RFB allocated some of its income to
Alpine for use of the licenses. RFB obtained financing to construct cellular
equipment and for working capital, and re-lent some of the loan proceeds to
Alpine. Alpine and the taxpayer documented the loans from RFB to Alpine
as shareholder loans. The taxpayer pledged RFB stock for the loans, but did
not guarantee the loans, which were also secured by corporate assets.
* First, for purposes of determining the
taxpayer's basis in Alpine, for purposes of applying the § 1366(d) limitation on
passed-through losses, the court (Judge Kroupa) held that (1) the taxpayer had
not established that he had borrowed money from the bank that he personally
re-lent to Alpine because RFB did not advance the funds to Alpine on the
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taxpayer's behalf, i.e., the loan ran directly from RFB to Alpine; and (2) the
taxpayer had not made any "economic outlay." Thus, the loans were not
included in the shareholder's basis to support loss deductions.
* Second, for purposes of determining the
taxpayer's at-risk amount with respect to Alpine, in what was described as an
issue of first impression, the court held that the RFB stock pledged for the loans
represented pledged property used in the business not eligible to be treated as an
amount at-risk by virtue of § 465(b)(2)(A). Since Alpine was formed to expand
RFB's cellular networks, the pledged RFB stock was related to Alpine's
business. Thus, because the shareholder did not guarantee the loans to Alpine,
the shareholder was not economically or actually at-risk with respect to his
involvement with Alpine.
* Third, the court held that Alpine could
not deduct interest, expenses, and depreciation during the years at issue because
it was not yet engaged in an active trade or business utilizing the licenses it
held. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that operation of cellular
networks by RFB could be attributed to Alpine. Acquisition of licenses and
related equipment was not sufficient to establish Alpine as engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business. Alpine failed to attach the required statement to
the return for the taxable year to claim § 195 amortization of start-up expenses
[which it could not have deducted even if it had attached the form because it
had not yet commenced business operations].
* Fourth, in another issue that the court
described as one of first impression, the court concluded that deductions under
§ 197 for amortization of the costs of FCC licenses were not available in years
in which the taxpayers was not yet engaged in a trade or business. The court
concluded that the language of § 197 that provides the deduction "in connection
with the conduct of a trade or business" requires that the intangibles "must be
used in connection with a business that is being conducted."
a. "Losses are not tested under the at-risk
rules until the shareholder has sufficient basis to deduct them." Broz v.
Commissioner, 727 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 8/23/13). The Sixth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Rogers, affirmed, holding that the Tax Court correctly
determined that the taxpayer did not have sufficient basis in Alpine to
support the claimed passed-through losses. The court also upheld denial of
the claimed § 162 expenses and § 197 amortization deductions for the
license-holding entities because those entities were not engaged in an active
trade or business. The court did not reach the at-risk issue.
* With respect to the § 1366(d) loss
limitation issue, the Sixth Circuit found that there was no evidence that at the
time the loan to Alpine was made the debt was intended to run directly from
Alpine to either Broz or his wholly owned LLC. It was intended to run from
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Alpine to RFB. "After-the-fact reclassification cannot satisfy the requirement
that the debt run directly from the S corporation to the taxpayer/shareholder."
Because Broz had insufficient basis to support any passed-through loss
deductions, the court did not reach the § 465 at-risk issue, stating that "losses
are not tested under the at-risk rules until the shareholder has sufficient basis to
deduct them." In dictum that followed, the court noted that "the at-risk limit in §
465 and the basis limit in § 1366(d) are functionally almost identical in the S
corporation context."
* Turning to the § 162 expense deductions,
the court held that "each entity's activity must be evaluated individually and not
in conjunction with any other entity." Thus, Alpine's and the LLC's activities
could not be amalgamated with RFB's activities. Viewed individually, neither
Alpine nor the LLCs conducted any business during the year. Broz chose to
employ separate entities for a business reason and could not have "'the best of
both worlds' by having the Alpine entities treated as separate for purposes of
avoiding or distinguishing liabilities, but treated as one entity together with
RFB for tax purposes."
* Finally, turning to the § 197 amortization
deductions, the court held that amortization deductions "do not begin upon
acquisition of the intangible asset if the intangible asset is not yet held in
connection with the conduct of a trade or business, because the assets are in that
case not eligible as 'amortizable section 197 intangibles."' The court noted that
although § 197(a) provides that the deduction is calculated beginning with the
month in which the intangible asset is acquired, it allows the deduction only for
"amortizable section 197 intangibles," which are defined in § 197(c) as
intangible assets "held in connection with the conduct of a trade or business."
Because the Alpine license-holding entities never actually leased the licenses to
Broz's other businesses, the licenses were never held in connection with a trade
or business that was actually being conducted. Thus, the licenses did not qualify
as "amortizable section 197 intangibles," and were ineligible for amortization
deductions.
III. INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME
A. Gains and Losses
1. What! You mean my money market fund might
lose money - a proposed de minimis exception from de mickeymouse
wash sale rules for money market fund losses. Notice 2013-48, 2013-31
I.R.B. 120 (7/3/13). This Notice proposes a revenue procedure that would
provide a de minimis exception to the § 1091 wash sale rules for certain
redemptions of shares of money market funds that, under regulations
proposed by the SEC, would no longer maintain a constant share price.
Under the proposed revenue procedure, if a taxpayer realizes a loss upon a
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redemption of shares in such a find, and the amount of the loss is not more
than 0.5 percent of the taxpayer's basis in the shares, the IRS will treat the
loss as not subject to § 1091. The purpose of the de minimis rules is to
mitigate tax compliance burdens that may result from the changes in money
market fund redemption prices. If the SEC does not adopt its proposed rules
in substantially the same form as they have been proposed, the revenue
procedure proposed by the Notice might not be adopted or might be adopted
in a materially modified form.
2. Caught in the zero basis trap for lack of adequate
records of stock purchase price. This case is too bad to be true. United
States v. Youngquist, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-2293 (Magistrate D. Or.
4/17/13), adopted by the court, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-2467 (D. Ore. 6/21/13).
The District Court (Judge Brown) adopted Magistrate Judge Papak's findings
and recommendations and held that a taxpayer's basis in stock sold through
one of his brokerage accounts was zero because the taxpayer introduced no
evidence of the cost of any particular block of shares sold, citing Coloman v.
Commissioner, 540 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1976). The taxpayer's evidence of the
amount deposited as the opening cash balance of the brokerage account did
not suffice to prove the basis of any block of stock. Cohan v. Commissioner,
39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), did not apply to allow an estimate of the basis of
any of the shares because no authority supported an "aggregate theory of
proving basis."
Taxpayer began his day trading in the
brokerage account in question on November 5, 1996 and closed the account on
December 20, 1996; nevertheless the IRS found, and the court concluded, that
he had $1,456,076 of income from the account during that period.
3. Section 1014 means what it says. Lower estate tax
today may mean higher income tax tomorrow. Van Alen v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-235 (10/21/13). The taxpayers were the
beneficiaries of a trust that was the residuary beneficiary of a decedent's
estate. The estate made a special farm use valuation election under § 2032A.
Section 1014 provides fair market value at the time of the decedent's death
for heirs and beneficiaries, but § 1014(b)(3)(A) requires use of the estate tax
value in the case of a special farm use valuation election under § 2032A,
which values the land at its then current use as agricultural land. Reg.
§ 1.1014-3(a) provides that the value of property at the date of death will be
the value as appraised for purposes of the Federal estate tax or the alternate
value, whichever is applicable. On the sale of a conservation easement on the
inherited ranch land by the trust, the Tax Court (Judge Holmes) required the
taxpayers to compute their distributive shares of the gain using as basis the
lower estate tax value reported under the § 2032A election. The court held
that the taxpayers had a "duty of consistency," because as residuary
284 [Vol. 15:5
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
beneficiaries of the trust, they had an economic interest in the lower estate
tax valuation and benefitted from the lower estate tax valuation. He rejected
their argument that the lower estate tax valuation should not be used because
it was erroneous and because the taxpayers did not understand the
implications of the reporting position. In addition, the taxpayers'
inconsistency led to accuracy related penalties.
4. You can't have your cake and eat it too. Moore v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-249 (10/30/13). In a somewhat convoluted
transaction, the taxpayer purchased some stock of his employer S corporation
from another shareholder and paid for the stock with a promissory note for
approximately $5.8 million. The taxpayer agreed to the purchase price on the
basis of information that the corporation had provided to him and the
corporation's promise that it would lend him the funds for the purchase price.
To settle a suit to rescind the loan agreement because of a mutual mistake as
to the value of the shares, the corporation reduced the debt to $1,000,000.
When the taxpayer subsequently sold the shares for $3 million, the question
was the taxpayer's initial stock basis, before taking into account § 1367
adjustments (which were to be left to Rule 155 computation). The taxpayer
reported a loss of approximately $1.5 million and the IRS asserted a
deficiency based on a $2 million gain. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton)
sustained the IRS's position. Judge Thornton concluded that there was no
"absolute indebtedness."
The economic reality of the transactions in question, viewed
in their totality, was that Mr. Moore agreed to purchase Mr.
Baker's ATS shares as an accommodation to ATS, with an
understanding that ATS' funds would be used to pay the
nominal purchase price. According to Mr. Moore's own
allegations in his subsequent lawsuit against ATS, there was
no expectation that he should pay out of his own funds more
than the true economic value of the shares, which both he
and ATS ultimately agreed was only $1 million.
* Judge Thornton noted that this result was
consistent with the IRS's conclusion in the course of auditing the taxpayer's
return for the year the debt was reduced to $1 million that the taxpayer had not
realized any COD income. The holding regarding basis in the year of the sale
produced symmetry with the earlier year.
* A § 6662 penalty was not upheld because
the court found that the taxpayer had reasonably and in good faith relied on his
tax advisors in taking the return position.
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B. Interest, Dividends, and Other Current Income
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
D. Section 121
There were no significant developments regarding this
topic during 2013.
E. Section 1031
1. Rental property occupied by the taxpayer's son was
investment property, not personal-use property. Adams v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2013-7 (1/10/13). The taxpayer engaged in a deferred like-kind
exchange through an intermediary in which he surrendered a property held
for rental and acquired a new residential property that was dilapidated and in
need of rehabilitation. The taxpayer and his son entered into an agreement
whereby the son and his family could live in the new house after renovations.
The son and his family worked on the house an aggregate of 60 hours per
week for three months before moving in. The son and his family bore all of
the rehabilitation expenses; their services were worth $3,600. After three
months of work, the son's family moved in, resided in the house for three
years, and paid rent that was a few hundred dollars per month less than the
fair rental value. The IRS took the position that the transaction was not a
§ 1031 like-kind exchange because the taxpayer acquired the new house for
personal purposes - i.e., "with the intention of letting his son and family live
there at below market rent" - and that the taxpayer thus must recognize gain
on the sale. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) found that the taxpayer had
acquired the new house for investment purposes and that the transaction thus
qualified as a § 1031 like-kind exchange. Furthermore, the limitations on
deductions imposed by § 280A did not apply to the new house rented to the
son. Pursuant to § 280A(d)(2), a taxpayer is treated as using a dwelling unit
during the taxable year as a residence if the taxpayer rents the dwelling unit
to a family member, unless the taxpayer rents the dwelling unit to the family
member "at a fair rental" and for use as that family member's principal
residence. The son used the residence as his principal residence and,
although the $1,200 per month cash rent was slightly below market, it was
286 [Vol. 15:5
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
fair rent considering the work that the son had performed with respect to the
house. Thus the § 280A(a) prohibition of deductions for dwelling units used
as residences did not apply.
2. Swapping both a personal residence and business
property for a new personal residence and business property invokes
both § 1031 and § 121 and provides a computational challenge. Yates III
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013-28 (1/24/13). Through a qualified
intermediary, the taxpayers exchanged a property that qualified as a principal
residence under § 121 and a business property for a new principal residence
and two business properties. The issues in the case dealt mainly with the
proper valuations of the properties, which determined the amount of gain
realized that was not sheltered by § 1031; and there is nothing noteworthy
about the valuation determinations. The important point of the case is that the
Tax Court (Judge Goeke) applied Reg. § 1.1031(j)-1(a)(1), which provides
that where multiple properties are transferred in a like-kind exchange, the
properties are separated and arranged for analysis into "exchange groups"
based on shared characteristics. A "residual group" is created if the aggregate
fair market value of the properties transferred in all of the exchange groups
qualifying for § 1031 treatment differs from the aggregate fair market value
of the properties received in all the exchange groups. Both residences were
treated as part of the residual group, with the new residence treated as boot,
but § 121 applied to provide nonrecognition (for up to $500,000) of gain on
the exchange of the old personal residence for a new one. The exact
computations were left to be made under Rule 155.
3. Tax ain't horseshoes: When the regulations say
thirty years, they don't mean 21 years and 4 months. VIP's Industries Inc.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2013-157 (6/24/13). Through a QI, the
taxpayer exchanged a leasehold with 21 years and 4 months remaining for a
fee interest in other real estate. The only significant issue was whether the
leasehold and fee interests were like-kind under Reg. § 1.1031-1(c), which
states that § 1031 nonrecognition can apply to an exchange of a leasehold
with 30 years or more to run for a fee interest. Applying May Department
Stores Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 547 (1951), which held that a 20-year
leasehold was not like-kind to a fee interest, Judge Marvel held that the
exchange of a leasehold with 21 years and 4 months remaining for a fee
interest in other real estate did not qualify as a like kind exchange.
4. That the residual method of valuing goodwill was
the proper method was a slam dunk for the government, but its
valuation amount bounced off the rim when the facts were analyzed by
the court. Deseret Management Corp. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 438
(8/22/13). The taxpayer exchanged a highly appreciated radio station in Los
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Angeles (KZLA) for several radio stations in St. Louis and reported that
pursuant to § 1031 no gain had been recognized. The government asserted
that the taxpayer was required to recognize gain with respect to the exchange
of KZLA's goodwill because Reg. § 1.1031(a)-2(c)(2) provides that "[t]he
good will or going concern value of a business is not of a like kind to the
goodwill or going concern value of another business." The taxpayer took the
positions that (1) as a matter of law goodwill never attached to the business
of a broadcast radio station, and (2) if goodwill could attach to the business
of a broadcast radio station, on the facts the value of the goodwill of KZLA
was zero. The parties agreed that the aggregate value of the exchanged
property was $185 million and stipulated that the value of all tangible assets
of KZLA was $3,384,637, and that the value of all intangible assets of
KZLA, apart from its FCC License and any goodwill, was $4,858,317. The
taxpayer took the position that the value of the FCC license was the
$176,757,046 that remained after accounting for those other assets, leaving
nothing to be assigned to goodwill under the residual method. First, the
Court of Federal Claims (Judge Allegra) rejected the taxpayer's argument
that as a matter of law goodwill never attached to the business of a broadcast
radio station. The taxpayer argued that a radio station can never possess
goodwill because audience loyalty is a matter of format and online
personalities. Judge Allegra responded
That listeners might flee a station that suddenly changes its
format or on-air personalities, however, does not prove
plaintiffs point-any more than it would be true to say that
other types of businesses cannot have goodwill because they
would lose their customers if they fundamentally changed
their business plan. Can it be that nationally-recognized
restaurant chains lack goodwill because their customers
might flee if they radically changed their menus; or that
sporting goods stores lack goodwill because they might
decide to sell only flowers; or that familiar chains of coffee
purveyors lack good will because they would lose their
current business if they sold only soda? One would think
not. ... Put another way, whether goodwill exists as part of
the assets acquired in a transaction cannot depend upon
whether the buyer concludes that it is in its best interests to
sustain the prior business model-that the prior goodwill
must be accounted for if the prior business model is
maintained, but not if that model is modified.
* Turning next to the factual valuation
issue, Judge Allegra handed the taxpayer a complete victory, based not on the
taxpayer's expert's report and analysis, which he had rejected but by using the
government's expert's methodology, modified to correct what he found to be
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errors in the methodology. In the end, applying the residual valuation method,
Judge Allegra concluded that the value of the FCC license, determining by
discounting the expected net cash flow from the license as if it belonged to a
start-up company, was at least $176,757,046, leaving nothing to be assigned to
goodwill.
5. The magistrate judge wasn't fooled by the
disguised related party exchange. North Central Rental & Leasing, LLC v.
United States, 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-7045 (D. N.D. 9/3/13). North Central
was an LLC taxed as a partnership owned 99 percent by Butler Machinery
Corporation and 1 percent by Mr. Butler personally. Butler Machinery was a
dealer in heavy equipment and North Central engaged in equipment leasing.
North Central and Butler Machinery engaged in almost 400 transactions that
it claimed were entitled to § 1031 like-kind exchange nonrecognition, but the
IRS and government took the position that pursuant to the § 1031(f) related-
party rules, § 1031 treatment was not available. Each of the transactions
followed essentially the same format. North Central desired to dispose of
equipment that it had rented out for a number of years (and which had a fair
market value in excess of adjusted basis). North Central conveyed the
equipment to a QI. The QI sold the truck to the unrelated third-party
customer. Butler bought the replacement equipment from Caterpillar under a
180 day payment plan. The QI used the cash from the sale of the equipment
to purchase the replacement property from Butler and transferred the
replacement property to North Central. North Central then paid any excess of
the cost of the replacement property over the sales price of the relinquished
property to Butler through adjustment of an intercompany note between
Butler and North Central. As structured, the transaction permitted Butler to
hold the cash for up to six months until the due date of the Caterpillar invoice
for the replacement property. Magistrate Judge Klein held that the
transactions allowed the related taxpayers to "cash out" - albeit only for six
months - low basis property through basis shifting and that they were
structured to avoid the limitations of § 1031(f). She rejected North Central's
claims that there were nontax business reasons for the structure of the
transactions. Accordingly, because § 103 1(f)(4) disqualifies from
nonrecognition "any exchange which is part of a transaction (or series of
transactions) structured to avoid the purposes of [§ 1031(f)]," the
transactions were all taxable.
F. Section 1033
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
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G. Section 1035
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
H. Miscellaneous
1. Making the straddle rules even more complicated
- retroactively for twelve years. T.D. 9635, Debt That is a Position in
Personal Property That is Part of a Straddle, 78 F.R. 54568 (9/5/13). The
Treasury has promulgated temporary regulations to provide guidance under
§ 1092 regarding when an issuer's obligation under a debt instrument may be
a position in actively traded personal property and, therefore, may be part of
a straddle. Temp. Reg. § 1.1092(d)-lT(d) provides that if a taxpayer is the
obligor under a debt instrument one or more payments on which are linked to
the value of personal property or a position with respect to personal property,
then the taxpayer's obligation under the debt instrument is a position with
respect to personal property and may be part of a straddle. The provision
applies to straddles established on or after 1/17/01.
* The twelve year retroactivity is based on
the fact that the Treasury Decision adopted Prop. Reg. § 1.1092(d)-i (d) in the
form proposed on 1/18/01, (REG-105801-00).
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. This ruling is expressly for new mothers.
Announcement 2011-14, 2011-9 I.R.B. 532 (2/10/11). This announcement
held that breast pumps and supplies that assist lactation are medical care
under § 213(d) because "they are for the purpose of affecting a structure of
the body of the lactating woman." The announcement did not refer at all to
the health of the baby.
a. Making what was recently held to be a
deductible medical expense into a mandatory freebee. A new mandate
under Obamacare makes all this stuff mandatory for group plans, as
well as miraculously free for the insureds. T.D. 9541, Group Health Plans
and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 F.R. 46621
(8/3/11). Temp. Reg. § 54.9815-2713T(a)(1)(iv) requires coverage by all
group plans of contraceptive, breast-feeding and many other services for
women without co-pays and without deductibles. REG-120391-10, Group
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Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
76 F.R. 46677 (8/3/11), promulgates identical proposed regulations. The
effective date is 8/1/12.
b. "[Obama says that] your little
[Republican] friends are wrong. . . . Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa
Claus."6 REG-120391, Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the
6. "DEAR EDITOR: I am 8 years old.
"Some of my little friends say there is no Santa Claus.
"Papa says, 'If you see it in THE SUN it's so.'
"Please tell me the truth; is there a Santa Claus?
"Virginia O'Hanlon.
"115 West Ninety-Fifth Street."
Virginia, your little friends are wrong. They have been affected by the skepticism of
a skeptical age. They do not believe except they see. They think that nothing can be
which is not comprehensible by their little minds. All minds, Virginia, whether they
be men's or children's, are little. In this great universe of ours man is a mere insect,
an ant, in his intellect, as compared with the boundless world about him, as
measured by the intelligence capable of grasping the whole of truth and knowledge.
Yes, Virginia, there is a Santa Claus. He exists as certainly as love and generosity
and devotion exist, and you know that they abound and give to your life its highest
beauty and joy. Alas! how dreary would be the world if there were no Santa Claus. It
would be as dreary as if there were no Virginias. There would be no childlike faith
then, no poetry, no romance to make tolerable this existence. We should have no
enjoyment, except in sense and sight. The eternal light with which childhood fills the
world would be extinguished.
Not believe in Santa Claus! You might as well not believe in fairies! You might get
your papa to hire men to watch in all the chimneys on Christmas Eve to catch Santa
Claus, but even if they did not see Santa Claus coming down, what would that
prove? Nobody sees Santa Claus, but that is no sign that there is no Santa Claus. The
most real things in the world are those that neither children nor men can see. Did you
ever see fairies dancing on the lawn? Of course not, but that's no proof that they are
not there. Nobody can conceive or imagine all the wonders there are unseen and
unseeable in the world.
You may tear apart the baby's rattle and see what makes the noise inside, but there is
a veil covering the unseen world which not the strongest man, nor even the united
strength of all the strongest men that ever lived, could tear apart. Only faith, fancy,
poetry, love, romance, can push aside that curtain and view and picture the supernal
beauty and glory beyond. Is it all real? Ah, Virginia, in all this world there is nothing
else real and abiding.
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Affordable Care Act, 78 F.R. 8456 (2/6/13). These proposed regulations
would require that insurance companies for tax-exempt religious
organizations, including hospitals, universities and schools, provide free
contraceptive services to all women insured by them (including students at
universities), but would provide that the insurance companies will be
reimbursed for the costs of individual contraceptive-only policies by the
government. However, HHS Secretary Sibelius stated that the taxpayers
would not pay for these reimbursements either. Thus, services that cost
$18,000 per woman would become free under Obamacare.
* Such is the magic power of compound
interest.
c. The Supreme Court will consider the
legality under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of the application
of Obamacare's contraceptive mandate to closely held businesses owned
by persons who claim their Christian beliefs would be violated by
compliance with that mandate. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sibelius, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 6/27/13) (en banc), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678
(11/26/13). The Tenth Circuit (Judge Tymkovich) held that the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (P.L. 103-141) protects closely held family
businesses operated in corporate form from violating their owners' Christian
principles by complying with a regulation under the PPACA (Obamacare)
that requires them to provide drugs and devices that they believe are
abortifacients as part of their employer-sponsored health care plans.
d. "White House suspends [individual]
mandate penalty for those with cancelled health plans." Individuals
whose health insurance plans were canceled by insurers because they did not
meet the requirements of the Affordable Care Act will be eligible for an
exemption from the individual mandate penalty under § 5000A that takes
effect in 2014, the Department of Health and Human Services said late
December 19. (2013 TNT 246-5, 12/19/13). The mandate requires everyone
to have health insurance or face a tax penalty, the greater of $95 or 1 percent
of income in 2014. The administration will also allow those consumers to
sign up for catastrophic coverage. Those bare-bones plans are available to
people who are under 30 or qualify for a "hardship exemption." HHS
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius said in a letter to Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., that
the administration is granting a "hardship exemption" to Americans whose
No Santa Claus! Thank God! he lives, and he lives forever. A thousand years from
now, Virginia, nay, ten times ten thousand years from now, he will continue to make
glad the heart of childhood. (The [New York] Sun, 9/21/1897, p. 1, unsigned, by
Francis Pharcellus Church).
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plans were canceled and "might be having difficulty" paying for standard
coverage.
2. You may have trouble with these proposed
regulations if you don't know the meaning of MV, EHB, HAS, HRA,
FPL, and "metal level." REG-125398-12, Minimum Value of Eligible
Employer-Sponsored Plans and Other Rules Regarding the Health Insurance
Premium Tax Credit. 78 F.R. 25909 (5/3/13). The IRS has issued proposed
regulations on the § 36B health insurance premium tax credit that provide
guidance on determining whether health coverage under an eligible
employer-sponsored plan provides minimum value.
3. The IRS provides guidance on the application of
the Affordable Care Act's market reforms to HRAs, EPPs, FSAs, and
EAPs-it's the bee's knees! Notice 2013-54, 2013-40 I.R.B. 287 (9/13/13).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act amended the Public Health
Service Act to implement certain market reforms for group health plans,
including requirements that: (1) group health plans not establish any annual
limit on the dollar amount of benefits for any individual, and (2) non-
grandfathered group health plans provide certain preventive services without
imposing any cost-sharing requirements for the services. The notice provides
guidance, in Q&A format, on the application of these market reforms to:
(1) health reimbursement arrangements (including HRAs integrated with
group health plans), (2) group health plans under which employers reimburse
employees for premium expenses incurred for an individual health insurance
policy (referred to in the notice as "employer payment plans"), and (3) health
flexible spending arrangements. The notice also provides guidance on
employee assistance programs and on § 125(f)(3), which generally provides
that a qualified health plan offered through a health insurance exchange
established under the Affordable Care Act is not a qualified benefit that can be
offered through a cafeteria plan. The notice applies for plan years beginning on
and after 1/1/14, but taxpayers can apply the guidance provided in the notice for
all prior periods. The Department of Labor has issued guidance in substantially
identical form (Technical Release 2013-03) and the Department of Health and
Human Services is issuing guidance indicating that it concurs.
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1. Some inflation adjusted numbers for 2014. I.R.
2013-86 (10/31/13).
* Elective deferral in §§ 401(k), 403(b),
and 457 plans, remains at $17,500 with a catch up provision for employees
aged 50 or older of $5,500.
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* The limit on contributions to an IRA will
be unchanged at $5,500. The AGI phase out range for employees covered by a
workplace retirement plan is increased to $96,000 and to $115,000 for
employees not covered by a workplace retirement plan. The phase-out range for
contributions to a Roth IRA is $181,000 to $191,000 for married couples filing
jointly, and $114,000 to $129,000 for singles and heads of household.
* The annual benefit from a defined benefit
plan under § 415 is increased to $210,000.
* The limit for defined contributions plans
is increased to $52,000.
* The amount of compensation that may be
taken into account for various plans is increased to $260,000, and $385,000 for
government plans.
2. Notice 2014-5, 2014-2 I.R.B. 276 (12/13/13). This
notice provides temporary nondiscrimination relief for certain "closed"
defined benefit pension plans (i.e., those that provide ongoing accruals but
that have been amended to limit those accruals to some or all of the
employees who participated in the plan on a specified date). Typically, new
hires are offered only a defined contribution plan, and the closed defined
benefit plan has an increased proportion of highly compensated employees.
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and
Stock Options
1. The Ninth Circuit shows the IRS no deference in
its interpretation of its own Regulations. Schwab v. Commissioner, 715
F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 4/24/13). The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge
M. Smith, affirmed the Tax Court's decision, rejecting the government's
argument that "because section 72 contemplates the 'cash value' of a non-
annuity 'without regard to any surrender charge,' I.R.C. § 72(e)(3)(A)(i),
then section 402(b)(2) must also apply without regard to any surrender
charge." In addition to being an erroneous interpretation of § 72(e)(3)(A), the
government's interpretation of § 402(b)(2) would "read[] the phrase 'amount
actually distributed or made available' entirely out of section 402(b)(2)." The
Court of Appeals also refused to defer to the government's interpretation of
Reg. § 1.402(b)-1(c) as prohibiting the consideration of surrender charges in
valuing a life insurance policy for purposes of § 402(b)(2). The court also
rejected the government's argument that surrender charges could not be
considered under § 402(b) because in Matthies v. Commissioner, 134 T.C.
141 (2010), the Tax Court concluded that, under the pre-2005 regulations,
surrender charges should not be considered when valuing a life insurance
policy under § 402(a). The Tax Court decided Matthies based on the
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regulation's requirement to account for the "entire cash value" of the policy,
while the regulation interpreting § 402(b)(2) contains no such language.
Accordingly, the Tax Court "correctly equated the 'amount' in section
402(b)(2) with the fair market value of the policies that were actually
distributed." Finally, the Tax Court did not err in the determination of the fair
market value of the policies after taking into account the surrender charges.
2. Substance over form determines that an option to
purchase shares of the taxpayer's employer was granted to him by the
corporation, not by his ex-wife to whom he transferred the shares in a
divorce. Davis v. Commissioner, 716 F.3d 560 (11th Cir. 5/16/13), aff'g
T.C. Memo. 2011-286. In connection with the taxpayer's divorce, he
transferred one-half of his shares of a family corporation of which he was a
shareholder and key employee to his ex-wife, who granted him an option to
purchase those shares. Contemporaneously, the corporation agreed to grant
him an option to purchase additional stock in the corporation as an
inducement for him to continue his employment. However, instead of
granting him the option, as contemplated by the parties all along, the
corporation redeemed the shares transferred to the taxpayer's ex-wife and
assumed the obligation under the option from the ex-wife to permit the
taxpayer to purchase the shares from the corporation. Subsequently, that
option was modified in several significant respects before it ultimately was
exercised. The taxpayer did not report income under § 83(a) upon exercise of
the option, but the corporation claimed a deduction under § 83(h). The
Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Ripple, affirmed the Tax Court's
decision that the taxpayer was required to recognize income under § 83 and
that the corporation was entitled to a deduction. The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that because the option originally was granted to him by
his ex-wife incident to their divorce, his exercise of it was shielded from
recognition by § 1041, holding instead that it was granted to him in
connection with his performance of services. A key fact supporting the
holding was that the revised option from the corporation imposed the
requirement that the taxpayer notify the corporation in writing if he chose to
make a § 83(b) election. Applying substance over form, the court held that
the corporation was the true counter-party to the option granted by the ex-
wife and that the option from the corporation, with substantially different
rights than those granted by the ex-wife's option, was a different option,
despite being termed an "amendment" of the option from the ex-wife.
Furthermore, the court added that had the taxpayer exercised the option
granted by the ex-wife, its exercise would not have been governed by § 1041,
because § 1041 applied only to the initial transfer of stock and the grant of
the option; it does not apply to subsequent dispositions of property received
in the divorce. The court went on to state that the exercise in that case still
would have produced ordinary income. That final conclusion puzzles us,
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because apart from § 83, the exercise of an option to purchase property, even
at a bargain, is not a realization event. But not to worry, the court's faux pas
was dictum.
3. A requirement to sell employer stock back at a
discount if the employee is sacked for "[flailure or refusal by Employee
... to cure by faithfully and diligently performing the usual and
customary duties of his employment" is a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Austin v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 18 (12/16/13). The taxpayers received
stock in a corporation in a § 351 transaction and entered into employment
agreement and restricted stock agreements with the newly formed
corporation. The taxpayers received 95 percent of the stock of the
corporation and an ESOP acquired 5 percent of the stock for a promissory
note. (The transactions occurred before the enactment of § 409(p) in 2004
and the tax years at issue were 2000-2003.) The taxpayers collectively were
the entire board of directors of the corporation. The corporation made an S
election. The employment agreements provided that upon termination of
employment, they would receive less than the full fair market value of their S
shares if they were terminated "for cause" during the initial term of the
employment agreement; otherwise on termination of employment the
taxpayers would receive in exchange for their stock 100 percent of the fair
market value, determined by formula. The employment agreements defined
termination "for cause" to include not only termination for "[d]ishonesty,
fraud, embezzlement, alcohol or substance abuse," but also termination upon
"[flailure or refusal by Employee ... to cure by faithfully and diligently
performing the usual and customary duties of his employment." The stock
certificates were legended as restricted stock. The taxpayers took the position
that their stock was not fully vested and that pursuant to Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1)
they were not shareholders, with the result that all of the S corporation's
income passed through to the ESOP and none passed through to them. The
IRS asserted deficiencies based on the ground that the stock was not subject
to forfeiture because Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) provides that a requirement that
stock be forfeited "if the employee is discharged for cause or for committing
a crime will not be considered to result in a substantial risk of forfeiture."
The IRS moved for summary judgment that the stock was not subject to a
risk of forfeiture, but the Tax Court (Judge Lauber) denied the IRS's motion.
The Court held that the restricted stock agreement and employment
agreement together constituted "an earnout restriction that may give rise to a
'substantial risk of forfeiture."' (Emphasis added). Although the contractual
provision addressed termination "for cause," "termination upon '[f]ailure or
refusal by Employee ... to cure by faithfully and diligently performing the
usual and customary duties of his employment' falls outside the scope of
discharge 'for cause or for committing a crime' within the meaning of [Reg.
§ 1.83-3(c)(2)]." Judge Lauber reasoned that "an employee's inability or
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disinclination to work for the agreed-upon term of his employment contract
is not a 'remote' event that is unlikely to occur." Moreover, a finding that
Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) "precludes an earnout restriction from creating a
'substantial risk of forfeiture' would make that subparagraph of the
regulation inconsistent with the statute."
* The IRS's other arguments, including that
the taxpayer's stock was "substantially vested" because as the sole directors of
the corporation they could "remove at will any ownership restrictions to which
their stock was subject, so that the forfeiture conditions were unlikely to be
enforced," presented issues for trial.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. Their IRAs got flecked by a prohibited
transaction, which piqued the interest of the IRS. Peek v. Commissioner,
140 T.C. No. 12 (5/9/13). Two unrelated taxpayers, Peek and Fleck,
established self-directed IRAs to purchase a business. The IRAs were funded
with rollovers from other IRAs and 401(k) accounts. The purchase was
accomplished by (1) Peek and Fleck forming a new corporation the stock of
which was issued to their IRAs for the cash that had been rolled into the
IRAs, and (2) the corporation purchasing the business assets from the seller
for cash received from the IRAs, proceeds from a bank loan, and the
corporation's promissory note, which was guaranteed by Peek and Fleck.
The IRAs subsequently sold the stock of the corporation, and the IRS
asserted deficiencies against Peek and Fleck on the grounds that the IRAs
had failed to qualify under § 408 because the loan guarantees were
prohibited transactions under § 4975. Section 408(e)(2)(A) provides that an
account ceases to qualify as an IRA if "the individual for whose benefit any
individual retirement account is established ... engages in any transaction
prohibited by section 4975." Section 4975(c)(1)(B) prohibits "any direct or
indirect ... lending of money or other extension of credit between a
[retirement] plan and a disqualified person." The taxpayers argued that the
prohibition applies only to an extension of credit that, whether direct (like a
loan) or indirect (like a loan guaranty), is "between a plan and a disqualified
person," and that the loan guaranties at issue were between disqualified
persons (Mr. Fleck and Mr. Peek) and an entity other than the plans, i.e., the
corporation that was owned by the IRAs, rather than the IRAs themselves.
The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) rejected the taxpayer's argument and
upheld the deficiency.
[The taxpayers'] reading of the statute, however, would rob
it of its intended breadth. Section 4975(c)(1)(B) prohibits
"any direct or indirect *** extension of credit between a
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plan and a disqualified person". ... The Supreme Court has
observed that when Congress used the phrase "any direct or
indirect" in section 4975(c)(1), it thereby employed "broad
language" and showed an obvious intention to "prohibit[]
something more" than would be reached without it.
Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
152, 159-160 (1993). As the Commissioner points out, if the
statute prohibited only a loan or loan guaranty between a
disqualified person and the IRA itself, then the prohibition
could be easily and abusively avoided simply by having the
IRA create a shell subsidiary to whom the disqualified
person could then make a loan. That, however, is an obvious
evasion that Congress intended to prevent by using the word
"indirect". The language of section 4975(c)(1)(B), when
given its obvious and intended meaning, prohibited Mr.
Fleck and Mr. Peek from making loans or loan guaranties
either directly to their IRAs or indirectly to their IRAs by
way of the entity owned by the IRAs.
* Accuracy related penalties were upheld.
2. "[Tjhis is precisely the kind of self-dealing that
section 4975 was enacted to prevent." Ellis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-245 (10/29/13). The taxpayer rolled-over from his 401(k) account to a
self-directed IRA approximately $320,000. The $320,000 was promptly
invested in a newly-formed LLC (which made a check-the-box election to be
taxed as a corporation) in which it obtained a 98 percent interest, with an
unrelated party holding the remaining 2 percent interest. During the
remainder of the year, the LLC, which was engaged in the used car business,
paid the taxpayer approximately $10,000 as compensation for managing the
LLC. The used-car LLC also paid rent to another LLC owned by the
taxpayer and his family that owned the property on which the used car
business was conducted. The Tax Court (Judge Paris) upheld that IRS's
determination that the taxpayer had engaged in a transaction with his IRA
that was prohibited under § 4975. Section 4975(c) prohibited transactions
include any direct or indirect: (1) sale or exchange, or leasing, of any
property between a plan and a disqualified person; (2) lending of money or
other extension of credit between a plan and a disqualified person;
(3) furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between a plan and a
disqualified person; (4) transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of, a
disqualified person of the income or assets of a plan; (5) act by a
disqualified person who is a fiduciary whereby he deals with the income or
assets of a plan in his own interests or for his own account; or (6) receipt of
any consideration for his own personal account by any disqualified person
who is a fiduciary from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a
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transaction involving the income or assets of the plan. Because the taxpayer
exercised control over the IRA, he was a disqualified person as defined in
§ 4975(e). Although the initial investment in the LLC was not a prohibited
transaction because it had no outstanding owners or ownership interests
before the initial capital contribution and therefore could not be a
disqualified person at the time of the investment, the taxpayer did engage in
a prohibited transaction when he caused the LLC to pay him compensation.
As a result, pursuant to § 408(e)(2)(A), the IRA ceased to be qualified as of
the first day of the taxable year and pursuant to § 408(e)(2)(B) the entire
amount was treated as distributed and includable in gross income. Because
the taxpayer was not 59V2 as of the first day of the year, the 10 percent
§ 72(t) penalty applied. And for good measure, a 20 percent § 6662(a)
negligence penalty was sustained as well.
3. Honey, I shrunk the IRAs! Divorce is bad enough
without learning that your IRAs have been depleted through forged
withdrawals and that the IRS is asserting a deficiency. Roberts v.
Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 19 (12/30/13). The taxpayer and his wife
permanently separated in January 2009 and were later divorced. The
taxpayer maintained two IRAs. During 2008, a total of approximately
$37,000 was distributed from the IRAs. The distributions were made
pursuant to forged withdrawal requests and the checks representing those
distributions were endorsed with forged signatures and deposited in a
checking account that the taxpayer owned jointly with his wife, but which
was used exclusively by his wife. The taxpayer did not know about or
authorize the IRA withdrawals at the time they occurred and first learned of
them in 2009, when he received Forms 1099-R. The Tax Court (Judge
Marvel), considering an issue of first impression, held that the distributions
were not includible in the taxpayer's gross income under § 408(d)(1), which
provides that the "payee or distributee" must include in gross income in the
manner provided under § 72 any amount paid or distributed out of an
individual retirement plan. The court rejected the government's argument
that the taxpayer was a payee or distributee under Bunney v. Commissioner,
114 T.C. 259 (2000), in which the court held that the payee or distributee of
an IRA distribution generally is "the participant or beneficiary who, under
the plan, is entitled to receive the distribution." The court reasoned that the
taxpayer was not a payee or distributee within the meaning of § 408(d)(1)
because "he did not request, receive, or benefit from the IRA distributions."
(The court found that the taxpayer's wife received and spent the funds.) The
court also rejected the government's argument that the taxpayer was a payee
or distributee because the taxpayer ratified or acquiesced in the IRA
withdrawals by: (1) failing to report the forged signatures to the financial
institutions in a timely manner or make a claim based on those signatures,
and (2) benefitting from the withdrawals in the divorce proceedings, in
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which the division of assets took into account that the funds went to the
taxpayer's wife. Any ratification or acquiescence, the court reasoned, did not
take place until 2009 at the earliest, and therefore could not affect whether
the taxpayer was a payee or distributee in 2008, the year for which the
deficiency was determined. Because the taxpayer was not subject to tax on
the distributions, he also was not subject to the 10% penalty tax imposed on
early withdrawals by § 72(t). The court imposed the § 6662(a) accuracy-
related penalty based on the taxpayer's failure to report interest income
unrelated to the IRAs, his underreporting of wage income, and his filing of a
return for 2008 as a single taxpayer despite the fact that he was married. The
2008 return, which the taxpayer never saw, was prepared and filed by his
wife.
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
1. DOMA could be on its way to the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, might this case lead to DOMA becoming the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment? Massachusetts v. United States Dept. of
Health and Human Services, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 5/31/12), affg Gill v.
Office of Personnel Management, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 7/8/10). In
an opinion by Judge Boudin, the First Circuit held that § 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, which limits the meaning of the word "marriage"
to "a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,"
and provides that "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or wife" for purposes of all federal laws is an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection in violation the equal protection
principles embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Joint return filing status under the Code was one of the issues addressed in
the case, as well as government benefits available to married individuals,
e.g., employee health benefits, social security benefits. The court further
ordered:
Anticipating that certiorari will be sought and that Supreme
Court review of DOMA is highly likely, the mandate is
stayed, maintaining the district court's stay of its injunctive
judgment, pending further order of this court.
a. The Second Circuit agrees in a split
decision. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 10/18/12) (2-1),
cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (12/7/12). In an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment in a tax refund suit by the District Court for the Southern District
of New York, the Second Circuit (Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs) affirmed the
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grant of summary judgment to the surviving spouse of a same-sex couple
that was married in Canada in 2007 and resided in New York at the time of
her spouse's death in 2009 who was denied the benefit of the § 2056 marital
deduction for federal estate tax on the ground that the Defense of Marriage
Act violated the Equal Protection Clause for want of a rational basis.
* The court concluded that review of § 7
required heightened scrutiny because (A) homosexuals as a group have
historically endured persecution and discrimination; (B) homosexuality has no
relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; (C) homosexuals are a
discernible group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in
the subset of those who enter same-sex marriages; and (D) the class remains a
politically weakened minority. The circuit court further concluded that the class
was quasi-suspect (rather than suspect) based on the weight of the factors and
on analogy to the classifications recognized as suspect and quasi-suspect. The
circuit court held that the rationale premised on uniformity was not an
exceedingly persuasive justification for DOMA, and that DOMA was not
substantially related to the important government interest of protecting the fisc.
* Judge Straub dissented on the following
basic ground:
The majority holds DOMA unconstitutional, a federal law
which formalizes the understanding of marriage in the
federal context extant in the Congress, the Presidency, and
the Judiciary at the time of DOMA's enactment and, I
daresay, throughout our nation's history. If this
understanding is to be changed, I believe it is for the
American people to do so....
At bottom, the issue here is marriage at the federal
level for federal purposes, and not other legitimate interests.
The Congress and the President formalized in DOMA, for
federal purposes, the basic human condition ofjoining a man
and a woman in a long-term relationship and the only one
which is inherently capable of producing another generation
of humanity. Whether that understanding is to continue is for
the American people to decide via their choices in electing
the Congress and the President. It is not for the Judiciary to
search for new standards by which to negate a rational
expression of the nation via the Congress.
b. Same-sex spouses in valid marriages now
get to share in marriage penalties and marriage bonuses when filing
income tax returns because "the principal purpose and the necessary
effect of [DOMAJ are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-
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sex marriage." United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (6/26/13). The
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996), defines "marriage" in any act of Congress, which (of course)
includes the Code, as a legal union "between one man and one woman" as
husband and wife. DOMA also defines the word "spouse" to mean only a
person of the "opposite sex" who is a husband or wife. This case involved
whether the § 2056 estate tax marital deduction was allowable with respect
to a bequest to a same-sex spouse whose marriage to the decedent was
recognized under local law. The Supreme Court held that § 3 of DOMA -
the provision that limits the meaning of the word "marriage" to "a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife," and provides
that "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or wife" - is an unconstitutional denial of equal protection in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As a result, the
§ 2056 estate tax marital deduction was allowable. It follows that for income
tax purposes same-sex married couples whose marriages are recognized by
local law are eligible to file a joint return and if they do not file a joint return
must file as married filing separately.
* Whether this result applies to a same sex
married couple that has moved from a state that recognizes same sex marriage
to a state that does not recognize same sex marriage is not entirely clear. The
Windsor Court limited its holding to the definition of marriage in § 3 of DOMA
and did not address § 2, which allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages from other states. Section 2 was not challenged in Windsor. Some
clue to future guidance might be found in Rev. Rul. 58-66, Rev. Rul. 58-66,
1958-1 C.B. 60, in which the IRS ruled that taxpayers who entered into a
common-law marriage in a state that recognized common law marriage would
be treated as married for tax purposes even if they later moved to a state in
which a ceremony is required to initiate the marital relationship.
* Other questions for a future time include
whether same sex spouses can toggle into and out of marriages when they
change residence and whether domestic partnerships in some states that are not
called marriage will be treated as marriage under federal law.
c. Shakespeare called it "The Merry Wives
of Windsor." And the IRS interprets Windsor broadly - a same-sex
marriage celebrated under the laws of one state is a federal tax
"marriage" in every state. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201
(8/29/13). In the wake of United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013),
the IRS ruled that the marital status of individuals of the same-sex who are
lawfully married under the laws of a state that recognizes such marriages will
be recognized for all purposes. The ruling held that for Federal tax purposes
(1) the terms "spouse," "husband and wife," "husband," and "wife" include
an individual married to a person of the same sex if the individuals are
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lawfully married under state law, and the term "marriage" includes such a
marriage between individuals of the same sex; and (2) a marriage of same-
sex individuals that was validly entered into in a state whose laws authorize
the marriage of two individuals of the same sex will be recognized even if
the married couple is domiciled in a state that does not recognize the validity
of same-sex marriages. However the terms "spouse," "husband and wife,"
"husband," and "wife" do not include individuals (whether of the opposite
sex or the same sex) who have entered into a registered domestic partnership,
civil union, or other similar formal relationship recognized under state law
that is not denominated as a marriage under the laws of that state, and the
term "marriage" does not include such formal relationships.
* Taxpayers may file amended returns,
adjusted returns, or claims for credit or refund for any overpayment of tax
resulting from this ruling if the statute of limitations is open. The ruling applies
retroactively with respect to any employee benefit plan or arrangement or any
benefit provided thereunder for purposes of filing original returns, amended
returns, adjusted returns, or claims for credit or refund of an overpayment of tax
concerning employment tax and income tax with respect to employer-provided
health coverage benefits or fringe benefits that were provided by the employer
and are excludable from income under §§ 106, 117(d), 119, 129, or 132 based
on an individual's marital status.
d. Correcting overpayments of FICA taxes
and income tax withholding resulting from the Windsor decision and
Rev. Rul. 2013-17 just got a little easier. Notice 2013-61, 2013-44 I.R.B.
432 (9/23/13). In the wake of United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013), the IRS issued Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201 (8/29/13),
discussed in section V.A. of this outline, in which it ruled that same-sex
couples who are lawfully married under the laws of a state or foreign
jurisdiction will be recognized as married for federal tax purposes. Rev. Rul.
2013-17 permits taxpayers to file amended returns, adjusted returns, or
claims for credit or refund for any overpayment of tax resulting from the
ruling if the statute of limitations is open. The notice provides guidance for
employers and employees to make claims for refunds or adjustments of
overpayments of FICA taxes and federal income tax withholding with
respect to: (1) health coverage benefits or fringe benefits provided by an
employer to a same-sex spouse that are excludable from income under
§§ 106, 117(d), 119, 129, or 132 based on an individual's marital status, and
(2) remuneration for services performed in the employ of an individual's
spouse that are excepted from FICA tax under § 3121(b)(3)(B). To correct
overpayments of FICA taxes, employers can use the regular procedures for
doing so or special, simplified administrative procedures provided in the
notice for correcting overpayments made in 2013 or in prior years. If an
employer corrects overpayments of FICA taxes for prior years, the usual
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requirements apply, including the filing of Form W-2c, Corrected Wage and
Tax Statement. Employers cannot correct overpayments of withheld income
tax after the end of a calendar year unless the overpayment is attributable to
administrative error. Accordingly, an employer can use the special
administrative procedures to correct overpayments of income tax
withholding only for 2013 and only by repaying or reimbursing the employee
during 2013 for the over-collected income tax.
e. Same sex marriage fringe benefits. Notice
2014-1 2014-2 I.R.B. 270 (12/17/13). This notice provides guidance in Q&A
format regarding the application of § 125 cafeteria plans, including health
and dependent care flexible spending arrangements (FSAs), and § 223,
relating to health savings accounts (HSAs), to same-sex spouses following
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), and Rev.
Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201.
2. And the IRS starts administering national health
care. T.D. 9632, Shared Responsibility Payment for Not Maintaining
Minimum Essential Coverage, 78 F.R. 53646 (8/30/13). The IRS and
Treasury have promulgated Reg. §§ 1.5000A-0 through 1.5000A-5 providing
comprehensive guidance regarding the requirement to maintain minimum
essential coverage under § 5000A, which was enacted by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, as amended by the TRICARE Affirmation Act
and Public Law 111-173. The regulations provide guidance to individual
taxpayers on their liability under § 5000A for the shared responsibility
payment for not maintaining minimum essential coverage. The T.D. largely
finalizes the rules in REG-148500-12, 78 F.R. 7314 (2/1/13). The
regulations are effective on 8/30/13.
3. Net investment income tax of 3.8 percent. Section
1411 of the Code, added by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, imposes a 3.8 percent tax on the net investment income of
individuals, estates, and trusts in taxable years beginning after 12/31/12. For
individuals (except nonresident aliens), the tax applies only to the lesser of
(1) net investment income or (2) the excess of modified adjusted gross
income over a threshold amount. I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1). The threshold amount
is $250,000 for spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse, $125,000
for married individuals filing separate returns, and $200,000 for single
taxpayers (including heads of household). I.R.C. § 1411(b). These threshold
amounts for individuals are not adjusted for inflation. Modified adjusted
gross income is adjusted gross income increased by the amount of foreign
earned income excluded under § 911(a)(1) (net of the deductions and
exclusions disallowed with respect to the foreign earned income). I.R.C. §
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1411(d). For estates and trusts, the tax is levied on the lesser of
(1) undistributed net investment income, or (2) the excess of adjusted gross
income (as defined in § 67(e)) over the dollar amount at which the highest
income tax bracket applicable to an estate or trust begins for the tax year
($11,950 for 2013). I.R.C. § 1411(a)(2). The tax does not apply to a trust that
is tax-exempt under § 501, is a charitable remainder trust tax-exempt under
§ 664, or all of the unexpired interests of which are devoted to charitable
purposes. Net investment income is investment income reduced by the
deductions properly allocable to that income. Investment income is the sum
of (1) gross income from interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents
(other than income derived from any trade or business to which the tax does
not apply), (2) other gross income derived from any trade or business to
which the tax applies, and (3) net gain (to the extent taken into account in
computing taxable income) attributable to the disposition of property other
than property held in a trade or business to which the tax does not apply.
I.R.C. § 141 l(c)(1). The § 1411 tax applies to trade or business income from
(1) a passive activity, and (2) trading financial instruments or commodities
(as defined in § 475(e)(2)). I.R.C. § 1411(c)(2). It does not apply to any other
trade or business income. However, income on the investment of working
capital is not treated as derived from a trade or business and is subject to tax
under § 1411. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(3). Gain or loss from the disposition of a
partnership interest or stock in an S corporation is taken into account only to
the extent gain or loss would be taken into account by the partner or
shareholder if the entity had sold all its properties for fair market value
immediately before the disposition. I.R.C. § 1411 (c)(4). Thus the transferor
partner or shareholder takes into account only the net gain or loss attributable
to the entity's property that is not attributable to an active trade or business.
Investment income does not include any distributions from a qualified
retirement plan or any income subject to self-employment tax. I.R.C. §
1411(c)(5) and(6). Unlike self-employment taxes, no part of the § 1411 tax is
deductible in computing taxable income under Chapter 1. The tax on net
investment income is subject to the estimated tax provisions. I.R.C. §
6654(a).
a. Final regulations provide extensive
guidance on the § 1411 tax on net investment income. T.D. 9644, Net
Investment Income Tax, 78 F.R. 72394 (12/2/13). The Treasury Department
and IRS have issued final regulations under § 1411 regarding the 3.8 percent
tax on net investment income. The final regulations generally follow, but
make some important changes to, the regulations that were proposed in
REG-130507-1 1, Net Investment Income Tax, 77 F.R. 72612 (12/5/12). The
final regulations generally are effective for tax years beginning after
12/31/13. However, § 1411 is effective for tax years beginning after
12/31/12. For tax years beginning before the effective date of the final
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regulations, taxpayers may rely on either the proposed regulations or the
final regulations for purposes of complying with § 1411. However, to the
extent taxpayers take a position inconsistent with the final regulations that
affects the treatment of an item in a taxable year beginning after 12/31/13,
they must make reasonable adjustments to ensure that their liability for the
§ 1411 tax in the later year is not inappropriately distorted. Such adjustments
might be required, for example, to ensure that an item of income or
deduction is taken into account only once in determining net investment
income.
* General provisions. Section 1411 is the
only provision in chapter 2A of subtitle A of the Code. Chapter 2A does not
contain any other operational or definitional provisions. Except as otherwise
provided, all Code provisions that apply for purposes of chapter I in
determining taxable income as defined in § 63(a) also apply in determining the
tax imposed by § 1411. Reg. § 1.1411-1(a).
* Application to individuals. Section 1411
applies to individuals but does not apply to nonresident aliens. The regulations
provide that dual resident taxpayers (as defined in Reg. § 301.7701(b)-7(a)(1))
who determine that they are residents of a foreign country and therefore entitled
to treaty benefits are nonresident aliens for purposes of the § 1411 tax. Reg. §
1.1411-2(a)(2)(i). Dual status individuals who are nonresident aliens for a
portion of the taxable year are not subject to the § 1411 tax for the portion of
the year during which they are nonresident aliens. Only income received during
the portion of the year that they are residents of the U.S. is subject to the tax.
Reg. § 1.1411-2(a)(2)(ii). Special rules apply to a U.S. citizen or resident who is
married to a nonresident alien. Reg. § 1.1411-2(a)(2)(iii).
* Application to estates and trusts. As a
general rule, the § 1411 tax applies to all estates and trusts that are subject to the
provisions of part I of subchapter J of chapter 1 of subtitle A of the Code. Reg.
§ 1.1411-3(a)(1)(i). Accordingly, the § 1411 tax does not apply to trusts that are
not classified as trusts under the check-the-box regulations (such as business
trusts). In response to comments on the proposed regulations, the final
regulations expand the list of estates and trusts that are specifically exempted
from the § 1411 tax. Trusts or estates, all of the unexpired interests of which are
devoted to charitable purposes, are not subject to the § 1411 tax. Reg. § 1.1411-
3(b)(1)(i). The tax also does not apply to trusts that are exempt from taxes
imposed by subtitle A of the Code. Reg. § 1.1411-3(b)(1)(ii)-(iv). This is true
even if the trust is subject to tax on its unrelated business taxable income. The
regulations clarify that grantor trusts are not subject to the tax. The grantor or
other person who takes into account the grantor trust's income and deductions
is treated as receiving and paying those items directly for purposes of
calculating that person's liability for the § 1411 tax. Reg. § 1.1411-3(b)(1)(v).
The § 1411 tax does not apply to cemetery perpetual care funds subject to
§ 642(i), Alaska Native Settlement Trusts that have made an election under
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§ 646, or foreign estates or trusts, but special rules apply to distributions from
foreign estates or trusts to U.S. beneficiaries. Reg. § 1.1411-3(b)(1)(vi)-(ix).
Special computational rules apply to electing small business trusts. Reg.§ 1.1411-3(c). Although charitable remainder trusts are not subject to the tax,
annuity and unitrust distributions may be net investment income to the non-
charitable beneficiary who receives them. Reg. § 1.1411-3(d).
* The regulations provide detailed rules
regarding the calculation of an estate or trust's undistributed net investment
income. Reg. § 1.1411-3(e). Generally, the rules for calculating undistributed
net investment income are guided by the subchapter J concept of distributable
net income, which apportions income between the trust and its beneficiaries.
* The Treasury Department and the IRS
reserved two issues related to estates and trusts for further study and have
requested comments on both issues. The first is how the § 1411 tax should
apply to distributions by foreign trusts of net investment income that was
accumulated for the benefit of U.S. beneficiaries. The second issue is the
appropriate method of determining whether an estate or trust materially
participates in an activity. This issue may be the subject of a separate guidance
project under § 469.
* Net investment income. Net investment
income is investment income reduced by the deductions properly allocable to
that income. The regulations provide an exclusive list of deductions that may be
properly allocable deductions and provide authority for the identification of
additional deductions in published guidance. Reg. § 1.1411-4(f). In response to
comments on the proposed regulations, the final regulations permit taxpayers to
treat a portion of a net operating loss deduction as a properly allocable
deduction. Reg. § 1.1411-4(f)(2)(iv), (h). Net investment income cannot be less
than zero. Deductions that exceed investment income can be carried forward
only to the extent provided in chapter 1 of the Code. Reg. § 1.1411-4(f)(1)(ii).
Deductions carried over to a tax year because they were suspended or
disallowed by other provisions, such as the investment interest, basis, at-risk, or
passive activity loss limitations, and allowed for that year in determining
adjusted gross income are also allowed in determining net investment income.
This is true regardless of whether the taxable year from which the deductions
are carried precedes the effective date of § 1411. The Treasury Department and
the IRS have issued proposed regulations that address issues related to the
treatment of capital loss carryforwards. REG-130843-13, Net Investment
Income Tax, 78 F.R. 72451 (12/2/13).
* If items of net investment income
(including the properly allocable deductions) pass through to an individual,
estate, or trust from a partnership or S corporation, the allocation of the items
must be separately stated under § 702 or § 1366. Although the proposed
regulations provided detailed guidance on determining the net investment
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income arising from the disposition of interests in partnerships or S
corporations, the Treasury Department and the IRS did not finalize this
guidance and instead issued a new proposed regulation that addresses the issue.
REG-130843-13, Net Investment Income Tax, 78 F.R. 72451 (12/2/13).
* Because trade or business income from a
passive activity is net investment income, the status of activities as passive and
the grouping of activities for purposes of the passive activity loss rules are
significant. The regulations provide individuals, estates, and trusts with a fresh
start to regroup activities in the first tax year that begins after 12/31/13 in which
§ 1411 would apply to the taxpayer. Reg. § 1.469-1 1(b)(3)(iv). Regrouping is
permitted on an original return or on an amended return if changes on the
amended return cause the taxpayer to become subject to the § 1411 tax.
Conversely, if a taxpayer regroups activities and it is subsequently determined
that the taxpayer is not subject to the § 1411 tax for the year during which
regrouping occurred, the regrouping is void and, subject to limited exceptions,
has no effect for that year and all future years. Despite comments on the
proposed regulations that requested the change, the Treasury Department and
the IRS declined to allow partnerships and S corporations to regroup activities.
* The regulations provide a safe harbor for
real estate professionals as defined in § 469(c)(7)(B) who participate in rental
real estate activities. If a real estate professional participates in rental real estate
activities for more than 500 hours during the year (or has participated in such
activities for more than 500 hours in any five of the last ten taxable years), then
gross rental income from the rental activity and gain or loss from the disposition
of property used in the rental activity is deemed to be derived in the ordinary
course of a trade or business. Reg. § 1.1411-4(g)(7). A real estate professional
who meets the 500 hour threshold would be treated as materially participating
in the rental real estate activity under Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1), (5). Accordingly,
the effect of the safe harbor is that the real estate professional's gross rental
income and gain or loss from the disposition of property is not included in net
investment income and therefore is not subject to the § 1411 tax. A real estate
professional who fails to satisfy the safe harbor is not precluded from
establishing that gross rental income and gain or loss from disposition of
property is not included in net investment income.
* International issues. Under § 951(a),
United States shareholders who own stock in a controlled foreign corporation
on the last day of the corporation's taxable year must include in gross income
their pro rata share of the CFC's subpart F income. Similarly, United States
persons who hold stock of a passive foreign investment company and elect to
treat the PFIC as a qualified electing fund must include in gross income
currently under § 1293 a pro rata share of the PFIC's earnings and profits.
When the CFC or PFIC later distributes its earnings, the shareholders can
exclude the distributions from gross income to the extent they previously were
taxed on them. These income inclusions and exclusions result in positive and
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negative stock basis adjustments. Because these income inclusions are not
treated as dividends unless expressly provided for in the Code, the regulations
do not treat the income inclusions as net investment income for purposes of
§ 1411. Instead, CFC shareholders and PFIC shareholders who have made a
qualified electing fund election must treat actual distributions of previously
taxed earnings as net investment income. Reg. § 1.1411-10(c)(2)(i). One effect
of this rule is that a CFC or PFIC shareholder can have one stock basis for
purposes of chapter 1 of the Code and a different stock basis for purposes of the
§ 1411 tax. To avoid these complexities, the regulations allow a taxpayer to
elect to treat the income inclusions required by § 951(a) and § 1293 as net
investment income. Reg. § 1.1411-10(g). In response to comments on the
proposed regulations, the final regulations allow taxpayers to make the election
on an entity-by-entity basis. The proposed regulations had required the election
to apply to all CFCs and PFICs held by the taxpayer, even if acquired
subsequent to the election. Once made, the election is irrevocable.
* The § 1411 tax cannot be reduced with
foreign tax credits because foreign tax credits reduce taxes imposed by chapter
I of the Code, and § 1411 is located in chapter 2A. Reg. § 1.1411-1(e).
* See also, FAQs on the net investment
income tax, originally released by the IRS on 11/29/12, 2012 TNT 232-47, and
subsequently updated on the IRS web site.
b. Proposed regulations address specific
issues related to the tax on net investment income. On 11/26/13, the
Treasury Department issued proposed regulations regarding the § 1411 tax
on net investment income. REG-130843-13, Net Investment Income Tax, 78
F.R. 72451 (12/2/13). The proposed regulations address discrete issues left
open in the final regulations issued on the same day. T.D. 9644, Net
Investment Income Tax, 78 F.R. 72394 (12/2/13). The proposed regulations
generally are proposed to be effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/13.
However, § 1411 is effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/12.
Taxpayers may rely on the proposed regulations for purposes of complying
with § 1411 until they are issued as final regulations. Some of the significant
topics addressed by the proposed regulations are:
* Gain or loss from dispositions of interests
in partnerships and S corporations. Gain or loss from the disposition of a
partnership interest or stock in an S corporation is treated as net investment
income only to the extent gain or loss would be taken into account by the
partner or shareholder if the entity had sold all its properties for fair market
value immediately before the disposition. I.R.C. 1411(c)(4). The proposed
regulations provide detailed rules for determining the transferor partner or
shareholder's net investment income from the disposition. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411 -
7. Generally, if the transferor realizes a gain from the disposition, the gain
subject to the § 1411 tax is the lesser of the transferor's recognized gain or the
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transferor's allocable share of net gain from a deemed sale by the partnership or
S corporation of property that would give rise to gain or loss includable in
determining the transferor's net investment income. The proposed regulations
also provide an optional, simplified reporting method that transferors who meet
certain eligibility requirements can use instead of the normal calculation.
Generally, the optional, simplified method relies on historic distributive share
amounts that the transferor has received from the partnership or S corporation
to determine a percentage of the firm's assets that are passive with respect to the
transferor and therefore would give rise to net investment income.
* Partnership payments to partners. The
proposed regulations provide guidance on the treatment of certain payments
from partnerships to partners. The treatment of guaranteed payments under
§ 707(c) depends on whether the payments are for services or the use of capital.
Guaranteed payments for the use of capital are included in net investment
income; guaranteed payments for services are not included in net investment
income regardless of whether the payments are subject to self-employment tax.
Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-4(g)(10). The treatment of payments to a retiring partner or
to a deceased partner's successor in interest in liquidation of the partner's entire
interest in the partnership is governed by how such payments are categorized
under § 736. Thus, payments that are treated under § 736(b) as distributions that
give rise to gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a partnership interest are
analyzed for purposes of § 1411 as gain or loss from the disposition of a
partnership interest. Payments that are treated under § 736(a)(1) as a distributive
share of income to the partner are analyzed for purposes of § 1411 in the same
manner as a partner's distributive share of income, and payments that are
treated under § 736(a)(2) as guaranteed payments are analyzed for purposes of
§ 1411 as guaranteed payments. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-4(g)(1 1).
* Capital loss carryforwards. When a
taxpayer determines net investment income for a taxable year, some capital
losses are taken into account in determining net investment income and others
are not. Capital losses that are not taken into account in determining a
taxpayer's net investment income include: (1) capital losses arising from the
sale or disposition of property used in a trade or business in which the taxpayer
materially participates, and (2) capital losses from sales or dispositions of
partnership interests or S corporation stock to the extent that the rules as to such
sales or dispositions do not treat the losses as part of net investment income.
Accordingly, when a taxpayer carries forward capital losses to a later year, the
taxpayer must identify what portion of the capital loss carryforward should not
be taken into account in determining net investment income in the later year.
The proposed regulations impose this requirement and provide examples to
illustrate it. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-4(d)(4)(iii).
* Charitable Remainder Trusts. The
proposed regulations provide charitable remainder trusts with an optional,
simplified method of tracking a beneficiary's net investment income. Prop.
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Reg. § 1.1411-4(d)(3). They also provide guidance for charitable remainder
trusts that have income from a CFC or from a PFIC that is treated as a qualified
electing fund. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-4(d)(2)(ii).
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. No COD from collateralized welfare benefit fund
borrowing. Pinn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-45 (2/11/13). The
taxpayer brothers were sole-shareholders and employees of their home
construction company. The taxpayers caused the corporation to appoint
Local 707 of the National Production Workers Union (of which four office
employees became members) to facilitate the creation of an employee death
benefit arrangement in which the taxpayers as owner/employees were
allowed to participate. The union set up the American Fund as a voluntary
employees beneficiary association (VEBA) which provided a trust for
guaranteed death benefits. The trust funded several million dollars of death
benefits by purchasing life insurance policies. The cost was paid with
deductible expenses by the taxpayers' corporation. Each of the taxpayers
then borrowed $500,000 as a hardship loan, justified by them because of
unexpected taxes. The loans were repayable with annual $50,000 quarterly
payments plus interest, or as a reduction in death benefits. No payments were
made. At the insistence of its independent accountant, the trust reported the
loans in 2002 on a schedule to its form 5500 as in default or uncollectable.
The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) rejected the IRS assertion that the taxpayers
recognized COD income in 2002. The court concluded that the loans
remained collectable from the taxpayers' death benefits with the insurance
policies provided as collateral. The court rejected the IRS argument that the
insurance policies were insufficient because they were owned by the trust,
not the taxpayers. The court observed that, "It follows that if a reduction in
the Pinns' death benefits or capture of insurance proceeds owed (in some
way) to them is an adequate alternative form of repayment, there should be
no COD income just because the Pinns failed to make their quarterly
payments-any more than we would find COD income only because a
homeowner stopped making payments on a $50,000 mortgage secured by a
house worth a million." The court held further that, when a debt is collectible
and fully secured (where the fair market value of the collateral exceeds the
loan balance), default alone will not result in COD income. The court also
observed that the trust could collect the full value of the loans with a
reduction in the taxpayers' death benefits.
2. The IRS says that a cut scrape or bruise is all you
need for 100 percent exclusion under § 104(a)(2). Private Letter Ruling
201311006 (released 3/15/13). This ruling dealt with the scope of the
exclusion for damages for physical personal injury under § 104 that were
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paid out of a qualified settlement fund. It involved damages paid to victims
of a fire and close relatives and estates of deceased victims. Each of the
victims received damages because he or she either suffered a cut, scrape,
bruise, or other physical injury in the incident, or inhaled thick smoke and, as
a result, suffered smoke inhalation during the fire. With no further
explanation than "each of the Victims suffered a personal physical injury or
physical sickness as a result of the Incident," the IRS ruled that 100 percent
of the damages were excludable. The ruling made no effort to separate
damages for the physical injuries and emotional injuries suffered by the
survivors, and it does not mention punitive damages.
a. Settling an unfiled workers' comp claim
is very taxing. Simpson v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 10 (10/28/13). The
taxpayer, who had been discharged by her employer, settled a suit against the
employer and received $262,500 - $12,500 for lost wages and employment
benefits, $98,000 for "emotional distress, physical and mental disability,"
which was based on the amount she could have received as workers'
compensation benefits (as well as an additional 25% penalty that could be
imposed on the employer for failing to advise her of potential workers'
compensation eligibility and benefits) if she had filed such a claim, and
$152,000 of attorney's fees and costs. The taxpayer never filed a workers'
compensation claim, and the settlement agreement was not submitted to the
California Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for the approval
required under the California Labor Code. The Tax Court (Judge Laro)
rejected the taxpayer's argument that $250,000 of the settlement should be
excluded under § 104(a)(1) as worker's compensation, reasoning that "[t]he
intent of the parties to a settlement of a workers' compensation claim does
not necessarily mean that the payment is excludable under section
104(a)(1)." Because the settlement agreement failed to meet the express
requirement of California's workers' compensation laws that approval from
the WCAB be obtained, payments received under the agreement could not
have been received under or pursuant to the state's workers' compensation
act. Rather, the payments were received under a private contract. Turning to
the taxpayer's claim that § 104(a)(2) applied to provide an exclusion, the
court concluded that the settlement was intended to compensate the taxpayer
for both "physical personal injuries and sickness" and emotional distress. It
took a guess, using its best judgment, at how much was attributable to
personal physical injuries and sickness; because the record "[was] not
susceptible of any precisely accurate determination" of the extent to which
the settlement was attributable to personal physical injuries and sickness, it
found that 10 percent of the $98,000 was on account of those physical
injuries and physical sickness (other than emotional distress). Finally, the
court allowed the taxpayer to deduct the full $152,000 of attorney's fees and
court costs as an above the line deduction under § 62(a)(20) because the suit
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that was settled originally had been brought as a suit for employment
discrimination on the basis of gender, age, and harassment in violation of
California law.
* Compare: It looks like damages for
physical sickness caused by emotional distress can be excluded if they go
beyond mere symptomatic manifestations of the underlying emotional
distress. Domeny v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-9 (1/13/10). The
taxpayer received approximately $33,000 in settlement of claims for wrongful
termination of employment and violations of various civil rights statutes. The
taxpayer's former employer paid approximately $8,000 to her that was reflected
on a Form W-2 as employee compensation, $8,000 to the taxpayer's lawyer, for
which no information return was filed, and $17,000 to the taxpayer that was
reflected on a Form 1099-MISC as "nonemployee compensation." The Tax
Court (Judge Gerber) held that the $8,000 paid directly to the taxpayer was
includable wage compensation, and the remaining amount was excludable
under § 104(a)(2) as damages for physical injuries attributable to exacerbation
of multiple sclerosis caused by a hostile work environment. The payor-former
employer's intent in settlement of the claim was evidenced by the issuance of
separate checks and different information returns; these facts indicated that the
former employer intended amount in excess of wages due to be in settlement of
tort claims for physical injuries attributable to the exacerbation of multiple
sclerosis.
* The legislative history indicates that
physical manifestations of emotional distress, such as insomnia, headaches, and
stomach disorders, are not to be treated as physical injuries. H.R. Rep. No. 737,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. 143, n.56 (1996).
* Compare: Having a heart attack can
improve your tax health. Parkinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-142
(6/28/10). The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that one-half of the amount
received by the taxpayer in settlement of suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was excludable under § 104(a)(2), because the payor
intended it to be compensation for a heart attack suffered as a result of the
emotional distress. He reasoned that "a heart attack and its physical aftereffects
constitute physical injury or sickness rather than mere subjective sensations or
symptoms of emotional distress." The other one-half of the settlement was not
excludable because it was compensation for the emotional distress itself.
* Compare: The IRS will treat innocent
ex-cons better than innocent victims of sexual harassment. JIM 201045023,
Tax Treatment of Compensation to Exonerated Prisoners (11/4/10, released
11/12/10). An individual who was wrongfully convicted of a crime and was
wrongfully incarcerated for several years may exclude from gross income under
§ 104(a)(2) the compensation he receives from the state where "[t]he individual
suffered physical injuries and physical sickness while incarcerated." It may
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have helped the result that one of the individuals involved, while meeting with
IRS officials, suffered a seizure and had to be carried out of the room by
paramedics - apparently the result of head injuries sustained while in prison.
* Compare: Compensation to victims of
human trafficking is tax-free. The IRS would have been pilloried if it had
ruled the other way. Notice 2012-12, 2012-6 I.R.B. 365 (1/19/12). Mandatory
restitution payments awarded under 18 U.S.C. § 1593, which criminalizes
(1) holding a person to a condition of peonage; (2) kidnapping or carrying away
a person to sell the person into involuntary servitude or to be held as a slave,
(3) providing or obtaining a person's services or labor by actual or threatened
use of certain means including force, physical restraint, serious harm, and abuse
of legal process, and (4) sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or
coercion, are excluded from gross income.
* But see P.L.R. 200041022 (7/17/00),
which required that a damage award be allocated between (a) damages awarded
for the period of sexual harassment without observable injury and (b) damages
awarded for the period after an incident of sexual harassment that resulted in
physical injury occurred.
3. "Neither a borrower nor a lender be, for loan oft
loses both itself and friend," and a loan gives rise to excludable COD
income, not compensation income. McAllister v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-96 (4/8/13). During 2005, the taxpayer borrowed a total of
$78,849 from his employer and executed promissory notes in favor of the
employer. The promissory notes, which did not have repayment dates and
did not require interest payments, required the taxpayer to repay the loans
from bonuses he earned through incentive plans that formed part of his
compensation. The taxpayer's employment ended in 2007 when his
employer encountered financial difficulties. The taxpayer did not report any
portion of the $78,849 as income on his return for 2007, which he timely
filed in March 2008. The employer was acquired by a corporation that issued
to the taxpayer in May 2008 a Form 1099-MISC that reported $78,849 as
nonemployee compensation for 2007. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison)
rejected the government's contention that the taxpayer's employer paid to the
taxpayer in 2007 a constructive bonus, which the taxpayer used to repay the
loans. Instead, the court concluded that the taxpayer had $78,849 of
cancellation of indebtedness income in 2007 because the Form 1099-MISC
memorialized the decision of the corporation that acquired the employer to
forgive the debt. The fact that the Form 1099-MISC classified the income as
nonemployee compensation was "a bookkeeping error." The court also
concluded that, immediately before the discharge of indebtedness, the
taxpayer was insolvent in the amount of $22,641 and therefore could exclude
this portion of the income under § 108(a)(1)(B). The court declined to
impose the accuracy-related penalty for a substantial understatement of
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income tax imposed by § 6662(a) and (b)(2). The court concluded that the
taxpayer had reasonable cause for and acted in good faith with respect to the
underpayment and therefore was not liable for the accuracy-related penalty
pursuant to § 6664(c)(1).
4. Equal tax rights for nonresident alien gamblers
who lose. Park v. Commissioner, 722 F.3d 384 (D.C. Cir. 7/9/13), rev'g 136
T.C. 569 (2011). In an opinion by Judge Kavanaugh, the D.C. Circuit held
that a nonresident alien who has gambling winnings in the United States
should be treated the same as a U.S. citizen and should be allowed to subtract
losses from their wins within a gambling session to arrive at per-session wins
or losses. The court rejected the IRS's argument that for purposes of § 871,
which taxes non-resident aliens for all "interest . . ., dividends, rents, salaries,
wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments,
and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and
income" received from sources in the United States, gambling winnings are
computed on a per bet rule. The court quoted IRS Office of Chief Counsel
Memorandum AM2008-11 (2008) [CCA 2008-011]: "'We think that the
fluctuating wins and losses left in play are not accessions to wealth until the
taxpayer redeems her tokens and can definitively calculate' her net gains. ...
Because gain or loss may be calculated over a series of wagers, a 'taxpayer
who plays the slot machines[] recognizes a wagering gain or loss at the time
she redeems her tokens.' ... Therefore, U.S. citizens do not 'treat every play
or wager as a taxable event.' ... The result is that U.S. citizens can measure
their gambling winnings and losses on a per-session basis." The court cited
Shollenberger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-306, for that same
proposition.
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) had
reasoned that a nonresident alien cannot "deduct or offset gambling losses
against gambling winnings," in part because for a U.S. citizen, the deduction for
gambling losses is an itemized deduction. "Thus, a nonresident alien who is not
engaged in gambling as a business within the United States is subject to tax
under section 871 (a)(1) on gross income from gambling without a deduction for
gambling losses." The Tax Court opinion did not address the reasoning of IRS
Office of Chief Counsel Memorandum AM2008-11, 4 (2008).
5. The Tax Court instructs you how not to word
discrimination suit settlement agreements. Molina v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-226 (9/23/13). In the course of holding that no portion of the
proceeds received from settling a discrimination claim against the taxpayer's
former employer were excluded under § 104(a)(2), the Tax Court (Judge
Wells) observed that "the nature of underlying claims cannot be determined
from a general release that is broad and inclusive," and "all settlement
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proceeds are included in gross income where there is a general release but no
allocation of settlement proceeds among various claims."
6. Atheists unite! Freedom From Religion Foundation,
Inc. v. Lew, 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-7103 (W.D. Wisc. 11/21/13). The District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin (Judge Crabb) held that§ 107(2), which excludes from gross income a minister's "rental allowance
paid to him as part of his compensation" violates the establishment clause of
the First Amendment. The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of 107(1), which excludes the rental value of a
parsonage provided in kind.
Stay tuned. This certainly isn't the end of
the story.
7. National Mortgage Settlement payments to
homeowners who got screwed by their lender might or might not be
taxable. Rev. Rul. 2014-2, 2014-2 I.R.B. 255 (12/18/13). This revenue
ruling deals with the tax treatment of payments received by homeowners
under the National Mortgage Settlement (NMS) between the government and
bank mortgage servicers regarding mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure
abuses. It addresses several different situations. First, a taxpayer who
receives an NMS payment as a result of foreclosure on the taxpayer's
principal residence must include the payment in the amount realized on the
foreclosure, but the taxpayer may exclude any resulting gain from gross
income to the extent allowed under § 121. Second, if the property contained
one or more additional dwelling units that were not used as the taxpayer's
principal residence, the entire NMS payment is allocable to the portion of the
property that the taxpayer used as a principal residence. Third, a taxpayer
who receives any portion of a deceased borrower's NMS payment stands in
the shoes of the borrower to determine the taxable portion, if any, of the
NMS payment. Any taxable amount is income in respect of a decedent (IRD)
under § 69 1(a).
C. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation
Homes
1. Computing the home office deduction just got
easier, but qualifying for it still remains as difficult as ever. This revenue
procedure is inadvisable unless the client lives in Dogpatch, Arkansas, or
(more generally), if the client can afford your fees, the deduction will
easily exceed $1,500. Rev. Proc. 2013-13, 2013-6 I.R.B. 478 (1/15/13). This
revenue procedure provides an optional safe harbor method that taxpayers
may use to determine the amount of expenses deductible under § 280A for
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business use of a portion of a personal residence, i.e., the "home office
deduction," in lieu of calculating, allocating, and substantiating of actual
expenses. Taxpayers using the safe harbor method must satisfy all
requirements of § 280A for determining eligibility to claim a deduction.
Under the revenue procedure, in lieu of depreciation, and allocable repairs,
utilities, and insurance, a taxpayer may deduct $5 per square foot for up to
300 square feet (i.e., a maximum of $1,500 per year) for the portion of the
residence used exclusively for business as required by § 280A. A taxpayer
electing the safe harbor method for a taxable year cannot deduct any actual
expenses related to the qualified business use of that home, but may deduct
all of the qualified home mortgage interest and real estate taxes, as well as
any allowable casualty losses, as itemized deductions. (Depreciation for the
year is treated as zero.) A taxpayer using the safe harbor method may deduct
allowable trade or business expenses unrelated to the qualified business use
of the home, such as advertising, wages, and supplies. An election for any
taxable year is irrevocable, but the election is year-by-year, and changing
from the safe harbor method in one year to actual expenses in a succeeding
taxable year, or vice-versa, is not a change of accounting method. The safe
harbor method does not apply to an employee with a home office if the
employee receives from an employer advances, allowances, or
reimbursements for expenses for the business use of the employee's home.
There are other details and several examples.
* For one of the gotchas that still remains,
see Hamacher v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 348 (1990).
2. What the taxpayer says his tax lawyer said is a
"fair" price is not probative evidence. DiDonato v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-11 (1/14/13). Among the many issues in this case, virtually all
of which went disastrously for the taxpayer, was the applicability of the
§ 280A limitation on deductions for personal residences used for mixed
business and personal purposes. The taxpayer rented a property to his father
as the father's principal residence for the entire year in question.
Notwithstanding the general rule in § 280A(d) that a family member's use of
a dwelling unit is treated as personal by the taxpayer, § 280(d)(3) provides
that a taxpayer is not treated as using the property for personal purposes for
any period for which the dwelling unit is rented to the family member for use
as the family member's principal residence at a fair rent. The Tax Court
(Judge Laro) held that the taxpayer failed to prove that the rent was "fair"
because the taxpayer "offered no evidence at trial as to the fair rental value
of the ... property other than [his own] testimony that the amount of rent to
be charged was set by his tax attorney and, in [his own] view, the rent was
fair by virtue of his belief that the property was in "deplorable shape." That
testimony alone was unpersuasive, because the legislative history makes
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clear that the fairness component be determined on the basis of comparable
rents in the area. See H.R. Rept. No. 97-404, at 8 (1981).
* See an earlier opinion in this case.
DiDonato v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-153 (6/29/11). The Tax Court
(Judge Laro) denied a 2004 charitable contribution deduction on grounds of
lack of substantiation under § 170(f)(8). The alleged donation was
memorialized by a 2004 contract between taxpayer and the charitable recipient
but the formal transfer did not occur until 2006, when the donation was
acknowledged. The 2006 acknowledgment was too late to substantiate a 2004
deduction because it was received by taxpayer after his 2004 federal income tax
return was filed.
3. Section 183 "does not apply only to wealthy
taxpayers who engage in unprofitable activities to create 'paper' losses
to offset against unrelated income." Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-221 (9/18/13). The facts and ultimate holding of this § 183
hobby loss case involving a horse breeding activity conducted by two
partners that spanned 15 years without showing a profit were unremarkable.
(Because the purported partnership was a "small partnership" that did not
elect to have TEFRA apply, the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review in
individual deficiency cases items otherwise subject to partnership-level
proceedings, including the disputed losses from the horse-breeding activity.)
Every one of the nine factors of Reg. § 1.183-2(b) favored the IRS. However,
two aspects of the case stand out. First, the court (Judge Laro) reiterated that
§ 183 "does not apply only to wealthy taxpayers who engage in unprofitable
activities to create 'paper' losses to offset against unrelated income." (This
case involved middle-income wage earners.) The analysis simply "compares
the income generated by an activity with the taxpayer's taxable income from
sources other than the activity and quer[ies] whether the taxpayer's ability to
earn income elsewhere allows her to finance an otherwise unprofitable
activity from which she derives some personal or tax benefits." Between
1993 and 2008, the taxpayers together had a combined wage income of $1.2
million. The horse breeding activity over that period was less than $15,000,
but it incurred more than $1.6 million in expenses. The taxpayers financed
these expenses using their wage income, life insurance proceeds, a home
equity loan, and personal savings. "The income and funds from these other
sources thus enabled petitioners to engage in their horse-breeding activity
that ... ha[d] strong personal elements." The second significant aspect of the
case is the court's observations about witnesses' credibility and
uncontradicted testimony, with respect to which the court stated as follows:
We determine the credibility of each witness, weigh each
piece of evidence, draw appropriate inferences, and choose
between conflicting inferences in finding the facts of a case.
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The mere fact that one party presents unopposed testimony
does not necessarily mean that the elicited testimony will
result in a finding of fact in that party's favor. We will not
accept a witness' testimony on its face if we find that our
impression of the witness coupled with our review of the
credible facts at hand conveys to us an understanding
contrary to the spoken word.
* One witness's testimony was
"ambiguous, equivocal, and sometimes evasive," and the other's, while
"credible" was "unhelpful and unreliable."
D. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. Is this a casualty loss in limbo? Alphonso v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 247 (3/16/11). The taxpayer owned stock in a N.Y.
cooperative housing corporation from which she rented an apartment as her
personal residence. When a retaining wall on the grounds of the apartment
complex collapsed, the corporation levied an assessment for the cost of
repairs, and the taxpayer paid $26,390, with respect to which she claimed a
casualty loss deduction of $23,188 (reflecting computational limitations in§ 163(h)). The IRS disallowed the deduction, and the Tax Court (Judge
Chiechi) upheld the disallowance. Judge Chiechi reasoned that under the
relevant state law and controlling legal instruments, the taxpayer had no
property interest in the retaining wall, which was part of the common
grounds - nothing in the lease, the corporation charter and by-laws, or any
other governing documents indicated that the taxpayer possessed a leasehold
interest, an easement, or any other property interest in the common grounds.
Finally, Judge Chiechi rejected the taxpayer's argument that § 216, which
allows cooperative apartment owners to deduct their shares of the real estate
taxes and mortgage interest paid by the cooperative corporation, should be
extended by judicial interpretation to casualty losses. Although Judge
Chiechi rejected the IRS's argument that the absence of a reference to
casualty losses in § 216 conclusively determined that it did not apply to
casualty losses, after examining the legislative history she concluded that
Congress intended § 216 to apply only to interest and real estate taxes.
a. No, it's not in limbo; the loss is allowed
by the Second Circuit. Alphonso v. Commissioner, 708 F.3d 344 (2d Cir
2/6/13), rev'g 136 T.C. 247 (2011). The Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Kearse, reversed the Tax Court's decision. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the right of a stockholder in a cooperative housing
corporation to use the grounds and to exclude persons who are not tenants or
the guests of tenants, coupled with obligations as a tenant stockholder under
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the cooperative lease, constituted a property interest in the land sufficient to
entitle the taxpayer to the claimed casualty loss deduction.
2. Home mortgage interest is deductible only if you
actually pay it. Smoker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-56 (2/21/13).
For the years in question, the taxpayer paid over $40,000 of home mortgage
interest and approximately $28,000 of home mortgage interest was deferred
and capitalized into the principal amount. Although the statutory language of
§ 163(h)(3) allows a deduction for qualified residence interest that is "paid or
accrued" during the taxable year, the Tax Court (Judge Laro) upheld the
denial of a deduction for the accrued but unpaid interest, because the
taxpayer was an individual on the cash method - which is the method
applicable to all individuals with respect to personal expenses. Under well-
established precedents, a cash method taxpayer may deduct in any taxable
year only interest actually paid during that taxable year. The accrued but
unpaid qualified residence interest would not be deductible until actually
paid. Inasmuch as no evidence was introduced to show that taxpayer relied
on professionals in preparation of his tax return, the accuracy-related penalty
was upheld.
a. See Here, Mr. & Mrs. Hargreaves!
Hargreaves v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2013-37 (5/15/13). Taxpayers
purchased a home in California with a "negative amortization loan" from a
bank. For the year 2007, they received a substitute Form 1098, which
characterized interest as (1) gross interest paid of $59,554; (2) interest
shortage of $33,288; and (3) net interest paid of $26,266, with the interest
shortage added to the balance of the loan. In their self-prepared federal
income tax return for 2007, they deducted the gross interest amount. The Tax
Court (Judge Haines) in this S case held that only the net interest was
deductible, but did not uphold the accuracy-related penalty because taxpayer
husband "credibly testified that he reported the interest deduction using what
he thought the Form 1098 stated."
3. The Court of Federal Claims rejects as a
"shibboleth"' the proposition that whether a "theft" has occurred, for
purposes of § 165(c)(3) depends upon whether a theft has occurred
under state law. Goeller v. United States, 109 Fed. Cl. 534 (3/20/13). The
7. [5] The Gileadites captured the fords of the Jordan leading to Ephraim,
and whenever a survivor of Ephraim said, "Let me cross over," the men of Gilead
asked him, "Are you an Ephraimite?" If he replied, "No," [6] they said, "All right,
say 'Shibboleth."' If he said, "Sibboleth," because he could not pronounce the word
correctly, they seized him and killed him at the fords of the Jordan. Forty-two
thousand Ephraimites were killed at that time. (Judges 12:5-6 (NIV).)
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Court of Federal Claims (Judge Allegra) denied both the taxpayers' and the
government's cross-motions for summary judgment in a refund suit
involving whether the taxpayers suffered a theft loss deductible under
§ 165(c)(3) as result of a failed investment in a real estate business. The court
observed that both the taxpayers and the government accepted, and cited
authority for, the proposition that whether a "theft" has occurred, for
purposes of § 165(c)(3) depends upon whether a theft has occurred under
state law, but disputed whether the controlling law is that of Ohio or of
California. However, in denying the motions on the ground that there were
material factual issues to be resolved by trial, the court unequivocally
rejected the proposition that whether a "theft" has occurred, for purposes of
§ 165(c)(3) depends upon whether a theft has occurred under state law.
Rather, the court held that there was a federal tax law concept of theft based
on "a long-standing and well-accepted meaning" of the term theft found in
Black's Law Dictionary, which "defines that term as '[t]he fraudulent taking
of corporeal personal property belonging to another, from his possession, or
from the possession of some person holding the same for him, without his
consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value of the same, and to
appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking."' The court also
observed that "by the time the 1954 [Internal Revenue] Code was enacted, it
also was well-accepted, based on Black's Law Dictionary that the definition
of 'theft' includes a crime in which one 'obtains possession of property by
lawful means and thereafter appropriates the property to the taker's own
use."' Furthermore, "these definitions of 'theft' are largely indistinguishable
from that employed in the Model Penal Code, which defines a 'theft' as
occurring where a person 'unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control
over, movable property of another with purpose to deprive him thereof.' ...
This is relevant because the Model Code's provisions have often been
employed in determining the scope of an offense referenced in a Federal
statute." These "well-accepted definitions of 'theft"' thus render reference to
state law unnecessary. The court concluded that "where a federal statute uses
a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it,
the practice is to give that term its common meaning," and saw "no reason
why this rule ought not apply to section 165(c)(3)." Nothing in the statutory
language, its legislative history, or the relevant regulations suggested
otherwise.
* For authorities holding that to claim a
theft loss, the taxpayer must prove that a theft occurred under the applicable
state law, see, e.g., Citron v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 200 (1991) (mere refusal to
return property was not equivalent of embezzlement under state law); Paine v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 736 (1975), aff'd by order, 523 F.2d 1053 (5th
Cir.1975) (denying a loss deduction under § 165(c)(3) to an investor who
purchased publicly traded stock at a price that was inflated by fraudulent
financial statements; no "theft" had occurred under state law because the
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taxpayer failed to prove a causal connection between the misrepresentations and
the loss); Alioto v. Commissioner, 699 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 2012) (taxpayer failed
to demonstrate that investment loss was due to false statements that would
constitute theft under relevant state law); Estate of Meriano v. Commissioner,
142 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 1998) (estate was entitled to theft loss for attorney's
failure to return excessive amounts withdrawn from the estate because a theft
occurred under state law; extensive analysis of relevant state law); Bellis v.
Commissioner, 540 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1976) (denying a theft loss deduction
because under relevant state law no theft had occurred).
4. Another case where married filing separately
significantly changes the ground rules. Field v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-111 (4/18/13). Married taxpayers must file a joint return in
order to claim the § 26 credit for adoption expenses. The Tax Court (Judge
Thornton) held that the joint filing requirement does not violate the
constitutional right to equal protection even though the married taxpayer who
filed separately had adopted a child alone, without her husband also adopting
the child.
5. Standard deduction for 2014. Rev. Proc., 2013-35,
2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (10/31/13). The standard deduction for 2014 will be
$12,400 for joint returns and surviving spouses, $6,200 for unmarried
individuals and heads of households, and $6,200 for married individuals
filing separately.
6. Long distance to a remote work site is not travel
away from home. Cor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-240 (10/22/13).
The taxpayer was required to commute daily from his home in Las Vegas to
a remote test site in the Nevada desert not served by public transportation.
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
extraordinary commuting expense should be allowable as a deduction
because of the exceptional nature of the commute compared to ordinary
commuting. The court cited the general principle that travel expenses going
to or from work on a daily basis are not ordinary business expenses.
E. Divorce Tax Issues
1. Here's how to shift taxation of child support
payments to the custodial spouse if state law allows it. DeLong v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-70 (3/11/13). The Tax Court (Judge
Kroupa) held that an unallocated family support allowance that under
California law was intended to provide both spousal and child support that
terminated entirely upon the death of the custodial payee spouse, but was not
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by its terms reduced upon emancipation of the children, was entirely
alimony.
2. Dueling lawyers' letters do not a divorce or
separation instrument make. Faylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-
143 (6/5/13). The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) held that a series of letters
between divorcing spouses' lawyers regarding temporary support prior to the
entry of a divorce decree did not constitute a divorce or separation agreement
where neither spouse signed two proposed temporary support agreements.
Accordingly, payments by the husband to the wife during the pendency of
the divorce were not deductible as alimony.
F. Education
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
G. Alternative Minimum Tax
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
1. Saving the world from double deductions. The
details emerge only nine years after Congress acted. T.D. 9633,
Limitations on Duplication of Net Built-in Losses, 78 F.R. 54156 (9/3/13).
The Treasury Department has promulgated final regulations, Reg. § 1.362-4,
under § 362(e)(2), which was enacted in 2004, with only minor clarifying
changes from the proposed regulations (71 F.R. 62067), which were
published in 2006. Section 362(e)(2) prevents taxpayers from transmuting a
single economic loss into two (or more) tax losses by taking advantage of the
dual application of the substituted basis rules in § 358 for stock received in a
§ 351 transaction and in § 362 for assets transferred to a corporation in a
§ 351 transaction. If the aggregate basis of the property transferred to a
corporation in a § 351 transaction exceeds the aggregate fair market value,
the aggregate basis of the property must be reduced to its fair market value.
The final regulations include examples illustrating the application of
§ 362(e)(2) to transactions qualifying as both § 351 transactions and
reorganizations, as well as an example illustrating the nonapplicability of
§ 362(e)(2) to triangular reorganizations that do not include a transfer to
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which § 362(a) applies. The regulations provide two exceptions to the
application of § 362(e)(2). First, a transaction will not be subject to
§ 362(e)(2) to the extent that the transferor distributes the stock received in
the transaction and, in the distribution, no gain or loss is recognized and no
person takes the stock or other property with a basis determined by reference
to the transferor's basis in the distributed stock. This exception applies
principally to distributions subject to § 355(a). In this situation there is no
duplicated loss that could be recognized by any taxpayer. Second, a
transaction will not be subject to § 362(e)(2) if the transaction is between
persons not connected to the United States, the transaction does not become
relevant for Federal tax purposes within two years of the transfer, and the
transaction is not undertaken pursuant to a plan to reduce or avoid Federal
taxes. This exception relates to transfers between foreign subsidiaries. The
assumption of a transferor's liabilities by the transferee generally does not
affect the application of § 362(e). However, if a § 362(e)(2)(C) election is
made, the reduction to stock basis is limited to the amount that the transferee
would otherwise reduce its basis in the transferred assets. This prevents the
reduction of stock basis attributable to contingent liabilities associated with a
trade or business, for which basis is specifically preserved under
§ 358(h)(2)(A). Furthermore, when the property transferred is an interest in a
partnership with liabilities, the final regulations provide that the value of a
partnership interest is the sum of cash that the transferee would receive for
such interest, increased by any Reg. § 1.752-1 liabilities (as defined in Reg.
§ 1.752-1(a)(4)) of the partnership that are allocated to the transferee with
regard to such transferred interest under § 752. See Reg. § 1.362-4(h), Ex.
8(ii). Finally, Reg. § 1.362-4(d) provides details on how to make the
§ 362(h)(2)(C) election to reduce the transferor's stock basis in lieu of the
corporation reducing asset basis; the regulations generally adopt the rules set
forth in Notice 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 694, and the proposed regulations, but
expand those rules significantly. A § 362(e)(2)(C) election is irrevocable. It
may be made protectively and will have no effect to the extent it is
determined that § 362(e)(2) does not apply. For an election to be effective,
(1) prior to filing "a Section 362(e)(2)(C) Statement" the transferor and
transferee must enter into a written, binding agreement to elect to apply §
362(e)(2)(C, and (2) detailed requirements for filing the "Section
362(e)(2)(C) Statement," which is required to contain extraordinarily
detailed information about the transfer, must be followed. If the transferor is
a person required to file a U.S. return for the year of the transfer, the
transferor must include the "Section 362(e)(2)(C) Statement" on or with its
timely filed (including extensions) original return for the taxable year in
which the transfer occurred. There is a long list of the persons required to file
the statement if the transferor is not required to file a U.S. return for the year
of the transfer.
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2. Built-in losses cannot be "imported" either from
offshore or from a U.S. tax-exempt. REG-161948-05, Limitations on the
Importation of Net Built-in Losses, 78 F.R. 54971 (9/9/13). The Treasury
Department and IRS have published proposed regulations under
§§ 334(b)(1)(B) and 362(e)(1), dealing with the importation of built-in losses
in § 332 subsidiary liquidations and § 351 transfers. (These regulations do
not deal with § 362(e)(2); Reg. § 1.362-4 deals with § 362(e)(2).) Section
362(e)(1) applies property-by-property to assign each transferred property a
fair market value basis rather than the normal § 362(a) transferred basis, if
(1) there is net built-in loss in the aggregate transferred properties and
(2) gain or loss realized by the transferor with respect to the property was not
subject to U.S. income tax immediately prior to the transfer. If a controlled
subsidiary is liquidated and (1) there is net built-in loss in the aggregate
transferred properties and (2) gain or loss realized by the transferor with
respect to the property was not subject to U.S. income tax immediately prior
to the transfer, § 334(b)(1)(B) provides the parent with a fair market value
basis in properties received in the liquidation.
* Prop. Reg. § 1.362-3 terms the
transactions to which § 362(e)(1) applies "loss importation transactions," and
the property to which it applies "loss importation property." The proposed
regulations use a hypothetical sale analysis to identify loss importation
property. The proposed regulations clarify that § 362(e)(1) applies to transfers
by U.S. tax-exempt organizations as well as transfers by foreign persons. The
proposed regulations also provide a look-through rule for transfers by grantor
trusts, partnerships, and S corporations, and in certain "tax-avoidance"
transactions, as well as rules dealing with tiered entities. The proposed
regulations clarify that whether a transaction is a loss importation transaction is
determined with respect to the aggregate amount of built-in gain and built-in
loss in all importation property acquired from all transferors in the transaction,
unlike the transferor-by-transferor approach of § 362(e)(2). Detailed basis
calculation rules are specified. The proposed regulations are illustrated by nine
examples. The rules in Prop. Reg.§ 1.362-3 will apply to any transaction
occurring on or after the date these regulations are finalized, unless effected
pursuant to a binding agreement that was in effect prior to that date and at all
times thereafter. Taxpayers may apply the proposed regulations to transactions
occurring after 10/22/04 - almost 9 years retroactively.
* Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.334-
1(b) apply similar rules to "loss importation transactions," and "loss importation
property" in § 332 liquidations. All of the examples deal with the liquidation of
a foreign subsidiary by a U.S. parent.
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B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. Leona Helmsley, eat your heart out! Welle v.
Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 19 (6/27/13). The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of Terry Welle Construction, Inc. (TWC). He used TWC to
facilitate the construction of a new home for himself and his wife. To keep
track of material and other construction costs, the taxpayer caused TWC to
open a "cost plus" job account on its books, but he personally acted as the
general contractor during construction. The taxpayer personally hired the
subcontractors and ordered building supplies from the vendors in TWC's
name. TWC kept track of construction costs and TWC's framing crew
framed the home. The taxpayer reimbursed TWC for its costs, including
overhead, but did not pay TWC an amount equal to the profit margin of 6 to
7 percent that TWC normally charged its customers. The IRS asserted that
the taxpayer received a constructive dividend from TWC in an amount equal
to TWC's forgone profit. The IRS's theory was that Magnon v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 980 (1980), which held that a shareholder of a
corporation received a constructive dividend when the corporation performed
electrical contracting services on the shareholder's personal property
primarily for the shareholder's own benefit and without any expectation of
repayment, stood for the proposition that the amount of the dividend
included not only the costs incurred by the corporation, but also an amount
equal to the corporation's customary profit margin. The Tax Court (Judge
Marvel) rejected the IRS's claim, stating that in Magnon "we did not hold,
and the Commissioner did not assert, that the constructive dividend the
shareholder received included an amount corresponding to the corporation's
forgone profit." Judge Marvel held that there was no constructive dividend
because "[a] finding that a shareholder received a constructive dividend from
a corporation is only appropriate where 'corporate assets are diverted to or
for the benefit of a shareholder,"' and that did not occur in this case. Judge
Marvel concluded that Melvin v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 63 (1987), aff'd on
other grounds, 894 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir.1990), in which the rental by a
corporation to its shareholders for personal purposes at a rental equal to the
corporation's costs with respect to the vehicles resulted in a dividend equal
to the amount by which the fair rental values of the automobiles exceeded the
reimbursements paid to the corporation, was distinguishable. Judge Marvel's
reasoning was as follows:
TWC maintained its corporate infrastructure and workforce
for business purposes. Mr. Welle's use of TWC during the
construction of petitioners' lakefront home was at most
incidental to those purposes. The most that can be said about
Mr. Welle's use of TWC is that he used the corporation as a
conduit in paying subcontractors and vendors and that he
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obtained some limited services from corporate employees.
Mr. Welle fully reimbursed the corporation for all costs,
including overhead, associated with those services, and
TWC did not divert actual value otherwise available to it by
failing to apply its customary profit margin in determining
the amount Mr. Welle had to reimburse the corporation. We
therefore conclude that this arrangement did not operate as a
vehicle for the distribution of TWC's current or accumulated
earnings and profits within the meaning of section 316(a).
* We think the result in this case turns on
the fact that, except possibly with respect to the use of TWC's framing crew by
the taxpayer, nothing in the facts indicates that the taxpayer's use of TWC's
services resulted in TWC forgoing profits that could have been earned from
transactions with third parties had TWC not been used by the taxpayer to
facilitate construction of his personal residence in the manner he did. In other
words, TWC incurred no opportunity costs. Had TWC incurred opportunity
costs, the result very well might have been different.
C. Liquidations
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
D. S Corporations
1. Realized but unrecognized gain is not tax-exempt
income. Ball v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-39 (2/6/13). The taxpayers
owned stock of an S corporation that had a wholly-owned subsidiary for
which it made a QSub election. They argued that the basis of their S
corporation stock had been increased by the amount of built-in gain on the
stock of the QSub that went unrecognized pursuant to § 332 as a result of the
QSub election, and that the increased basis supported claimed passed-
through loss. Their position was based on the argument that the unrecognized
gain was tax-exempt income that resulted in a basis increase under
§ 1367(a)(1)(A). The Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) rejected the taxpayer's
argument, and held that unrecognized gain resulting from a QSub election
does not create an item of income or tax-exempt income pursuant to
§ 1366(a)(1)(A). The court reasoned that nonrecognition rules do not exempt
income from taxation but merely defer recognition through substituted basis
rules.
2. S corporation shareholders aren't allowed to just
make up their own basis adjustment rules. Barnes v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-80 (3/21/12). The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) agreed with the
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IRS in holding - unsurprisingly - that there is no upward stock basis
adjustment under § 1367 for amounts that are erroneously reported by the
shareholder as § 1366 pass-through income but that do not correspond to, but
exceed, the shareholder's actual pro rata share of pass-through income.
Likewise, § 1367(a)(2)(B) requires an S corporation shareholder to reduce
stock basis by any losses that the shareholder is required to take into account
under § 1366(a)(1)(A), even if the shareholder does not actually claim the
pass-through losses on the shareholder's return. Because the taxpayer had
reported gain rather than loss in a prior year in which a very large loss had
been passed through, the shareholder had no basis to support passed-through
losses in the year in question.
a. And the D.C. Circuit sees it the same way
- "the Barneses paid more in taxes than they owed. But so it goes."
Barnes v. Commissioner, 712 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 4/5/13). The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Nothing in [sections 1366 and 1367] suggests that a
shareholder's basis is not reduced if the shareholder fails to
take a deduction for the corporation's losses. Indeed, the fact
that the Code explicitly provides that a shareholder's basis is
increased by corporate income "only to the extent such
amount is included in the shareholder's gross income on his
return," ... but provides no similar exception for corporate
losses, militates against the Barneses' preferred reading. See
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a
statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). This difference makes sense.
Although Congress had every reason to prevent taxpayers
from reaping a double benefit by failing to report income
while still being credited with an increased basis, it had no
reason to permit them to indefinitely delay the realization of
losses.
3. The Third Circuit says that QSub status isn't
"property" under the Bankruptcy Code and tells the Ninth Circuit that
it was all wrong when it held that S corporation status was "property"
under the Bankruptcy Code. In re The Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716
F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 5/21/13), rev'g 466 B.R. 666 (Bankr. D. Del. 1/24/12). A
debtor QSub, but not its parent S corporation, was in bankruptcy. After the
bankruptcy petition was filed the parent corporation revoked its S
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corporation status, which under § 1361(b)(3)(C) automatically terminated the
debtor-subsidiary's QSub status, converting it into a C corporation. The
bankruptcy court held that the parent corporation's action that terminated
pass-through tax benefits that the debtor subsidiary had enjoyed was a
voidable transfer of estate property in violation of Bankruptcy Code § 549.
The debtor's QSub status was property of the bankruptcy estate, and as a
result of the loss of that status the bankruptcy estate was required to, and did,
pay state income taxes it would not otherwise have been required to pay.
(The corporation had not paid any federal income taxes, but the IRS's claim
for any deficiency would be affected, so the IRS opposed the debtor's
argument that its QSub status was property of the bankruptcy estate.)
Accordingly, the revocation of the parent's status as an S corporation and the
termination of the debtor's status as a QSub were held to be "void and of no
effect." The bankruptcy court relied on In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 107 B.R.
832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1991), which held
that a subsidiary's NOL carryforward was property of the subsidiary's
bankruptcy estate and that the parent's plan to claim a worthless stock
deduction, which would have eliminated the NOL would violate the
automatic stay, and its progeny holding that S corporation status is
"property" and that the termination of an S election can be a voidable
transfer. See In re Bakersfield Westar, 226 B.R. 227 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998);
In re Frank Funaro Inc., 263 B.R. 892 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); In re Trans-
Lines W., Inc., 203 B.R. 653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996); In re Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 162 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
* The Third Circuit in an opinion by Judge
Jordan, reversed, first finding based on nuances of the Bankruptcy Code, that
the Internal Revenue Code, rather than state law, governs whether an entity's
tax status is a property interest for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The court
of appeals concluded that the extension of Prudential Lines, by In re Trans-
Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. 653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996), and a series of cases
that followed it, which held that a corporation's revocation of its S corporation
status prior to filing for bankruptcy was a prepetition transfer of property
avoidable by the trustee pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 548 was "untenable."
First, NOLs are not contingent at all; a bankrupt corporate debtor has a specific
amount of NOL at the time of the bankruptcy filing that are a function of the
debtor's operations prior to bankruptcy; the NOLs "are not subject either to
revocation by the shareholders or termination by the IRS." In contrast, under
§ 1362, the shareholders of an S corporation can terminate its status at will,
"regardless of how long it has been an S-corp and whatever its pre-bankruptcy
operating history has been"; "the tax status of the entity is entirely contingent
on the will of the shareholders." Second, NOLs have a readily determinable
value that is available to the bankruptcy estate, either as a carryback or a
carryforward against future earnings, while the value of the S corporation
election is dependent on it not being revoked and the amount and timing of
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future earnings. NOL carryforwards may be monetized while S corporation
status cannot. Third, S corporation status cannot be a property interest because
S corporation status can be automatically terminated in a variety of manners by
which the corporation can become ineligible to be an S corporation. Fourth,
even if S corporation status had some value to the estate, because it allows the
debtor corporation to "place its tax liabilities on a non-debtor" shareholder, a
"tax classification over which the debtor has no control is not a 'legal or
equitable interest[] of the debtor in property' for purposes of § 541 [of the
Bankruptcy Code]." Finally, to allow all of the debtor corporation's profits to
remain in the bankruptcy estate while transferring the tax liability to the non-
debtor shareholders would be inequitable. After so reasoning that S corporation
status was not "property" under the Bankruptcy Code, the court of appeals
found that "QSub status is an a fortiori case." A QSub's continuing status as
such is contingent on a number of factors entirely outside of the QSub's control,
and a QSub cannot "transfer or otherwise dispose of its QSub status." Thus,
QSub status cannot be "property." Furthermore, even if QSub status is property,
it could not be property of the bankruptcy estate; it would be property of the
subsidiary's S corporation parent. For tax purposes a QSub does not exist.
Finally, the court added the coup-de-grice:
Moreover, allowing QSub status to be treated as the property
of the debtor subsidiary rather than the non-debtor parent, as
the Bankruptcy Court did in this case, places remarkable
restrictions on the rights of the parent, restrictions that have
no foundation in either the I.R.C. or the Code. First, the
corporate parent loses not only the statutory right to
terminate its subsidiary's QSub election, see I.R.C. §
1361(b)(3)(B), (D), but also its right to terminate its own S-
corp election, see id. § 1361(d). Second, the corporate parent
loses the ability to sell the subsidiary's shares to any
purchaser other than an S-corp, and would then be required
to sell 100 percent of the shares, because any other sale
would trigger the loss of the subsidiary's QSub status. See
id. § 1361(b)(3)(B). Third, the S-corp parent and its
shareholders lose the ability to sell the parent to a C-
corporation, partnership, or other non-S-corp entity, to a
non-resident alien, or to more than 100 shareholders,
because any of those transactions would also trigger the loss
of the subsidiary's QSub status. See id., § 1361(b)(1)(B),
(C), (A). Filing a bankruptcy petition is not supposed to
"expand or change a debtor's interest in an asset; it merely
changes the party who holds that interest." In re Saunders,
969 F.2d 591, 593 (7th Cir. 1992). But under the Bankruptcy
Court's holding in this case, a QSub in bankruptcy can
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stymie legitimate transactions of its parent as unauthorized
transfers of property of the estate, even though the QSub
would have had no right to interfere with any of those
transactions prior to filing for bankruptcy.
4. Another taxpayer fails in the never-ending quest
for S corporation debt basis without an economic outlay. Montgomery v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-151 (6/17/13). In 2006, the taxpayer
guaranteed a loan to an S corporation in which he was a shareholder. The
corporation passed through losses to the taxpayer for 2007 in excess of the
taxpayer's basis in the stock and loans the taxpayer had made to the
corporation. The taxpayer claimed that because the corporation defaulted on
the loan in 2008, he defaulted on the guarantee in that year, and in 2009 the
creditor obtained a judgment against the taxpayer for $435,169.54, he should
have had a basis increase in that amount for the corporation's debt that he
obtained through subordination. Judge Morrison was unimpressed by the
argument.
"[I]t is the payment by the guarantor of the guaranteed
obligation that gives rise to indebtedness on the part of the
debtor to the guarantor. The mere fact that the debtor
defaults and thereby renders the guarantor liable is not
sufficient." [Quoting from Underwood v. Commissioner, 63
T.C. 468, 476 (1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1976)].
Patrick Montgomery did not make any payments on the
SunTrust Bank loan during 2007. Therefore his guarantee of
the SunTrust Bank loan did not give rise to a debt to him
from Utility Design, Inc., during 2007.
* In partial solace for the taxpayer, at least
no § 6662 accuracy-related penalties were assessed by the IRS.
5. Rev. Proc. spells relief for late elections. Rev.
Proc. 2013-30, 2013-36 I.R.B. 173 (8/14/13). The IRS has consolidated
multiple rulings into a single procedure for requesting relief from late S
corporation, QSST and QSub elections. In general the procedure requires
that a requesting entity has reasonable cause for making a late election and
has acted diligently to correct the mistake upon its discovery. The request
must be made within 3 years and 75 days of the effective date of the election.
E. Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
2014] 331
Florida Tax Review
F. Corporate Divisions
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
G. Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns
1. Twenty-seven years after the authorizing statute was
enacted, the Treasury and IRS finalize regulations to prevent triple
taxation resulting from sales, exchanges, and distributions of corporate
stock resulting from General Utilities repeal. T.D. 9619, Regulations
Enabling Elections for Certain Transactions Under Section 336(e), 78 F.R.
28467 (5/15/13). The IRS published regulations under § 336(e). Section
336(e), enacted as part of the TRA 1986 repealing the General Utilities
doctrine, authorizes regulations allowing a corporation that sells, exchanges,
or distributes stock in another corporation (target) meeting the requirements
of § 1504(a)(2) to elect to treat the disposition as a sale of all of target's
underlying assets in lieu of treating it as sale, exchange, or distribution of
stock, as under § 338(h)(10). The purpose of a § 336(e) election is to prevent
creation of a triple layer of taxation - one at the controlled corporation
level, one at the distributing corporation level and, ultimately, one at the
shareholder level. Reg. §§ 1.336-0 through 1.336-5 provide the requirements
and mechanics for, and consequences of, treating a stock sale, exchange, or
distribution that would not otherwise be eligible for a § 338 election, as an
asset sale under § 336(e). Under the regulations, the results of a § 336(e)
election generally are the same (with certain exceptions) as those of a
§ 338(h)(10) election. The structure of the regulations resembles that of the
§ 338(h)(10) regulations regarding the allocation of consideration,
application of the asset and stock consistency rules, treatment of minority
shareholders, and the availability of the § 453 installment method, although
certain definitions and concepts differ to reflect differences between § 336
and § 338(h)(10). Unlike under § 338(h)(10), however, a § 336(e) election is
a unilateral election by the seller. A transaction that meets the definition of
both a qualified stock disposition and a qualified stock purchase under
§ 338(d)(3) generally will be treated only as a qualified stock purchase and
does not qualify for a § 336(e) election. Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(6)(ii).
* General Rules. A qualified stock
disposition for which a § 336(e) election may be made is any transaction or
series of transactions in which stock meeting the requirements of § 1504(a)(2)
(80 percent of voting and value) of a domestic corporation is either sold,
exchanged, or distributed, or any combination thereof, by another domestic
corporation or the shareholders of an S corporation in a disposition (as defined
in Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(5)), during the 12-month disposition period (as defined in
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Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(7)). (All members of a consolidated group are treated as a
single transferor. Reg. § 1.336-2(g)(2)). Stock transferred to a related party
(determined after the transfer) is not considered in determining whether there
has been a qualified stock disposition. Reg. §§ 1.336-1(b)(5)(i)(C) and 1.336-
1(b)(6)(i). A section 336(e) election is available for qualifying dispositions of
target stock to non-corporate transferees, as well as to corporate transferees.
Reg.§ 1.336-1(b)(2)
* Because the regulations require only that
stock meeting the requirements of § 1504(a)(2) be transferred, the transferor (or
a member of its consolidated group) may retain a portion of the target stock.
Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(v) and 1.336-2(b)(2)(iv). Furthermore, the regulations
allow amounts of target stock transferred to different transferees, in different
types of transactions to be aggregated in determining whether there has been a
qualified stock disposition. For example, the sale of 50 percent of target's stock
to an unrelated person and a distribution of another 30 percent to its unrelated
shareholders (who might or might not be the purchasers of the 50 percent that
was sold) within a 12-month period would constitute a qualified stock
disposition. Reg. § 1.336-1(b)(5).
* Election. The election is made by the
seller and the target by entering into a binding written agreement before the due
date of the tax return for the year of the stock disposition and filing a required
statement of election with the tax return for the appropriate year. The consent of
both seller and the target (on behalf of the buyer) are required to avoid surprises
to the buyer. An election for an S corporation target requires a binding written
agreement between the target S corporation and all of the S corporation
shareholders, including shareholders who do not sell stock, before the due date
of the tax return for the year of the stock disposition and an election statement
attached to the return for the year of the disposition. In both cases, the target
must retain a copy of the written agreement. If the seller and target are members
of a consolidated group, the seller and target must enter into a binding written
agreement, retained by the parent of the consolidated group, and the common
parent of the group must attach an election statement to the consolidated return
for the year of the disposition. Reg. § 1.336-2(h).
* Sales or Exchanges of Target Stock. In
general, if a seller sells or exchanges target stock in a qualified stock
disposition, the treatment of old target, seller, and purchaser are similar to the
treatment of old target (old T), S, and P under § 338(h)(10). If a § 336(e)
election is made, the sale or exchange of target stock is disregarded. Instead,
target (old target) is treated as selling all of its assets to an unrelated corporation
in a single transaction at the close of the disposition date (the deemed asset
disposition). Old target recognizes the deemed disposition tax consequences
from the deemed asset disposition on the disposition date while it is a subsidiary
of seller. In the case of a deemed asset sale by a Subchapter S corporation, the
tax consequences of the deemed asset sale pass through to the S corporation
2014] 333
Florida Tax Review
shareholders. See Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(1)(A). Old target is then treated as
liquidating into seller which in most cases will be treated as a § 332 liquidation
to which § 337 (or § 336) applies. Additionally, the deemed purchase of the
assets of old target by new target constitutes a deemed purchase of any
subsidiary stock owned by target, and a § 336(e) election may be made for the
deemed purchase of the stock of a target subsidiary if it constitutes a qualified
stock disposition. A § 336(e) election generally does not affect the tax
consequences, e.g., stock basis, to a purchaser of target stock.
* Distributions of Target Stock Not Subject
to § 355. A § 336(e) election can be made for a taxable distribution of target
stock (e.g., dividend, redemption, liquidation), but the election does not affect
the tax treatment of the shareholders. Special rules assure that the tax
consequences to a distributee are the same as if no § 336(e) election was made.
If a distribution is a qualified stock disposition, the distributing corporation is
treated as purchasing from new target (immediately after the deemed
liquidation of old target) the amount of stock distributed and to have distributed
the new target stock to its shareholders. The distributing corporation recognizes
no gain or loss on the distribution (old target having recognized gain on the
deemed asset sale). Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(1)(iv). If the distribution is a § 301
distribution, the portion that is a dividend may be affected by the difference
between (1) the § 311 gain, and thus E&P, that would have been recognized on
a stock distribution and (2) the gain, and thus E&P, that results from the
deemed asset disposition and liquidation of target. See Reg. § 1.336-2(c).
Realized losses on the deemed asset disposition are allowed to offset realized
gains, Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(1)(i)(B)(2)(i). However, the regulations disallow a net
loss recognized on the deemed asset disposition in proportion to the amount of
stock disposed of by the seller in one or more distributions during the 12-month
disposition period. Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(1)(i)(B)(2)(ii).
* Section 355 Distributions. The
regulations allow a corporation that would otherwise recognize gain with
respect to a qualified stock disposition resulting, in whole or in part, from a
disposition described in § 355(d)(2) or (e)(2) to make a § 336(e) election.
However, to preserve the E&P allocation consequences of a § 355 distribution
under Reg. § 1.312-10, the regulations provide special rules. Old target is not
deemed to liquidate into the distributing corporation, but is treated as acquiring
all of its assets from an unrelated person and the distributing corporation is
treated as distributing the stock of the controlled corporation (old target) to its
shareholders. Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(2)(i)(A). Because the controlled corporation
(old target) is not treated as liquidated, it will retain its tax attributes despite the§ 336(e) election. Furthermore, the controlled corporation will take into account
the effects of the deemed asset disposition to adjust its E&P immediately before
allocating E&P pursuant to Reg. § 1.312-10. Reg. § 1.336-2(b)(2)(vi). Net
losses from the deemed asset sale will be recognized only in relation to the
amount of stock sold or exchanged in the qualified stock disposition during the
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12-month disposition period. Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(iii). However, if
the controlled corporation (old target) has any subsidiaries for which a § 336(e)
election is made, the general deemed asset disposition methodology shall apply.
This prevents taxpayers from effectively electing whether the attributes of the
lower tier subsidiary become those of target, by doing an actual sale of target
subsidiary's assets followed by a liquidation of target subsidiary, or remain with
target subsidiary, by making a § 336(e) election for target subsidiary.
* Intragroup Transfers Prior to External
Dispositions. If target stock is transferred within an affiliated group and is then
transferred outside the affiliated group, a § 336(e) election is not available for
the intragroup transfer (because a qualified stock disposition may not be made
between related sellers and purchasers). Even if a § 336(e) election is made for
the transfer outside of the group, the affiliated group would recognize gain both
on target's assets and the target stock. To solve this problem the final
regulations modify Reg. § 1.1502-13(f)(5)(ii)(C) to allow a § 1.1502-13(f)(5)
election to treat the deemed liquidation of target into the seller as a taxable
liquidation in order to provide the consolidated group with a stock loss to offset
some, if not all, of the intragroup seller's stock gain from the intragroup
transaction. Reg. § 1.366-2(b)(2)(i)(A)(2) also provides that in the case of a
§ 355(d)(2) or (e)(2) transaction that is preceded by an intragroup transaction,
for purposes of the § 1.1502-13(f)(5) election, immediately after the deemed
asset disposition of target's assets, target is deemed to liquidate into seller,
which provides seller with a stock loss that can offset some or all of the group's
intercompany gain on the transfer of target stock.
* Aggregate Deemed Asset Disposition
Price (ADADP) and Adjusted Grossed Up Basis (AGUB). To calculate old
target's gain under a § 336(e) election, the regulations define a new term,
"aggregate deemed asset disposition price" (ADADP). New target's asset basis
is determined with reference to adjusted grossed up basis (AGUB), as used in
§ 338 and Reg. § 1.338-5. Under Reg. §§ 1.336-3 and 1.336-4, ADADP and
AGUB are determined similarly to the way ADSP and AGUB are determined
under the § 338 regulations. The regulations account for the lack of an actual
amount realized on a stock distribution by treating the grossed-up amount
realized as including in the amount realized the fair market value of distributed
target stock on the date of distribution. Reg. § 1.336-3(c)(1)(i)(B). In addition,
because in the case of a § 336(e) election (unlike in the case of a § 338 election,
where there is only one purchasing corporation and it is relatively easy to
determine the purchaser's basis in nonrecently purchased stock in order to
determine AGUB), there can be multiple purchasers or distributees who
acquired target stock prior to the 12-month disposition period, the regulations
provide that "nonrecently disposed stock," which has a similar meaning to the
term "nonrecently purchased stock" in § 338(b)(6)(B), includes only stock in a
target corporation held by a purchaser (or a related person) who owns (with
§ 318(a) attribution, except §318(a)(4)), at least 10 percent of the total voting
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power or value of the stock of target that is not recently disposed stock. Reg.
§ 1.336-1(b)(18).
* New target is treated as acquiring all of
its assets from an unrelated person in a single transaction at the close of the
disposition date, but before the deemed liquidation (or, in the case of a § 355
distribution, before the distribution) in exchange for an amount equal to the
AGUB. With certain modifications, Reg. § 1.336-4 generally resembles Reg.
§ 1.338-5 to determine target's AGUB. New target allocates AGUB among its
assets in the same manner as in Reg. §§ 1.338-6 and 1.338-7. Reg. §§ 1.336-
2(b)(1)(ii) and 1.336-2(b)(2)(ii).
* Any stock retained by a seller (or a
member of its consolidated group) or an S corporation shareholder is treated as
acquired by the seller on the day after the disposition date at its fair market
value, which is a proportionate amount of the grossed-up amount realized on
the transfer under the § 336(e) election. Reg. §§ 1.336-2(b)(1)(v) and 1.336-
2(b)(2)(iv). A continuing minority shareholder is generally unaffected by the
§ 336(e) election. Reg. § 1.336-2(d).
* A holder of nonrecently disposed stock
may irrevocably elect (similarly to under § 338) to treat the nonrecently
disposed stock as being sold on the disposition date. Reg. § 1.336-4(c). The
gain recognition election is mandatory if a purchaser owns (after applying
§ 318(a), other than § 318(a)(4)) 80 percent or more of the voting power or
value of target stock. Reg. §§ 1.336-l(b)(15) and 1.336-4(c).
* A taxpayer will be allowed to make a
protective § 336(e) election if it is unsure whether a transaction constitutes a
qualified stock disposition, e.g. the disposition date is the first day of the 12-
month disposition period that may span two taxable years. A protective election
will have no effect if the transaction does not constitute a qualified stock
disposition, but it will otherwise be binding and irrevocable. Reg. § 1.336-2(j).
* Correction to Reg. § 1.338-5. Reg.
§ 1.338-5(d)(3)(ii) is corrected to use the grossed-up basis of recently purchased
stock in determining the basis amount, rather than the non-grossed-up basis.
* Effective date. The regulations apply to
any qualified stock disposition for which the disposition date is on or after May
15, 2013.
2. The Eleventh Circuit interprets a tax sharing
agreement. You don't often see cases like this. Zucker v. FDIC, 727 F.3d
1100 (11th Cir. 8/15/13). This case involved the interpretation of a tax
sharing agreement (TSA) among members of a consolidated group. The TSA
provided that although the parent holding company would file the group's
tax return, a bank subsidiary would pay all income taxes for the group and
receive contributions from other members of the group and the bank would
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pay any member of the group that member's share of any refund. The day
after the bank was closed and the FDIC appointed its receiver, the holding
company filed for Bankruptcy Act Chapter 11 protection. Subsequently, the
holding company received a refund, which it treated as part of the
bankruptcy estate rather than paying it to the FDIC (as the bank's successor)
for distribution pursuant to the TSA. The Eleventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Tjoflat, reversed the Bankruptcy Court and held that the refund was
not part of the holding company's bankruptcy estate; the refund was to be
paid over to the FDIC for distribution to the group's members in accordance
with the TSA. Interpreting the TSA contract under the controlling Delaware
law, the court found that although the TSA did not contain a provision
expressly requiring the holding company to forward the tax refunds to the
bank, that was what the parties intended. Thus, the court concluded:
The relationship between the Holding Company and the
Bank is not a debtor-creditor relationship. When the Holding
Company received the tax refunds, it held the funds intact-
as if in escrow-for the benefit of the Bank and thus the
remaining members of the Consolidated Group. The parties
intended that the Holding Company would promptly forward
the refunds to the Bank so that the Bank could, in turn,
forward them on to the Group's members. In the Bank's
hands, the tax refunds occupied the same status as they did
in the Holding Company's hands-they were tax refunds for
distribution in accordance with the TSA.
3. The Tax Court invokes a "common law" doctrine
to disallow a double deduction for the same economic loss. Duquesne
Light Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-216 (9/11/13).
Duquesne was the common parent of a consolidated group of corporations.
Duquesne held 1.2 million shares of AquaSource, which until 2001 was a
wholly-owned member of the group. In 2001, Duquesne sold 50,000 shares
of AquaSource, in which it claimed to have a basis of $206,402,100 to
Lehman Brothers-remember them-for $4,000,000 and claimed a
$202,402,100 capital loss. Duquesne filed an application for tentative refund,
in which it carried back from 2001 $161,640,702 to year 2000, $135,267,183
of which was attributable to the 2001 stock loss in question, and the IRS paid
a tentative refund. Subsequently, AquaSource, while still a member of the
group, sold various assets resulting in aggregate recognized losses exceeding
$235,000,000, which were claimed on Duquesne's consolidated return,
which were carried back to 2000. The IRS determined that the 2001 loss on
the disposition of 50,000 shares of AquaSource stock (approximately 4
percent of the stock) recognized by the common parent was a loss
attributable to the fact that there was built-in loss in the underlying assets of
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AquaSource, and that under the doctrine of Charles Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez,
292 U.S. 62 (1934), the group was not permitted to take the duplicative
losses upon the subsequent sale of the underlying assets that were sold in
2002. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) upheld the IRS's determination,
relying in part on Thrifty Oil v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 198 (2012). In doing
so, it held that Charles Ifeld Co. continues to be "a vital canon of statutory
construction in tax law," even after the implementation of former Reg.
§ 1.1502-32. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that Rite Aid Corp.
v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001), supported allowing the
deduction, and that the disallowance of double deductions could be effected
only through the promulgation of valid regulations. Although the court
acknowledged that former Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-35T, which was in effect for
the years in question, did not disallow the losses, nothing prohibited the court
from disallowing duplicate deductions for the same economic loss under
Charles Ilfeld Co. Finally, the court held that even though the statute of
limitations had expired for 2000 - the year to which losses had been carried
back - the period was still open pursuant to § 650 1(h) and § 6501(k), thereby
allowing the tentative refund to be assessable.
H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. There goes corporate letter ruling practice! Rev.
Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55 (6/25/13), modifying Rev. Proc. 2013-1,
2013-1 I.R.B. 116. The IRS will no longer rule on whether a transaction
qualifies for nonrecognition treatment under §§ 332, 351, 355, or 1036, or on
whether a transaction constitutes a reorganization within the meaning of
§ 368, regardless of whether the transaction presents a significant issue and
regardless of whether the transaction is an integral part of a larger transaction
that involves other issues upon which the IRS will rule. However, the IRS
will rule on one or more issues under those sections to the extent that such
issue or issues are significant. There is no limit on the number of significant
issues that may be the subject of a single letter ruling. A "significant issue is
an issue of law the resolution of which is not essentially free from doubt and
that is germane to determining the tax consequences of the transaction."
2. "[Aldoption of these exceptions [to § 382(g)] is
appropriate because these transactions do not introduce new capital into
the loss corporation and because direct or indirect ownership of the loss
corporation becomes less concentrated, thus diminishing the
opportunity for loss trafficking." T.D. 9638, Application of the
Segregation Rules to Small Shareholders, 78 F.R. 62418 (10/22/13). The
Treasury Department has promulgated amendments to Reg. § 1.382-3
(proposed in REG-149625-10, Application of the Segregation Rules to
Small Shareholders, 76 F.R. 72362 (11/23/11)). The amendments to Reg.
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§ 1.382-3 reduce the complexity of applying § 382 in tracking transactions
involving small amounts of stock of a loss corporation. Reg. § 1.382-3
provides that all shareholders who do not individually own 5 percent of a
loss corporation are grouped together and treated as a single "public group"
5-percent shareholder. However, Temp. Reg. § 1.382-2T segregates into two
or more public groups any public group of less than 5 percent stockholders
that can be separately identified as having acquired their stock in a particular
transaction. The amendments to the regulations provide that the segregation
rule does not apply to transfers of a loss corporation's stock to non-5-percent
shareholders by 5-percent shareholders, or entities that directly or indirectly
own at least 5 percent of a loss corporation whose owners (excluding those
who are 5-percent shareholders of a loss corporation) own, in the aggregate,
5 percent or more of a loss corporation. The amendments to the regulations
also provide that the segregation rules do not apply to transfers of ownership
interests in 5-percent entities to shareholders who are not themselves 5-
percent shareholders. The proposed regulations also provide a special
exception under which a loss corporation may annually redeem 10 percent of
the value of its stock, or 10 percent of the shares of a particular class of
stock, without triggering the segregation rules and the creation of new 5-
percent groups. This redemption rule also applies to redemptions of not more
than 10 percent of the value (or class of stock) of an entity that is a 5-percent
owner of the loss corporation. The amendments also extend the 10-percent
limitation for the application of the small issuance exception to issuances of
stock by a 5-percent entity, calculated by reference to the value of the stock
of the issuing entity. Transactions that under the prior version of the
regulations resulted in the creation of a new public group, and thus a possible
owner shift, now are simply folded into the existing public groups, thereby
reducing the chance of an ownership change. The amendments also add an
anti-abuse rule to the small issuance (issuance of stock that does not exceed
10 percent of the total value (or 10 percent of the class) of the corporation's
outstanding stock at the beginning of the taxable year) exception. The
effective dates for various amendments vary, with some effective as early as
11/4/92, and others effective 10/22/13.
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
1. Final regulations cover noncompensatory options
on partnership interests. T.D. 9612, Noncompensatory Partnership
Options, 78 F.R. 7997 (2/5/13). Final regulations under § 721 generally
provide for nonrecognition of gain or loss to the partnership or option holder
on the exercise of a noncompensatory stock option that grants the holder the
right to acquire an interest in the issuer (defined as an option not issued in
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connection with the performance of services) on the transfer of money or
property to the partnership. The regulations also address the maintenance of
partnership capital accounts and the determination of partners' distributive
shares. As a brief and horribly incomplete summary of the lengthy
regulation-
The regulations provide that § 721 does
not apply to the transfer of property in exchange for an option or the satisfaction
of a partnership obligation by issuance of an option. The transfer or satisfaction
will result in recognition of gain or loss to the option recipient and open
transaction treatment with respect to the partnership. The regulations do provide
for § 721 treatment for the receipt of convertible equity in exchange for
property.
* Section 721 does not apply to the
issuance of an option for accrued but unpaid interest, interest on convertible
debt, rent, or royalties.
* The nonrecognition rule of § 721 does not
apply to the exercise of a noncompensatory option issued by a disregarded
entity that would become a partnership if the option were exercised.
* The investment partnership rules of
§ 721(b) apply to cause recognition if the partnership would be treated as an
investment company.
* Cash settlement of a noncompensatory
option is treated as a sale or exchange of the option under § 1234 rather than as
a contribution to a partnership.
* Lapse of a noncompensatory option is
treated as recognition of gain to the partnership and a loss to the option holder
to the extent of the option premium. For this purpose, proposed regulations
under § 1234 would treat partnership interests as securities for purposes of
§ 1234 (REG-106918-08, Treatment of Grantor of an Option on a Partnership
Interest, 78 F.R. 8060 (2/5/13)).
* Redemption of an interest following
exercise of a noncompensatory option may be treated as a disguised sale. In
addition, general tax principles will apply to determine the nature of the
transaction if the exercise price of a noncompensatory option exceeds the
capital account received by the option holder.
* The regulations permit revaluation of
partnership capital accounts on issuance of a noncompensatory option and
provide further that any revaluation of partnership capital accounts must take
into account the fair market value of any outstanding noncompensatory options.
The value of partnership property must be adjusted to reflect the difference (if
any) between the value of outstanding noncompensatory options and the
amount paid by the option holder as consideration for the option.
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* The regulations require corrective
allocations to account for any shift in partners' capital accounts that results from
capital account reallocations pursuant to exercise of a noncompensatory option.
Corrective allocations to the option holder can only include items properly
allocable to a partner who suffered a capital account reduction.
* Noncompensatory options are generally
not characterized as partnership equity. However, an option holder will be
treated as a partner if the option holder's rights are "substantially similar" to
rights afforded to a partner, and there is a strong likelihood that the failure to
treat the option holder as a partner would result in a substantial reduction in the
present value of the partners' and option holder's aggregate Federal tax
liabilities under the facts and circumstances. The relevant facts and
circumstances include the likelihood that the option would be exercised. The
regulations contain a couple of safe harbors indicating that an option is not
reasonably expected to be recognized (exercisable more than 24 months after
the measurement date with a strike price equal to or greater than 110 percent of
the value of the interest, or the strike price is equal to or greater than fair market
value of the interest on the exercise date). The facts and circumstances
determination whether an option holder has partner attributes includes whether
the option holder has managerial rights in the partnership and rights to share in
partnership profits through current and liquidating distributions, and has
partnership obligations.
2. Even the used car salesman has to provide
evidence of partnership status. Azimzadeh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-169 (7/23/13). The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) rejected the taxpayer's
assertion that his small California used car business was a partnership with a
person called Barghi, who also was in the automobile sales business. The
court indicated that partnership status was a question of Federal tax law,
regardless of whether the taxpayers formed a separate state law entity, and
applied the eight factors of Luna v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964), to
answer the ultimate test of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733
(1949), described as "whether the parties intended to, and did in fact, join
together for the present conduct of an undertaking or enterprise." Looking to
the Luna factors the court determined that the absence of a partnership
agreement weighed against partnership status, the lack of proof regarding
mutual contributions to the venture was neutral, Barghi's authority to write
checks as control over income favored partnership status, that proof of the
nature of the relationship with Barghi as a co-proprietor or suppler "left only
the muddiest of tracks," the absence of K-is and other partnership return
filings, the absence of partnership books indicating Barghi's interest in the
enterprise, weighed against partnership status, and the absence of evidence of
Barghi's joint control other than signature authority on the checking account
was a neutral factor. Thus, only one of the Luna factors supported
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partnership status while the rest were negative or neutral. The partnership
went down by the count. The court also affirmed the IRS's reconstruction of
the taxpayer's income from bank deposits and the IRS's denial of cost of
goods sold and other claims.
3. You can be partners without realizing you are.
And if it turns out to be to your benefit, you can change your tune in the
course of litigation. Jimastowlo Oil, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-195 (8/26/13). The taxpayer LLCs purchased percentage working
interests in oil and gas leaseholds operated by Energytec on a cooperative
basis-i.e., as an economic activity collectively owned and cooperatively
exploited) for the working interest owners-but there was no formal written
joint operating agreement executed by the working interest owners. To carry
out the actual operation of the wells Energytec employed another company.
The operating company was supposed to collect oil from the wells in tanks,
sell the collected oil, offset operating expenses against sale proceeds, and
apportion what remained among the working interest owners in proportion to
their percentage interests. No working interest owner could take in kind or
sell on its own its share of any oil production. When Energytec subsequently
presented the LLCs and the other working interest owners in the leaseholds
with draft joint operating agreements formally designating its wholly owned
subsidiary as operator of the wells, many of the leasehold owners, including
the LLCs, would not execute the draft agreements. In actual operation most
of the working interest owners, including the LLCs, initially received
recurring payments that did not vary with production, oil and gas prices, or
operating expenses. Eventually, Energytec notified the working interest
owners that the recurring payments had exceeded the net revenue that was
due to them and that subsequent revenue distributions would be applied
against the outstanding balance due to Energytec. Alternatively, the affected
working interest owners could "pay the outstanding balance due Energytec
and subsequently receive revenue distributions based upon actual revenues
less applicable lease operating expenses." The LLCs opted to pay the amount
due to Energytec. The issue before the Tax Court (Judge Halpern) was
whether the informal joint operating agreement was a partnership. If so,
FPAAs to the LLCs denying deductions and treating reported losses as
passive activity losses under § 469 were invalid because no FPAAs had been
issued with respect to the joint venture.
The principle ... that [the Tax Court] lack[s] jurisdiction to
redetermine affected items attributable to a source
partnership before the source partnership-level proceedings
have been completed, applies even when the members of the
source partnership have failed to recognize that they have
created a separate entity (i.e., a partnership) for Federal
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income tax purposes and have not, therefore, filed a
partnership return on its behalf, and the Commissioner has
neither conducted a source partnership-level audit nor issued
an FPAA to it.
Judge Halpern held that the joint operating agreement constituted a
partnership under § 761(a) and that FPAAs issued to the LLCs were invalid.
To exploit the working interests, the co-owners cooperated, with Energytec
acting as common agent operating the wells for the working interest owners.
No owner could take his share of production in kind or sell it independently
of the other owners, and they were not merely sharing expenses. They were
jointly carrying on a trade or business and dividing the proceeds therefrom.
Thus, the working interest owners "jointly carried on a trade or business,
dividing the proceeds therefrom among themselves, each trade or business
constituted for Federal tax purposes an entity separate from the co-owners of
the appurtenant working interest." Because there was no argument that the
resulting entity should be classified as a trust (or otherwise specially
classified), the entity must have been classified as either a partnership or a
corporation under Reg. § 301.7701-2(a), and because it was a domestic
business entity with more than two members that was not a per se
corporation (and did not elect to be classified as a corporation), it was, by
default, a partnership pursuant to Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) and (b)(1).
4. Section 47 historic rehabilitation credits were
allowed to an LLC (taxed as a partnership) in which Pitney Bowes was a
99.9 percent member despite an IRS challenge under the anti-abuse
provisions of Reg. § 1.701-2, but it was too late to keep the Miss America
Pageant in Atlantic City. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner,
136 T.C. 1 (1/3/11). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the ownership
interest on the historic East Hall of the Atlantic City Boardwalk Hall under a
35-year lease belonging to the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority
could be transferred to Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC, in which Pitney
Bowes (through a subsidiary and an LLC) was the 99.9 percent member (and
the NJSEA was the 0.1 percent member). Along with ownership went the
§ 47 Federal tax credit of 20 percent of the qualified rehabilitation
expenditures incurred in transforming the run-down East Hall from a flat-
floor convention space to a "special events facility" that could host concerts,
sporting events, and other civic events. Pitney Bowes became the 99.9
percent member of Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC, following an offering
memorandum sent to nineteen large corporations, which described the
transaction as a "sale" of tax credits (although that description was not
repeated in any of the subsequent documents relating to the transaction).
NJSEA lent about $57 million to Historic Boardwalk Hall. and Pitney Bowes
made capital contributions of more than $18 million to that LLC, as well as
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an investor loan of about $1.2 million. In that offering memorandum, losses
were projected over the first decade of operation of East Hall. The IRS
argued that the bulk of the Pitney Bowes contributions were paid out to
NJSEA as a "development fee" and that the entire transaction was a sham
because NJSEA was going to develop East Hall regardless of whether Pitney
Bowes made its capital contributions and loan.
* Judge Goeke held that one of the
purposes of § 47 was "to encourage taxpayers to participate in what would
otherwise be an unprofitable activity," and the rehabilitation of East Hall was a
success, leading to the conclusion that Historic Boardwalk had objective
economic substance. He also held that "Pitney Bowes and NJSEA, in good faith
and acting with a business purpose, intended to join together in the present
conduct of a business enterprise" and that while the offering memorandum used
the term "sale," "it was used in the context of describing an investment
transaction." Finally, Judge Goeke used Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example (6),
involving two high-bracket taxpayers who joined with a corporation to form a
partnership to own and operate a building that qualifies for § 42 low-income
housing credits, to conclude that Reg. § 1.701-2 did not apply to the Historic
Boardwalk transaction because that regulation "clearly contemplate[s] a
situation in which a partnership is used to transfer valuable tax attributes from
an entity that cannot use them ... to [a taxpayer] who can ....
* Query whether "economic substance"
requirements are applicable when the tax benefits take the form of tax credits
enacted to encourage specific types of investments?
a. "'(TIhe sharp eyes of the law' require
more from parties than just putting on the 'habiliments of a partnership
whenever it advantages them to be treated as partners underneath.' ...
Indeed, Culbertson requires that a partner 'really and truly intend[] to ...
shar[e] in the profits and losses' of the enterprise. ... And, after looking
to the substance of the interests at play in this case, we conclude that,
because Pitney Bowes lacked a meaningful stake in either the success or
failure of Historic Boardwalk Hall, it was not a bona fide partner."
Historic Boardwalk Hall LLC v. Commissioner, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir.
8/27/12), cert. denied, 5/28/13. In a unanimous opinion by Judge Jordan, the
Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held that Pitney Bowes was not a
bona fide partner in Historic Boardwalk Hall LLC. The court's reasoning
was based on the Culbertson test [Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733
(1949)], as applied by the Second Circuit in TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States,
459 F.3d 220, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (Castle Harbour II), to find that the Dutch
banks were not partners, and the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Virginia
Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir.
2011), to find that the investors who acquired the Virginia Historic
Rehabilitation credits through the partnership bore no "true entrepreneurial
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risk," which the Third Circuit concluded was a characteristic of a true partner
under the Culbertson test. The Third Circuit concluded that Pitney Bowes
was not a partner because, based on an analysis of the facts, as the
transaction was structured, (1) Pitney Bowes "had no meaningful downside
risk because it was, for all intents and purposes, certain to recoup the
contributions it had made to HBH and to receive the primary benefit it
sought - the HRTCs or their cash equivalent," and (2) Pitney Bowes's
"avoidance of all meaningful downside risk in HBH was accompanied by a
dearth of any meaningful upside potential." The analysis was highly factual
and based on substance over form. As for downside risk, the Court of
Appeals reversed as clearly erroneous the Tax Court's finding that Pitney
Bowes bore a risk because it might not receive an agreed upon 3 percent
preferred return on its contributions to HBH. Referring to Virginia Historic
Tax Credit Fund, the Third Circuit treated the 3 percent preferred return as a
"return on investment" that was not a "share in partnership profits," which
pointed to the conclusion that Pitney Bowes did not face any true
entrepreneurial risk. As for upside potential, applying the substance over
form doctrine, the court concluded that "although in form PB had the
potential to receive the fair market value of its interest . . . in reality, PB
could never expect to share in any upside." The court noted that it was
mindful "of Congress's goal of encouraging rehabilitation of historic
buildings," and that its holding might "jeopardize the viability of future
historic rehabilitation projects," but the court observed that it was not the tax
credit provision itself that was under attack, but rather the particular
transaction transferring the benefits of the credit in the manner that it had.
* The opinion makes it very clear that the
decision was based on applying the "substance over form" doctrine rather than
the "economic substance" doctrine to determine that Pitney Bowes was not a
partner.
b. The IRS is gilding the lily of its Historic
Boardwalk victory. FAA 20124002F, 2013 TNT 41-18 (dated 8/30/12;
released 10/5/12). This Field Attorney Advice dealt with whether a taxpayer
was a partner in a partnership that generated § 47 historic rehabilitation tax
credits. The FAA held that under the Culbertson doctrine, as applied in
Castle Harbour, the taxpayer was not a partner. The taxpayer had no
meaningful downside risk in that it is assured of receiving the benefit of its
bargain, and it had no upside potential. All it could receive was it specified
priority return. Alternatively, the purported partnership was a sham; it served
no business purpose. Its only purpose was to effect a sale of the rehabilitation
tax credits to the taxpayer. Sacks v. Commissioner, 69 F.3d 982 (9th Cir.
1995), which held that a sale-leaseback transaction involving solar energy
equipment had economic substance even though the investment had a
negative rate of return before taking into account tax benefits, was
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distinguished on the ground that the transaction at issue in Sacks otherwise
had economic substance in terms of risk and reward. In reaching the
conclusion, the FAA states as follows:
In any event, the notion that a court may consider tax
benefits in evaluating the economic substance of a
transaction involving - or of a purported partnership
engaged in - tax-favored activity finds no support apart
from Sacks. Two circuits, in analyzing the economic
substance of American Depository Receipts (ADR)
transactions, determined that it was inappropriate to deduct
the cost of foreseeable foreign taxes imposed on the
transaction in determining the expected pre-tax profit of the
transaction. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner,
277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001) and IES Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). These holdings
address the calculation of pre-tax profit to be used in
determining whether transactions resulted in pre-tax
economic losses; they do not stand for the proposition that
United States tax credits may serve as a substitute for
economic profit. As such, these cases do not adopt the
court's holding in Sacks that a court may consider tax
benefits in evaluating the economic substance of a
transaction involving - or of a purported partnership
engaged in - tax-favored activity.
* This position is absurd because the
purpose of tax credits is to encourage taxpayers to engage in otherwise
unprofitable activities. A holding that an activity that is unprofitable before
taking tax credits into consideration lacks economic substance defeats that
purpose.
c. The IRS now provides a Safe Harbor
under which it will not use its Historic Boardwalk victory to challenge
allocations of § 47 rehabilitation credits to investor partners. Rev. Proc.
2014-12, 2014-3 I.R.B. 415 (12/31/13). This revenue procedure specifies the
conditions under which the IRS will not challenge partnership allocations of
§ 47 rehabilitation credits. Section 4 of the revenue procedure contains the
requirements for the Safe Harbor. It defines investors as partnership partners
(other than principals) (§4.01); provides for an investor's minimum
partnership interest (§4.02); provides for an investor's minimum
unconditional contribution of 20 percent of the investor's total expected
capital contribution before the date the building is placed in service (§4.03);
and requires that at least 75 percent of the investor's total expected capital
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contribution be fixed in amount before the building is placed in service
(§4.04).
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt,
and Outside Basis
1. Consistency for small minds - allocations to
foreign partners, withholding at one rate, taxable at another. Ann. 2013-
30, 2013-21 I.R.B. 1134 (4/24/13). Partnership income effectively connected
to a U.S. trade or business allocable to a foreign partner is subject to
withholding at the highest rate specified in §§ 1 or 11. Fiscal year
partnerships for a year beginning in 2012 must withhold at rates in effect for
2012. Foreign partners who include partnership income for a partnership year
ending in 2013, however, are subject to tax at the 2013 rates as increased by
the American Taxpayer (and not so grand compromise) Relief Act of 2012.
2. "This appears to be an issue of first impression as
no case has specifically decided whether the transferor or the transferee
of a nonvested partnership capital interest must include in gross income
the undistributed partnership profit or loss allocations attributable to
the partnership capital interest." Crescent Holdings, LLC v.
Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 15 (12/2/13). This TEFRA partnership case
addressed the treatment of partnership income recognized while a partner
held a two percent restricted membership interest received for services that
was forfeitable, and thus not vested, and for which no § 83(b) election had
been made. An individual (Fields) received a two percent capital interest in a
partnership (Crescent Holdings LLC) as compensation for entering into a
contract to provide services to a lower-tier entity (Crescent Resources LLC).
Field's membership interest in Crescent Holdings would be forfeited if he
terminated his employment with Crescent Resources before three years after
the formation of Crescent Holdings. His interest was nontransferable until
the forfeiture restrictions lapsed. He was entitled to the same distributions as
other holders of member interests and that any distributions he received were
not subject to forfeiture. No § 83(b) election was made. Crescent Holdings
issued Schedules K-1 allocating $423,611 of ordinary business income to
Fields for 2006 and $3,608,218 for 2007 as his § 702 distributive share of the
partnership's income. No distributions were made. Fields did not believe that
the Schedules K-1 were proper because he did not believe that he was a
partner for tax purposes. Fields argued that § 83 applied to his interest in
Crescent Holdings and because his right to the interest never vested, he was
not the owner of the interest under Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) and should not be
allocated any partnership profits or losses attributable to the interest for the
years at issue. The partnership argued that § 83 did not apply to Fields'
interest because it was a profits-only interest and that under Rev. Proc. 93-
2014] 347
Florida Tax Review
27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, Fields was liable for tax on his share of the
undistributed profits of Crescent Holdings for the years at issue.
Alternatively, the partnership argued that if Rev. Proc. 93-27 did not apply,
then Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) controlled and Fields thus was the owner of the
interest. The IRS argued that Rev. Proc. 93-27 and Rev. Proc. 2001-43,
2001-2 C.B. 191, apply only to partnership profits interests and are
inapplicable to a partnership capital interest, and that Fields' interest in
Crescent Holdings was a capital interest. The IRS's position was that Field's
capital interest was subject to § 83 and that because under Reg. § 1.83-
1 (a)(1) he was not the owner of the interest, no profit or loss should have
been allocated to him for the years at issue. The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe)
held for Fields and the IRS on all counts.
* First, the court held that Fields' interest
was a capital interest, not a profits interest. Under Rev. Proc. 93-27, a capital
interest is "an interest that would give the holder a share of the proceeds if the
partnership's assets were sold at fair market value and then the proceeds were
distributed in a complete liquidation of the partnership." Under the contractual
terms of the Crescent Holding LLC agreement, absent "priority capital
contributions," of which there were none, the LLC members were entitled to
receive liquidating distributions equal to their percentage interests. Thus, the
fact that Fields did not have any initial capital account did not mean that he did
not have a capital interest. If Crescent Holdings had liquidated immediately
after Fields received his interest, he would have received a share of the
proceeds. Thus, Rev. Proc. 2001-43 and Rev. Proc. 93-27 were not applicable.
* Second, the court held that a partnership
capital interest is "property" for purposes of § 83, citing Larson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-387 and Campbell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1990-162, af'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 943 F.2d 815
(8th Cir. 1991), and Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) applied to Fields' interest in Crescent
Holdings. Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) provides that "[u]ntil such property becomes
substantially vested, the transferor shall be regarded as the owner of such
property." The court rejected the argument that the absence of a reference to
partnership interests in the legislative history of § 83 indicated that Congress
did not intend § 83 to apply to partnership interests.
* Third, the court held that although neither
§ 83 nor Reg. § 1.83-1(a)(1) specifically addressed the issue, the transferee of a
nonvested partnership capital interest does not recognize in income the
undistributed partnership profit or loss allocations attributable to that interest. In
this case Fields' right to receive the undistributed income allocations
attributable to the interest was subject to the same substantial risk of forfeiture
as his right to the partnership interest itself; if he forfeited his right to the
interest, then he would also forfeit his right to receive any benefit from the
undistributed income allocations. The undistributed income allocations were
subject to the same substantial risk of forfeiture as the two percent interest in
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Crescent Holdings. The court noted that had Fields continued his employment
until the interest vested, the fair market value of the interest includable in gross
income at that time would have included the undistributed income.
* Fourth, the court held that under Reg.
§ 1.83-1(a)(1) undistributed partnership allocations attributable to a nonvested
partnership capital interest are included in the gross income of the transferor.
Based on the contractual provisions regarding the formation of the two LLCs,
Crescent Holdings was the transferor. Accordingly, the profits and losses
attributable to the forfeitable two percent interest should be allocated to the
other LLC members (partners) in accordance with their distributive shares
(which in this case were pro rata to their percentage interests).
3. Proposed regulations allocate liabilities among
multiple parties and among related parties. REG-136984-12, Section 752
and Related Party Rules, 78 F.R. 76092 (12/16/13). The IRS has proposed
regulations to address allocation of the risk of economic loss for purposes of
allocating partnership liabilities to a partner's basis. Under Reg. § 1.752-2(a)
a partner is allocated a share of recourse liability to the extent that the partner
or a related person bears the economic risk of loss. A liability is nonrecourse
when no partner or related person bears an economic risk of loss.
* Multiple Parties Under Prop. Reg. §
1.752-2(a)(2) where multiple partners bear the economic risk of loss with
respect to the same liability, the amount of the liability will be taken into
account only once, and if the total amount of liability borne by the partners
exceeds the amount of the liability, the economic risk of loss to be borne by
each partner would be determined by multiplying the amount of the liability by
a fraction determined by dividing the amount of the economic risk of loss of a
partner over the sum of the amount of loss borne by all partners. Thus, as
illustrated by an example in the proposed regulations, where partner A
guarantees the full $1,000 of a bank loan to the AB partnership and partner B
guarantees $500 of the liability, the amount of the liability allocable to A is
$667 ($1,000 x $1,000/$1,500) and the amount of the liability allocable to B is
$333 ($1,000 x $500/$1,500). Prop. Reg. § 1.752-2(i) would be amended to
provide that where a liability of a lower-tier partnership is allocated both to the
upper-tier partnership and to a partner who bears economic risk of loss as a
partner in both the upper-tier and lower-tier partnerships, the basis resulting
from such a liability will be allocated directly to the partner of the lower-tier
partnership rather than to the upper-tier partnership.
* Related Persons Under Reg. § 1.704-
4(b)(1) an individual and a corporation are treated as related persons if the
individual is an 80 percent or greater shareholder. Where the corporation is a
lender to a partnership or has a payment obligation with respect to a partnership
liability, Prop. Reg. § 1.752-4(b)(1)(iv) would disregard the application of §
267(c)(1) that provides that stock owned by a partnership is treated as owned
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proportionately by its partners. As a result, a partner in a partnership that owns
80 percent of the stock of the corporate lender will not be treated as related to
the corporation that bears the economic risk of loss. Prop. Reg. § 1.752-4(b)(2)
would provide that if a person who is a lender or has a payment obligation for a
partnership liability is related to more than one partner, the liability will be
shared equally among the related partners. This rule revises the existing
provision that allocates the liability to the partner with the highest percentage of
related ownership. In addition, the rule of Reg. § 1.752-4(b)(2)(iii), which
provides that persons owning interests in the same partnership are not treated as
related persons for purposes of determining economic risk for partnership
liabilities would be modified to apply only to persons who bear the economic
risk for a liability as a lender or have a payment obligation for the partnership
liability.
The proposed regulations are to be
effective on the date final regulations are published in the Federal Register.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the
Partnership and Partners
1. DAD follows the Son of Boss into the tax shelter
abyss. Superior Trading. LLC v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 70 (9/1/11). This
case involved a so-called distressed asset/debt (DAD) tax shelter structure
created by John Rogers, tax lawyer and purported international finance
expert. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) described the structure by noting that,
"true to the poet's sentiment that 'The Child is father of the Man', the DAD
deal seems to be considerably more attenuated in its scope, and far less
brazen in its reach, than the Son of BOSS transaction." At the top of Rogers'
pyramid, Warwick Trading, LLC acquired uncollectable receivables from a
bankrupt Brazilian retailer under a contribution arrangement. Warwick
claimed a transferred basis in the receivables equal to their face value under§ 723. The receivables were then contributed through multiple tiers of
trading companies, interests in which were sold to individual investors. Not
long after the contribution transaction, the interest of the Brazilian retailer in
Warwick was redeemed, but no § 754 election to adjust basis under § 743(b)
was made. Ultimately the individual investors claimed loss deductions
though their interests in the trading company partnerships as the receivables
were liquidated at their depreciated value through an accommodating party.
These transactions occurred before the October 2004 revisions to §§ 704(c),
734 and 743 (requiring allocations of built-in loss only to the contributing
party, limiting basis to FMV at the time of contribution, and requiring
mandatory basis adjustments on distributions involving substantial basis
reductions). The court found multiple grounds on which to undo these
transactions.
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* First, the court held that the original
contribution of the receivables was not a partnership transaction under § 721
with § 723 transferred basis, but was instead a sale. The court concluded that
the Brazilian retailer was never a partner in a partnership with a joint-profit
motive, and thus the transfer of the receivables in the initial transaction was not
a § 721 contribution to a partnership.
* The Brazilian retailer's receipt of money
within two years of the transfer of the receivables supported recharacterization
of the transaction as a sale under § 707(a)(2)(B).
* From the Brazilian retailer's financial
statements the court found that the receivables had a zero basis at the time of
the contribution in any event.
* And if that was not enough, the court
collapsed the transaction under the step-transaction doctrine into a single
transaction that consisted of a sale of the receivables for the amount of cash
payments eventually made to the Brazilian retailer on redemption of its interest.
Thus, Warwick's basis in the receivables was no higher than the cash payment,
which the taxpayer failed to substantiate, resulting in a zero basis.
* Interestingly, the court concluded that it
was not necessary to address the broad judicial economic substance doctrine
that other courts had used to disallow the tax benefits of the Son-of-Boss cases.
The court said that, "Because of a DAD deal's comparatively modest grab and
highly stylized garb, we can safely address its sought-after tax characterization
without resorting to sweeping economic substance arguments" and added that,
"we need only look at the substance lurking behind the posited form, and where
appropriate, step together artificially separated transactions, to get to the proper
tax characterization."
* All of that was followed by an accuracy-
related penalty under § 6662.
a. The Seventh Circuit goes back to the
generic economic substance doctrine and addresses the penalties.
Superior Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 728 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 8/26/13).
Rather than focus on the technical application of the partnership provisions,
with a generic tax shelter analysis, Judge Posner stated flat out that the
partnership was a sham and said that, "If the only aim and effect are to beat
taxes, the partnership is disregarded for tax purposes." The court's opinion is
interesting for its holding on the § 6662 40 percent gross valuation
misstatement penalty. The Seventh Circuit joined the majority view that "a
taxpayer who overstates basis and participates in sham transactions, as in this
case, should be punished at least as severely as one who does only the
former." The minority view was that the gross valuation penalty applied only
applicable to an overstatement of value and thus was not applicable to
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deficiencies attributable to transactions that lack economic substance. As
discussed in section VIII.D. of this outline, in Woods v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 557 (12/3/130), rev'g 471 Fed. Appx. 320 (5th Cir. 6/6/12), the Supreme
Court resolved the conflict among the circuits.
* In a warning that might be applicable to
our headlines, Judge Posner also chided the Tax Court by saying in a
parenthetical, "We note with disapproval the loquacity of, and lame attempts at
humor in, the Tax Court's opinion, which include making fun of Rogers' name,
as in the section title 'Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood."'
b. And the money hidden in Mr. Rogers'
house is taxable to him. Rogers v. Commissioner, 728 F.3d 673 (7th Cir.
8/26/13). John Rogers, the promoter of the DAD shelter in Superior Trading,
was the sole shareholder of an S corporation, Portfolio Properties, Inc. (PPI),
which received $2.4 million in payments from investors in the DAD shelter.
Of that money, $1.2 million was transferred to the LLC that was the general
partner in the shelter as the purchase price for the depreciated receivables
used in the shelter. Rogers argued that the full $2.4 million was held in trust
for the shelter partnership, Warwick. The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner)
agreed that the money actually transferred to Warwick was received by PPI
impressed with a fiduciary obligation and therefore not taxable to PPI.
However, the court stated that the Tax Court was not required to believe
Rogers' testimony that the funds not transferred to Warwick were held in
trust. The Tax Court's conclusion was bolstered by the fact that a portion of
the funds was distributed to Rogers. Judge Posner also remarked on the
"minuteness" of the $500 § 6662 penalty imposed on Rogers' $269,107 tax
deficiency.
c. The Tax Court again finds a disguised
sale in the DAD transaction. Buyuk L.L.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-253 (11/6/13). Judge Laro held that the DAD (distressed debt structure)
marketed by BDO Seidman failed to provide its promised basis step up under
alternative holdings that the acquisition of high-basis, low-value receivables
was a disguised sale under § 707(a)(2)(B), the transaction was in substance
an installment sale of the receivables, and the transaction lacked economic
substance. Under the DAD structure a Russian utility company, Saratov,
transferred distressed receivables to an LLC formed with Gramercy Advisors
LLC in exchange for a partnership interest in the LLC. This master LLC then
transferred its interest in the receivables to a second LLC in exchange for a
membership interest in the second LLC. Gramercy was a one percent
member of the second LLC. The tax shelter investor would acquire a 90
percent interest in the second LLC for cash. After the cash contribution the
Russian company was redeemed from the master LLC for cash. The second
level LLC would transfer the receivables to a third level LLC for a 99
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percent interest in that entity. The third level LLC would then exchange the
receivables for interests in other Gramercy assets and claim a loss, which
was passed through to the tax shelter investor.
* Section 707(a)(2)(B). As it held in
Superior Trading LLC v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 70 (2011), aff'd, 728 F.3d
676 (7th Cir. 8/26/13), the court concluded that the transfer of receivables by
the Russian company to the master LLC was a transfer of property followed by
the related distribution of cash treated as a disguised sale under § 707(a)(2)(B).
This resulted in a basis for the receivables in the LLC equivalent to the cash
distributed to the Russian company rather than the company's higher basis. The
court cited the two-year presumption of Reg. § 1.707-3(c), which the taxpayer
failed to overcome. The court also indicated that the contribution and cash
distribution were "reciprocal transfers." Further, the court found that the
receivables were not at risk in the master LLC and the cash transfers to the
Russian company bore no relationship to the entrepreneurial risks of the
partnership operations. The court also pointed out that the collection of the
receivables was reassigned to the Russian company so that Gramercy's lack of
due diligence with respect to the collectability of the receivables indicated that
Gramercy was never serious about collecting in order to derive a joint profit on
the transaction. Rather than conducting a detailed analysis of the 10 facts and
circumstances enumerated in Reg. § 1.707-3(f), the court stated that, "the
crucial and common theme to be gleaned from the 10 facts and circumstances
in the regulations and their examples is that if, at the time of the earlier transfer,
it was reasonably certain that the transferor would receive cash or other
consideration for the property transferred of an amount determinable with
reasonably certainty, the related transfers will be reclassified as a sale."
* Substance over form and step
transaction. Using a similar analysis the court held that the substance of the
whole transaction, including the contribution and distribution of cash, was an
installment sale of the receivables. The court stated, "[t]he amount of cash
Saratov would receive was already determined at the time of the initial transfer.
It was virtually certain from the outset that BDO would be able to collect
sufficient money from buyers interested in the tax attributes of the receivables
to fund the promised consideration to Saratov. Thus, the overall transaction was
in substance an installment sale of the receivables." The court found that the
various steps could be collapsed into a single transaction under the end result
test and the interdependence test.
* Economic Substance. Consistent with the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Superior Trading, the court concluded that the
transaction lacked economic substance under both the objective test (a
transaction has economic substance for Federal income tax purposes if the
transaction offers a reasonable opportunity for pretax profit) and the subjective
test (whether the taxpayer has subjective nontax reasons for entering into the
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transaction and whether the taxpayer has a legitimate profit motive for doing
so). Based on testimony of expert witnesses the court held that there was no
realistic possibility for the transaction to break even absent tax benefits. In
addition, the court held that the taxpayers did not show any valid business
purpose for engaging in the transaction, based in part on the absence of any due
diligence with respect to collecting the receivables and transferring the funds to
the U.S. master LLC.
* The court sustained § 6662(a) and (b)
accuracy and substantial valuation misstatement penalties.
2. It's difficult to claim you are not a partner when
you agree in writing to receive a K-1. Cahill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-220 (9/18/13). The taxpayer entered into a convoluted memorandum
agreement with a partnership (FC) that provided the taxpayer with cash
payments - termed a "drawdown"- aggregating to $175,000. The
agreement required the taxpayer to repay the "drawdown" out of future
income of the venture that was allocated to him and that outstanding
balances would bear interest, while also specifically providing that FC,
which changed its name to CFC, would report any draws on a Schedule K-1,
Partner's Share of Income, Deductions, Credits, etc., or a Form 1099-MISC,
Miscellaneous Income. However, under a formula provided by the terms of
the agreement, $125,000 of the drawdown was not subject to repayment.
CFC reported the $175,000 paid to the taxpayer as a guaranteed payment to a
partner and issued a Schedule K-1 reporting a guaranteed payment of
$175,000. Eventually, the relationship soured and the taxpayer refused to
sign a formal partnership agreement. The taxpayer did not report any of the
$175,000, and the IRS asserted a deficiency. The Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan)
upheld the deficiency, rejecting the taxpayer's arguments that he was not
partner and that the $175,000 was received as a loan. Even though the
taxpayer never signed the formal partnership agreement, the memorandum
provided the mechanism under which he would share in the profits of
FC/CFC and specifically provided that FC/CFC would issue petitioner a
Form 1099-MISC or a Schedule K-1 with respect to any money he received,
and there was no evidence that he ever objected to receiving a Schedule K-1
on the grounds that he was not a partner. Finally, that FC changed its name to
CFC evidenced that he was a partner (the other partners' names being
Christie and Friemann). Of the $175,000, $125,000 was unquestionably a
§ 707(c) guaranteed payment because under the terms of the agreement, that
amount would have been paid to the taxpayer even if had been an employee;
that amount was earned by FC/CFC pursuant to a flat fee (plus expenses)
contract with a third-party that called for the taxpayer's services and under
the terms of the FC/CFC agreement the gross amount of the fee was to be
allocated directly to the taxpayer. The remaining $50,000 was not a loan
because no agreement provided any definite date of repayment or a manner
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of repayment other than from future FC/CFC income allocated to the
taxpayer. Furthermore, the memorandum agreement expressly stated that any
draws would be considered income to the taxpayer. The taxpayer also lost on
a variety of other issues, none of which presented any interesting points. A
§ 6662(a) negligence penalty was upheld.
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and
Mergers
1. No bingo for Mingo! Former PWC consultant
was required to recognize ordinary income attributable to her interest in
partnership unrealized receivables on her receipt of convertible
promissory notes in connection with the sale of the PWC consulting
business to IBM. Mingo v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-149 (6/12/13).
The taxpayer was a partner in the management consulting and technology
services business (consulting business) of PWC until PWC sold its
consulting business to EBM. The sale was structured by PWC transferring its
consulting business to a newly formed partnership, PwCC, the partners of
which were subsidiaries of PWC. Among the assets PWC transferred to
PwCC were its consulting business' uncollected accounts receivable for
services it had previously rendered (unrealized receivables). PWC then
transferred to each of the 417 consulting partners an interest in PwCC and
cash in exchange for the partner's interest in PWC. The taxpayer was one of
the partners who received a partnership interest in PwCC and cash from
PWC in exchange for her partnership interest in PWC. Then the PWC
subsidiaries sold their interests in PwCC to IBM, and the 417 consulting
partners sold their interests in PwCC to IBM in exchange for convertible
promissory notes. The value of the taxpayer's partnership interest in PwCC
was $832,090, of which $126,240 was attributable to her interest in
partnership unrealized receivables, which were uncollected accounts
receivable for services. The taxpayer reported her entire gain on the sale
under the § 453 installment method, but the IRS asserted a deficiency on the
ground that the gain on the § 751(c) unrealized receivables was not eligible
for installment reporting. The Tax Court (Judge Paris) held that § 453
installment reporting is not available for gains attributable to § 751(c)
unrealized receivables that represent uncollected cash-method accounts
receivable for services. The court relied on Sorensen v. Commissioner, 22
T.C. 321 (1954), which held that installment reporting was not available with
respect to the sale of options to purchase stock that had been granted as
compensation for the taxpayer's services, because "[t]he provisions of
section [453] relate only to the reporting of income arising from the sale of
property on the installment basis. Those provisions do not in anywise purport
to relate to the reporting of income arising by way of compensation for
services."
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* Furthermore, the IRS's determination that
the gain attributable to the unrealized receivables was not eligible for § 453
installment sale reporting, after the taxpayer had reported on the installment
method, was a change of accounting method subject to § 481(a). As a result the
court sustained the IRS's adjustment for the year 2003, the year the IRS
initiated the change, even though the gain properly was reportable in 2002, the
year of the sale. The court cited Bosamia v. Commissioner, 661 F.3d 250 (5th
Cir. 2011), affg T.C. Memo. 2010-218, for the principle that a § 481(a)
adjustment may include amounts attributable to tax years outside the statute of
limitations on assessments.
* Finally, because the taxpayer was
required to recognize $126,240 of ordinary income relating to partnership
unrealized receivables in 2003, the taxpayer was entitled to increase the basis of
the note by that amount, which reduced the reported long-term capital gain for
the year in which the note was satisfied by conversion into IBM stock.
2. A partnership termination is only a termination
for some purposes. REG-126285-12. Partnerships; Start-up Expenditures;
Organization and Syndication Fees, 78 F.R. 73753 (12/9/13). Proposed
amendments to Reg. §§ 1.195-2(a), 1.708-1(b)(6), and 1.709-1(b)(3) would
provide that on a technical termination of a partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B)
caused by a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of partnership interests
within a 12-month period, the new partnership deemed to be formed as a
continuation of the terminated partnership under Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(4), would
continue to amortize § 195 start-up expenses and § 709 organization
expenses using the same amortization period adopted by the terminated
partnership. The proposed regulation clarifies that the terminated partnership
may not claim a § 165 loss deduction for any unamortized start-up or
organization expenses. The IRS reasoned in the Preamble that the technical
termination of a partnership under § 708(b)(1)(B) is not a cessation of the
trade or business to which the start-up and organizational expenses relate.
The Preamble also points out that this treatment is consistent with the
amortization of § 197 intangibles to the extent of the transferor's adjusted
basis, which continues in the new partnership over the remainder of the
transferor's 15-year amortization period. When final, the regulations will be
applied to technical terminations that occur after 12/9/13.
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
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F. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Penalties assessed on outside basis adjustments
are not a partnership item. Arbitrage Trading, LLC v. United States, 108
Fed. Cl. 588 (1/30/13). Following Petaluma FX Partners, and Tigers Eye
Trading LLC, the Court of Federal Claims held in this Son of Boss TEFRA
proceeding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the application
§ 6662 accuracy related penalties on adjustments to the taxpayer's outside
basis, which is an affected item in the partnership proceeding. The court
further held that it had jurisdiction to consider accuracy related penalties
related to adjustment of the disregarded partnership's losses and other
deductions.
2. Rely on the IRS for legal advice, you lose.
Kearney Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1408
(M.D. Fla. 3/27/13), reconsideration denied, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-2043
(M.D. Fla. 5/20/13). The taxpayer invested in a tax shelter scheme called
"Family Office Customized" (FOCus) program" by acquiring a direct
interest in an LLC called Nebraska Partners, which included indirect interests
in Lincoln Partners LLC owned 99% by Nebraska, and Kearney Partners
LLC, owned 99% by Lincoln. On initiation of a TEFRA audit procedure
(which the court referred to as "TERFA"), the IRS mailed the required
Notice of Beginning of Administrative Proceedings (NBAP) to the
partnerships but not to the partners. Section 6223(a) requires notice of
initiation of an audit at least 120 days before issuance of a Final Partnership
Administrative Adjustments (FPAA) to partners whose names and addresses
are furnished to the IRS. Section 6223(e) allows a partner who was not
provided a required notice to opt-out of the partnership proceeding. In
issuing its FPAA to Kearney Partners, the IRS attached a cover letter
indicating that since the taxpayer had not been issued an NBAP the taxpayer
was entitled to opt-out of the partnership proceeding, which he elected to do.
However, shortly after the taxpayer notified the IRS of his election to opt-
out, the IRS sent a letter to the taxpayer indicating that it erred in informing
the taxpayer of an election to opt-out because the taxpayer was not directly
entitled to an NBAP in the first instance. The taxpayer's petition to the Tax
Court following a separately issued notice of deficiency was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction but the basis for the decision was not specified. The
District Court rejected the taxpayer's motion that the court lacked
jurisdiction over the taxpayer in the partnership proceeding because of the
taxpayer's election to opt-out. First, the court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the IRS was collaterally estopped from asserting jurisdiction in
the partnership proceeding. The court concluded that since the basis for the
Tax Court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction over the notice of
deficiency issued to the taxpayer was not clear, the issue was not fully
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litigated in the Tax Court and, therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply.
The court then found that the taxpayer was not initially entitled to receive an
NBAP because the partnership failed either to provide the names and
addresses of partners on a partnership return or by separate statement as
required by § 6223(c). Further, the court held that the IRS is not required to
search its records for other information that may be available to it that
identifies the names and addresses of partners. That applies even if the IRS is
aware of the partner's identity. Finally, the court indicated that, "While the
Agency's error (subsequently rescinded) is regrettable to the extent it
muddied the waters, it does not alter the fact that there was no legal
obligation to provide the NBAP to [the taxpayer] in the first place and the
letter to the contrary does not change that circumstance."
a. Strike two, same partner, different
argument. Kearney Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d
2013-1789 (M.D. Fla. 4/25/13). In this action the court denied summary
judgment motions by the partnerships and the 99 percent partner challenging
IRS assertions that the FOCus investment lacked economic substance so that
all of the gains and losses emanating from the tax shelter should be
disregarded and alternatively that if the losses allocated to the partner are
respected then under the step transaction doctrine gains recognized before
the partner acquired his interest should also be allocated to the partner. The
transaction involved offsetting straddle gains allocated to one owner (and
eliminated on the owner's return) and losses, allocated to the later acquiring
partner. The court noted that both IRS positions are predicated on the
conclusion that FOCus is an abusive tax shelter and observed that both the
economic substance doctrine and the step transaction theory have been
applied to give effect to both the cost and income functions of a transaction
or to neither. The court concluded that the IRS offered sufficient evidence to
create a material issue over whether the 99 percent partner intended to
benefit from the inception of the transaction and that the losses were
generated through an interrelated series of transactions. Further, citing the
partnership anti-abuse rule of Reg. § 1.701-2 as a complement to the
economic substance doctrine, the court indicated that the IRS may disregard
the entire transaction.
b. And a win for the taxpayer in another
court on an earlier date. Kearney Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 111
A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1780 (N.J. 7/13/12). A magistrate judge denied the IRS's
motion to compel production of documents reflecting communications
between the 99 percent partner and Rabner, Allcorn, Baumgart & Ben-Asher,
P.C. The court concluded that the documents were protected by the attorney-
client privilege and rejected the IRS's argument that the firm was providing
financial advice after an in camera review. The court found that the attorney
358 [Vol. 15:5
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
was providing legal and tax advice. The court also held that even if the
partner were a party in the Florida TEFRA litigation, the partner did not
waive the attorney-client privilege by intending to call the attorney as a
witness in that matter because the partner would not rely on the attorney's
advice in that case. The court also held that the documents were prepared in
anticipation of litigation because of the aggressive nature of the tax shelter
program.
c. And a partial loss and partial win for the
taxpayer who seems to have unlimited attorney fee resources for pre-
trial motions. Kearney Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d
2013-1963 (M.D. Fla. 5/10/13). In this round the court denied the taxpayer's
objection to a magistrate's ruling that certain documents sought by the
taxpayer from the IRS were protected under the "deliberative process
privilege." The privilege attaches to documents that precede an agency's
final determination or outcome on a policy or legal matter and which reflect
the give-and-take of the consultative process that is antecedent to final
agency action. After in in camera review of the requested documents, the
court found that all of the documents, except one, were subject to the
privilege reflecting inter-agency opinions and recommendations of IRS
investigators, examiners and counsel at the Office of Chief Counsel that
preceded the IRS's final determination of the taxpayer's tax obligations
concerning the FOCus partnerships and application of accuracy related
penalties. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that lower-level
determinations relating to tax-return examinations were not subject to the
privilege, noting that the entire body of work of auditors are subject to the
deliberative process privilege. However, a legal memorandum written by
Debra Butler, Associate Chief Counsel Procedure and Administration, in
response to a request for assistance as to whether accuracy related penalties
could be imposed on taxpayers notwithstanding their disclosure of
participation in the FOCus partnerships, was described by the court as the
type of legal document relied upon by recipients as statements of law and
public policy that are not pre-decisional and therefore not subject to the
privilege. The court cited Tax Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 117 F.3d
607 (D.C. Cir. 1997) holding that Field Service Advice Memoranda could
not be viewed as pre-decisional because the documents represented
statements of the agency's legal position. The court described the document
as follows:
Similarly, the memorandum here reflects the Office of the
Chief Counsel's statements of law and assessments of
Plaintiffs' tax obligations. The opinion appears to be in its
final form, with no visible marks or edits. The tone of the
document is impersonal with distinct conclusion, facts, and
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law and analysis sections. Although the memorandum
indicates that it may not be used or cited as precedent, the
document is a representation of the IRS's legal position in
this case. And even if the document precedes the IRS's final
decisions in Plaintiffs' case, there is no indication that it
precedes the Agency's final legal position.
* The court also found that although the
memorandum was subject to the attorney-client privilege, it should be produced
because it reflects the IRS's final legal position regarding the taxpayer's tax
obligations. The court also upheld the magistrate's ruling that other documents
from an attorney in the Office of Chief Counsel advising revenue agents were
not protected by the attorney-client privilege and subject to disclosure. The
court indicated that it was unable to ascertain whether the attorney conducted
factual and legal analysis as counsel to the revenue agents or as one of the
revenue agents, and that the IRS thus failed to meet its burden of identify'ing the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the privilege.
d. And the waiver of penalties raises issues
that may or may not be considered in the partnership proceeding.
Kearney Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 946 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (M.D.
Fla. 5/22/13). In this decision the court determined that it had jurisdiction to
determine under Ann. 2002-2, 2002-1 C.B. 304, whether voluntary
disclosure filed by the partner entitled him to waiver of accuracy related
penalties under the terms of the Announcement. The court held that since the
Announcement consists of an agency directive designed to confer important
benefits to taxpayers who disclose their involvement in tax shelters in
exchange for the waiver of penalties, the thrust of the Announcement was to
provide a benefit to taxpayers, not to internally regulate IRS affairs. In
addition, the specific procedures and requirements enumerated in the
Announcement provided the necessary law to evaluate the taxpayer's
eligibility for penalty waiver. Thus, the court determined that it may review
whether the taxpayer's voluntary disclosure satisfied the Announcement's
requirements. In addition, however, the court considered whether the penalty
provisions were subject to review in the partnership level proceeding, or
whether it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the penalty as a
partner item. That question turned on whether the partner who provided the
disclosure had authority under the LLC agreements to disclose on behalf of
the partnership so that the disclosure was a partnership matter. The court
determined that question depended on a showing of facts not in the record on
summary judgment and thus denied summary judgment on the penalty issue.
* The court also held that it did not have
jurisdiction to review whether the IRS followed its own internal procedures for
reviewing penalty waivers, as the IRS internal memorandum requiring approval
of the Director of Field Operations for penalties, which were determined at the
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Office of Chief Counsel instead, represented internal general statements of
policy and rules governing internal agency operations that do not have the force
of law and, therefore, are not binding on the agency.
3. Wise guys respond to the wrong notice, it's their
problem even though the IRS made the mistake. Wise Guys Holdings.
LLC v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 193 (4/22/13). The IRS mailed a FPAA to
the tax matters partner from one office, and nine months later sent a second
notice from a different office. The first and second FPAAs were similar in
content, set forth the same adjustments, but contained different contact
information for the IRS. After the deadline for challenging the first FPAA
had expired, the taxpayer filed a petition in response to the second FPAA.
Too bad says the court (Judge Thornton). Section 6223(f) provides that, "If
the Secretary mails a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment for
a partnership taxable year with respect to a partner, the Secretary may not
mail another such notice to such partner with respect to the same taxable year
of the same partnership in the absence of a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or
misrepresentation of a material fact." Thus, concluded the court, the second
FPAA is invalid and the taxpayer failed to file a timely petition in response
to the first FPAA. Reasoning from cases considering a statutory notice of
deficiency, the court indicated that the Tax Court's jurisdiction proceeds
from a valid petition, which must be filed from a valid statutory notice
(citing Stamm Int'l Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 248, 252 (1985)). The
court also indicated that it does not have authority to apply equitable
principles such as estoppel to acquire jurisdiction.
4. The IRS doesn't have to search for the addresses
of notice partners. Taurus FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-168 (7/22/13). Bricolage Capital, LLC was the tax matters partner
(TMP) and FX Trading Co., LLC was a notice partner of Taurus FX Partners
LLC. Richard Postma was the sole member of FX Trading Co., which was
thereby a disregarded entity. The IRS sent both the notice of beginning of
administrative proceeding and the notice of final partnership administrative
adjustment (FPAA) to the tax matters partner and the notice partner, plus
Postma, to the addresses shown on the partnership's 2000 return, the year
under review. Postma filed a petition with the Tax Court as a partner other
than the TMP after the 150 day period for filing had expired. The court
(Judge Buch) rejected Postma's assertion that the FPAA was invalid because
the IRS did not mail the notices to the addresses shown on the partnership's
2001 return, the partner's last known address, which was different than the
addresses on the 2000 return subject to the audit. Section 6223(c)(1) provides
that the IRS "shall use the names, addresses, and profits interest shown on
the partnership return" and § 6223(c)(2) provides that the IRS shall use such
additional information furnished to it under regulations. Temp. Reg.
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§ 301.6223(c)-1T(a) required a written statement to the Service Center where
the partnership return was filed that identified the partners, the years
involved, and provided addresses. The court held that in the absence of the
notice required by the regulations, it was sufficient for the IRS to mail the
FPAA to the tax matters partner and the notice partner at the addresses
shown on the partnership's 2000 return, notwithstanding the fact that the
partnership's 2001 return had different addresses. The court stated that,
"[a]lthough the Commissioner may use other information in its possession,
he is not obligated to search his records for information that is not expressly
furnished on the 2000 return or pursuant to the regulations," citing Temp.
Reg. § 301.6223(c)-lT(f). The court also rejected Postma's argument that he
should have received a copy of the FPAA as a notice partner. The court
indicated that Postma was not identified as an indirect partner in a statement
to the IRS as required by Temp. Reg. § 301.6623(c)-1T, even though Postma
was named on the Schedule K-i as the contact person for FX Trading, the
disregarded entity in which Postma was the sole member. The court
indicated that the language of Temp. Reg. § 301.6223(c)-1T(f), which
provides that the IRS "may use other information in its possession," does not
create an obligation on the IRS to search its records for information not
expressly provided under the regulations. The court ultimately held that the
FPAA was valid and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case
because Postma's petition was filed more than 150 days after the FPAA was
issued to the TMP.
5. The grantor of a trust is not a partner under
TEFRA audit rules. Sugarloaf Fund, LLC, JetStream Business Limited v.
Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 4 (9/5/13). This TEFRA audit case is an
offshoot of the John Rogers Depreciated Asset/Debt (DAD) tax shelter
rejected by the courts in Superior Trading (discussed in Part C of this
section). In the DAD shelter, Sugarloaf LLC transferred depressed Brazilian
receivables to Main Trust (an Illinois common law business trust) which in
turn allocated the receivables to a Sub-Trust. The taxpayer Elmes (who was
represented by Rogers) transferred cash to the Main trust for the entire
interest in Sub-Trust. Elmes claimed a § 166 bad debt deduction for the
receivables. The deduction depended upon the transferred basis of the
receivables from Sugarloaf. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) rejected Elmes's
assertion that he was a partner in Sugarloaf because his basis in the
receivables was dependent on Sugarloafs basis. For purposes of
participating in a TEFRA proceeding, a partner is defined in § 6231 (a)(2) as
"any other person whose income tax liability *** is determined in whole or
in part by taking into account directly or indirectly partnership items of the
partnership." Partners also include indirect partners, defined by
§ 6231(a)(10) to include "person[s] holding an interest in a partnership
through I or more pass-thru partners." The court concluded that Elmes's
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Sub-Trust had no interest in the Sugarloaf partnership. The court also
concluded that a trust is not necessarily a partner merely because the trust
received assets from the partnership. The court indicated that the fact that
assets were transferred to the trusts did not depend upon any legal
relationship among Elmes, the trusts and the partnership. The court
distinguished the relationship of other investors in the DAD shelter, noting
that in other cases before the court each of those investors owned an interest
in a trading company through one or more pass-through partners.
6. Thirty years after investing in a tax shelter, the
taxpayers find no help from the courts. Acute Care Specialists II v. United
States, 727 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 8/22/13). In the mid-1980's the taxpayers
invested in tax shelters created by American Agri-Corp. which were found
by the Tax Court in a partnership proceeding to lack economic substance and
amount to nothing more than tax-avoidance schemes, with appropriate
penalties. The taxpayers filed suit in the District Court challenging
deficiency assessments resulting from the partnership proceeding. The court
affirmed District Court holdings that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because the taxpayers' assertions regarding statutes of limitations and
penalties were partnership-level determinations.
G. Miscellaneous
1. The First Circuit intrudes on tax law in an ERISA
case between private litigants and may resolve carried interest issues.
Sun Capital Partners III, L.P. v. New England Teamsters and Trucking
Industry Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 7/24/13). In an ERISA case
two private equity funds organized as limited partnerships sought to
withdraw from liability for contributions to the Teamsters multi-employer
plans on the grounds that the funds were merely passive investors in a
bankrupt company owned by one of the funds. In a decision that could have
implications for application of tax principles, the court affirmed summary
judgment that at least one of the funds was not merely a passive investor in
the bankrupt portfolio company. Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendment Act of 1990 (29 U.S.C. § 1381 et. seq.) (MPAA) all employees
of trades or businesses that are under common control are treated as
employed by a single employer that becomes liable for obligations under
defined benefit plans. Applying the principles of Commissioner v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987), the court concluded that the private equity
fund was in the trade or business of developing companies and selling them
at a profit. Along the way the court rejected the equity funds' argument that
investing was not a trade or business under either Higgins v. Commissioner,
312 U.S. 212 (1941), or Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963). The
court distinguished Higgins by indicating that the taxpayer in that case was
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not engaged in the management of the companies represented in the
taxpayer's investment portfolio. The court concluded that Whipple did not
bar trade or business status because, paraphrasing the language of Whipple,
the funds "did not simply devote time or energy to [the bankrupt company]
'without more.' Rather they were able to funnel management and consulting
fees to [the fund's] general partner and its subsidiary." Quoting from
Rosenthal, "Taxing Private Equity Funds as Corporate Developers," Tax
Notes, Jan. 21, 2013 at 361, the court stated that, "[P]rivate equity funds are
active enough to be in a trade or business."
* While the court was clear that it based its
opinion on its independent interpretation of the MPAA, the court deferred under
the standard of Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (the weight of the
agency opinion depends upon its thoroughness and validity of its reasoning), to
a 2007 PBGC letter concluding that an equity fund was engaged in a trade or
business under the Groetzinger two-part test based on findings that the fund
was engaged in an activity with the primary purpose of income or profit and
that it conducted that activity with continuity and regularity. The PPGC letter
indicated that the size of the fund involved in the ruling, the size of its profits,
and the management fees paid to the general partner of the fund established the
requisite continuity and regularity.
* The court rejected the equity funds'
assertion that the phrase "trade or business" must have a uniform interpretation
across federal statutes in the context of the application of Higgins and Whipple.
Nonetheless, the court found no inconsistency in its interpretation of trade or
business under those cases and Groetzinger, which leaves wide open the
possibility that fees and the profits interests of an equity fund represent ordinary
income derived from services in the trade or business of acquiring and
managing business operations.
2. Hiding abusive shelter transactions behind
disregarded entities makes the indirect partner an unidentified partner
for statute of limitations purposes. Gaughf Properties L.P. v.
Commissioner, 139 T.C. 219 (9/10/12). The taxpayers invested in
KPMG/Jenkens & Gilchrist currency options tax shelters through a
partnership consisting of two disregarded LLCs and a wholly owned
corporation. After the IRS caught up with the taxpayers from information
obtained through a John Doe summons issued to Jenkens & Gilchrist, the
IRS asserted that the statute of limitations remained open with respect to the
taxpayers under § 6229(e), which extends the limitation period for one year
after the name and address of a partner is furnished to the IRS where (1) the
name address and TIN of the partner is not "furnished" on the partnership
return and the IRS has sent notice of an FPAA within the statute of
limitations, or (2) the taxpayer has taken an inconsistent position and fails to
provide the notice required by § 6222(b). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held
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that the statute remained open under both provisions. Following the holding
in Costello v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 1003 (C.D. Cal. 1991), the court
held that, although Schedule K-is are required only for direct partners, an
indirect partner who is not identified on a partnership return remains an
"unidentified partner" for purposes of § 6229(e)(1). The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that because the IRS was in possession of identifying
information from applications for taxpayer identification numbers for the
disregarded entities (Forms SS-4) and information from Jenkens and
Gilchrist and KPMG John Doe summonses more than one year before
issuing assessment notices. The court upheld the validity of requirements in
Temp. Reg. § 301.6223(c)-IT that information be "filed" with the IRS at the
Service Center where the taxpayer's returns are filed and that the identifying
information be specific. The court interpreted § 6229(e)'s use of term
"furnished" as sufficiently close to the filing requirement of the temporary
regulations to indicate that the regulation was a valid exercise of
administrative authority under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and § 7805(a).
* The court also held that the taxpayer took
an inconsistent position on returns reporting the partnership transactions
because of the way the partnership netted contributions of long and short
options which the taxpayer reported separately in claiming basis increases. As a
result, the taxpayer was found to have failed to provide the statement required
by § 6222(b) thereby extending the statute of limitations under § 6229(e)(2).
* The court also rejected the taxpayer's
arguments that the IRS was estopped from assessing a deficiency because of
(1) IRS delays in issuing Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (notifying taxpayers
of the issues raised by the shelter transaction); (2) because of the long period
before the IRS issued an FPAA to the taxpayer's partnership; or (3) because the
IRS had withheld and destroyed evidence or placed witnesses beyond the reach
of the taxpayer because of criminal investigations.
a. Affirmed by the D.C. Circuit. Gaughf
Properties L.P. v. Commissioner, 738 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 12/27/13), aff'g
139 T.C. 219 (9/10/12). In an interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Circuit (Judge
Henderson) affirmed the Tax Court and held that the Gaughfs were
"unidentified partners" who took positions on their own tax returns that were
inconsistent with those of the partnership in its returns.
ViII. TAx SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings
1. Had this opinion been issued on October
25th, the taxpayer might have had a chance. However, the opinion was
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issued on March 14th, so success was not in the cards. Crispin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-70 (3/14/12), on appeal to the Third
Circuit. The taxpayer, an experienced CPA, entered into a CARDS
transaction in 2001 to shield about $7 million of shared fees (ordinary)
income from his wholly owned S corporation that engaged in a business
related to a pool of collateralized mortgage obligations. The promoter was a
longtime friend who did not charge the taxpayer any fee to participate in the
CARDS transaction. The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) held that the transaction
lacked economic substance because it lacked business purpose and profit
expectation, stating, "[w]e have consistently held that CARDS transactions
lack economic substance," and noting that an appeal in this case lies in the
Third Circuit, which decided ACM P'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231
(3d Cir. 1998).
Judge Kroupa also upheld the 40 percent
gross valuation misstatement accuracy-related penalty. The tax opinion the
taxpayer received from his advisors relied on "false representations [the
taxpayer] made," including that he had a business purpose for entering into the
CARDS transaction and that he anticipated earning a profit, absent tax benefits,
from the CARDS transaction, which were "material to the conclusions reached
in the tax opinion." Furthermore, the taxpayer had not actually relied on the
opinon.
a. This opinion was issued on February 25th
and amended on March 19th so the taxpayer was again out of luck.
Crispin v. Commissioner, 708 F.3d 507 (3d Cir. 2/25/13), amended by 2013
U.S. App. LEXIS 5341 (3d Cir. 3/19/13). The Third Circuit (Judge Jordan)
upheld the Tax Court determination that the CARDS transaction failed both
the objective and subjective tests for economic substance. The Third Circuit
further found that the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not
to credit either taxpayer's evidence as to business purpose [in that he
approached the lender to substitute aircraft for cash as collateral] or the
expert opinion by taxpayer's expert [in that potential profit could be
generated by using the CARDS loan proceeds to purchase aircraft]. The
penalty issue was decided against taxpayer, following Gustashaw v.
Commissioner, 696 F.3d 1124 (11th Cir. 9/28/12).
* Judge Jordan concluded:
"When, as here, a taxpayer is presented with what would
appear to be a fabulous opportunity to avoid tax obligations,
he should recognize that he proceeds at his own peril."
Neonatology Assocs., 299 F.3d at 234. Crispin gambled at
CARDS and lost, and he is liable for both the underpayment
of his taxes and the accuracy-related penalty as determined
by the Commissioner.
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2. Taxpayer victory in the Court of Federal Claims
in a lease-in, lease-out (LILO) transaction with a Dutch utility. On
appeal, the taxpayer is likely to hit a Dutch wall, i.e., a [Timothy] Dyk.
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228
(10/21/09). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Horn), in a long and detailed
opinion, held that, under the particular facts of this case, the LILO
transaction taxpayer entered into with a Dutch utility had economic
substance, i.e., that no decision as to whether particular options would be
exercised was "pre-ordained" and that taxpayer "bore the burdens and
benefits of ownership." In finding that taxpayer had shown that the
transaction was a true lease and should be respected, she distinguished
factually other LILO cases decided for the government, such as BB & T
Corporation v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008), and A WG
Leasing Trust v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
* A large portion of the opinion consists of
Judge Horn's analysis of the expert evidence, with pointed criticism of one
expert who "failed to conduct in-depth studies of the ... [t]ransaction and gave
almost automatic and generalized conclusions on the flaws of LILO and SILO
transactions for tax purposes."
* Alleged "spoliation of evidence" in 2000
by reason of a switch in e-mail systems without preserving all of the then-
existing e-mails, and the desire to protect 1997 memoranda as work product,
came into conflict with a bad result for the credibility of an in-house lawyer.
("He was considered by the court an unreliable witness, perhaps willing to write
or say whatever he thought would assist his then current assignment.") The
court found that litigation was not reasonably anticipated until 2002 at the
earliest because negotiations in connection with the IRS audit were ongoing
until at least that year. The 1997 memoranda were ordered disclosed.
a. And, indeed, as expected, the shelter
crashes against the Dutch Wall in the form of Judge Timothy Dyk!
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. United States, 703 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1/9/13). In an opinion by Judge Dyk, the Federal Circuit reversed
Judge Horn. The court applied the substance-over-form doctrine under its
decision in Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 641 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2011), to disallow ConEd's claimed deductions for rent and interest. Because
there was a reasonable likelihood that the tax-indifferent entity in the LILO
Transaction (the lessor of the master lease) would exercise its purchase
option at the conclusion of the ConEd sublease, the master lease was
illusory. Therefore, the LILO Transaction did not constitute a true lease and
ConEd's rent deductions were disallowed. The interest deductions were
disallowed because the loan proceeds effectively remained in an account to
satisfy ConEd's loan obligation to the lender; ConEd did not have the use of
the funds. Therefore, there was no genuine indebtedness. The case was
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remanded to the Court of Federal Claims for the limited purpose of
determining only the refund of previously paid interest ConEd might be
entitled to receive.
* While Judge Horn failed to stick her
finger into the dike belonging to the Dutch utility, Judge Dyk shoved his thumb
all the way into Judge Hom. In so doing, he also trashed the Deloitte & Touche
appraisal report relied upon by ConEd.
3. A Tax Court judge sees a MidCoast deal as
immune from transferee liability. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-298 (12/27/11). The Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) refused to uphold transferee liability against the shareholders of a
corporation who sold the stock of the corporation engaged to a midco
(Fortrend, which was brought into the deal by the infamous MidCoast to
provide financing) after an asset sale. He found that the shareholders knew
little about the mechanics of the transaction and exercised due diligence.
The trust representatives believed Fortrend's attorneys to be
from prestigious and reputable law firms. They assumed that
Fortrend must have had some method of offsetting the
taxable gains within the corporations. They performed due
diligence with respect to Fortrend to ensure that Fortrend
was not a scam operation and that Fortrend had the financial
capacity to purchase the stock. The trust representatives
believed Fortrend assumed the risk of overpaying for the
Taxi corporations if they did not have a legal way for
offsetting or reducing the tax liabilities.
* Judge Goeke applied state fraudulent
conveyance law to determine whether the transactions should be collapsed and
concluded that they should not, because the IRS, which has the burden of proof
in transferee liability cases, did not prove that "the purported transferee had
either actual or constructive knowledge of the entire scheme." Because in this
case the transaction was structured in such a manner that the corporation never
made any payments to the shareholders, there was no actual or constructive
fraudulent transfer to the shareholders. Finally, turning to federal tax law, Judge
Goeke held that "substance over form and its related doctrines [were] not
applicable," because the transaction was an arm's length stock sale between the
shareholders and a purchaser in which the parties agreed that the purchaser
would be responsible for reporting and paying the corporation's income taxes.
"There was no preconceived plan to avoid taxation ... ." Judge Goeke
distinguished Feldman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-297 (2011),
because in that case "[i]t was 'absolutely clear' that the taxpayer was aware the
stock purchaser had no intention of ever paying the tax liabilities [and] the
taxpayer did not conduct thorough due diligence of the stock purchaser ... ."
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a. But the First Circuit says Judge Goeke
misunderstood Massachusetts law and tells him to try a different
analysis. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, 712 F.3d 597
(3/29/13). The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lynch, vacated and
remanded the Tax Court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the Tax
Court correctly looked to Massachusetts law to determine whether the Trust
could be held liable for the corporations' taxes and penalties, rejecting the
IRS's argument that the Tax Court should have applied the federal tax
substance-over-form doctrine to determine whether the Trust should be
considered a "transferee" of the four corporations' assets. However, the
Court of Appeals held that the Tax Court erred in construing Massachusetts
fraudulent transfer law (which is the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act) to
require, as a prerequisite for the Trust's liability, either (1) that the Trust
knew of the new shareholders' scheme or (2) that the corporations
transferred assets directly to the Trust. The IRS had presented evidence of
fraudulent transfers from the four corporations to the midco entities, and the
midco entities purchased the four corporations from the Trust. The Court of
Appeals concluded that if on remand the Tax Court were to find that at the
time of the purchases, the assets of these midco entities were unreasonably
small in light of their liabilities and that the midco entities did not receive
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the purchase prices, then the
Trust could be held liable for taxes and penalties assessed upon the four
corporations regardless of whether it had any knowledge of the new
shareholders' scheme.
b. Uh oh, it's midco! The Second Circuit
says taxpayers can't act like the three monkeys. Diebold Foundation, Inc.
Commissioner, 736 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 11/14/13), vacating and remanding
Salus Mundi Foundation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-61. The
Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Poller, vacated a Tax Court decision
holding that the shareholders of a corporation, and a transferee of a
shareholder, that sold stock in a midco transaction were subject to § 6901
transferee liability for the corporate level taxes that were avoided. As an
initial matter, the Second Circuit overruled its holding in Bausch & Lomb
Inc. v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991) that mixed questions of
law and fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard when reviewing
a Tax Court decision, and held that Tax Court fact findings are reviewed for
clear error, "but that mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo,
to the extent that the alleged error is in the misunderstanding of a legal
standard." The Tax Court had held that because there was no conveyance
from the corporation to the shareholders, under the relevant state fraudulent
conveyance law (New York, NYUFCA) there was no state law liability in
law or equity, and thus the successor foundations were not liable as
transferees. The Tax Court did not address federal law, but concluded that
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because there was no state law liability, it was immaterial to the outcome of
the case if the shareholder was a transferee under the terms of § 6901. The
Second Circuit concluded that the two prongs of § 6901 are independent and
that the Tax Court did not err by only addressing the liability prong. Section
6901 exists only if: (1) the party is a transferee under § 6901, and (2) the
party is subject to liability at law or in equity. Federal tax law controls the
first prong, while the second prong is determined by the applicable state law.
If there was not a "conveyance" under state law, it did not matter whether or
not the selling shareholder was a "transferee" as defined by § 6901(h). But
then the Second Circuit differed with the Tax Court and held that state law
transferee liability might have existed. Under the NYUFCA "[i]t is well
established that multilateral transactions may under appropriate
circumstances be 'collapsed"' and treated as phases of a single transaction
for analysis." Under New York law, a transaction can be collapsed if (1) the
consideration received from the first transferee [is] "reconveyed by the [party
owing the liability] for less than fair consideration or with an actual intent to
defraud creditors," and "the transferee in the leg of the transaction sought to
be voided [has] actual or constructive knowledge of the entire scheme that
renders her exchange with the debtor fraudulent." The Second Circuit found
that it was clear that the first element had been met and that the crucial issue
was whether the shareholders had "actual or constructive knowledge of the
entire scheme that renders [the] exchange ... fraudulent." In this respect the
Second Circuit held that the shareholders had such constructive knowledge.
[W]e must now assess whether the Shareholders had actual
or constructive knowledge of the entire scheme. The Tax
Court concluded they did not. This assessment is a mixed
question of law and fact, assessing whether based upon the
facts as determined by the Tax Court, the Shareholders had
constructive or actual knowledge as a matter of law.
Therefore, we review de novo the Tax Court's determination
that the Shareholders did not have constructive knowledge,
but review for clear error the factual findings that underpin
the determination.
Concluding that a party had constructive knowledge
does not require a showing that the party had actual
knowledge of a scheme; rather, it is sufficient if, based upon
the surrounding circumstances, they "should have known"
about the entire scheme. HBE Leasing, 48 F.3d at 636
(internal quotation marks omitted). Constructive knowledge
in this context also includes "inquiry knowledge"-that is,
where transferees "were aware of circumstances that should
have led them to inquire further into the circumstances of the
transaction, but ... failed to make such inquiry....
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The Tax Court did not sufficiently address the
totality of the circumstances from all of the facts, which that
court had already laid out itself. ... [i]t is of great import that
the Shareholders recognized the "problem" of the tax
liability arising from the built-in gains on the assets ... . The
Shareholders specifically sought out parties that could help
them avoid the tax liability inherent in a C Corp holding
appreciated assets. ... The parties to this transaction were
extremely sophisticated actors, deploying a stable of tax
attorneys from two different firms in order to limit their tax
liabilities. ... Considering their sophistication, their
negotiations with multiple partners to structure the deal, their
recognition of the fact that the amount of money they would
ultimately receive for an asset or stock sale would be
reduced based on the need to pay the C Corp tax liability,
and the huge amount of money involved, among other
things, it is obvious that the parties knew, or at least should
have known but for active avoidance, that the entire scheme
was fraudulent and would have left Double D unable to pay
its tax liability.
... To conclude that these circumstances did not constitute
constructive knowledge would do away with the distinction
between actual and constructive knowledge, and, at times,
the Tax Court's opinion seems to directly make this mistake.
The facts in this case strongly suggest that the parties
actually knew that tax liability would be illegitimately
avoided, and in any event, as a matter of law, plainly
demonstrate that the parties "should have known" that this
was a fraudulent scheme, designed to let both buyer of the
assets and seller of the stock avoid the tax liability inherent
in a C Corp holding appreciated assets and leave the former
shell of the corporation, now held by a Midco, without assets
to satisfy that liability.
* Because the Tax Court had determined
that there was no state law liability, it did not consider the other questions
determinative to the case. Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded to the Tax
Court to determine whether the shareholders were transferees under § 6901 and
to resolve other procedural issues.
4. Welfare for tax litigators - another generic tax
shelter litigated to the bitter end. Nevada Partners Fund, L.L.C. v. United
States, 720 F.3d 594 (5th Cir. 6/24/13), vacated and remanded for
reconsideration, 134 S. Ct. 903 (2014). The Fifth Circuit in an opinion by
Judge Dennis, affirmed a District Court decision, 714 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D.
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Miss. 2010), denying the taxpayer's deduction for losses purportedly
generated by a KPMG FOCus tax shelter transaction. The shelter involved
three tiers of partnerships and foreign currency transaction straddles that
produced offsetting economic gains and losses. A transitory partner would
recognize the gains while the taxpayer would recognize the losses through an
inflated partnership basis. The transaction was substantially similar to the
listed transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the District Court "did not err legally or factually
in determining that the partnerships failed to meet their burden of proving
that the transactions giving rise to the $18 million tax loss in question had
economic substance." The District Court correctly held that the transactions
"served no other purpose than to provide the structure through which
Williams could enjoy the reduction of his tax burden for that year." That in
subsequent years the taxpayer made significant profits from currency
transactions and other investments effected through the tax shelter promoter
was not relevant; the later year's transactions were separate transactions. A
§ 6662 negligence penalty was upheld notwithstanding that Arnold & Porter
had issued an opinion that the losses "more likely than not" would be
allowable. The taxpayer, Williams, was not a partner at the time the opinion
letter was issued. Furthermore, "the partnerships could not reasonably rely
on Arnold & Porter's tax opinions in good faith because Williams and the
partnerships failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they
supplied the professional with all pertinent information necessary to assess
the purpose and elements of the transactions at issue as they were actually
effectuated."
5. You say SILO/LILO, but the courts keep singing
bye-bye tax benefits. John Hancock Life Insurance Company v.
Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 1 (8/5/13). This case was the first SILO/LLO
transaction to come before the Tax Court. After detailed fact findings and an
examination of the various Courts of Appeals opinions in earlier SILO/LILO
cases, the Tax Court (Judge Haines) held for the IRS. In each of four
different transactions, the substance of the transaction was not consistent
with its form. There was only de minimis risk to the taxpayer and the terms
of the agreements assured that the taxpayer would receive its expected return
on its equity investments. The Tax Court stated:
This guaranteed return is not indicative of a leasehold or
ownership interest. Rather, it is reflective of what is better
described as a very intricate loan from John Hancock to the
lessee counterparties.
* Thus - even though the court did find that
the transactions had economic substance - because the taxpayer was in
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substance a lender, its claimed deductions for rent, interest and depreciation
were disallowed.
6. Another tax shelter strategy bites the dust - isn't
it about time for frivolous litigation penalties to start being assessed
against big corporations for this detritus (a more polite word than some
of us would use)? WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, 728 F.3d 736 (8th
Cir. 8/22/13). The court affirmed a district court ruling that a KPMG
contingent liability tax reduction strategy sold to Wells Fargo Bank failed to
produce claimed capital loss deductions because the transaction lacked
economic substance.
7. The STARS are blacked out by the economic
substance doctrine. Bank of New York Mellon Corp. v. Commissioner, 140
T.C. 15 (2/11/13). In a case described as a case of first impression in the Tax
Court, the court (Judge Kroupa) denied the taxpayer's claimed foreign tax
credits and other tax benefits artificially generated through a "STARS" tax-
shelter transaction developed and marketed by KPMG. The transaction that
generated the purported foreign tax credit lacked economic substance. The
taxpayer's control and management over the transferred assets did not
materially change as a result of the transaction and the STARS structure had
no effect on the income stream generated by the assets; the assets would have
generated the same income regardless of being transferred. "Thus, income
from the STARS assets was not an incremental benefit of STARS." The
court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the STARS structure was security
for a loan from Barclays Bank, finding that the loan proceeds were not used
to purchase the STARS assets and that the loan was adequately secured by
other assets. Thus the loan was a separate transaction from the STARS
transaction, which standing by itself lacked economic substance.
Furthermore, the STARS transaction still lacked economic substance even if
the STARS structure and the loan were evaluated as an integrated
transaction.
The STARS transaction was a complicated scheme centered
around arbitraging domestic and foreign tax law
inconsistencies. The U.K. taxes at issue did not arise from
any substantive foreign activity. Indeed, they were produced
through pre-arranged circular flows from assets held,
controlled and managed within the United States. We
conclude that Congress did not intend to provide foreign tax
credits for transactions such as STARS.
* Finally, the claimed transactional
expenses, the zero coupon swap interest expense, and the U.K. taxes that were
incurred in furtherance of the STARS transaction were not deductible.
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"Expenses incurred in furtherance of a transaction that is disregarded for a lack
of economic substance are not deductible."
a. But on reconsideration, the taxpayer wins
a skirmish after the major battle is over. Bank of New York Mellon Corp.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-225 (9/23/13). The Tax Court (Judge
Kroupa) granted the taxpayer's motion for reconsideration of its decision,
140 T.C. 15 (2/11/13), which disallowed the taxpayer's claimed STARS tax
shelter deductions, but only with respect to the disallowance in the earlier
decision of interest deductions with respect to a loan incurred as part of the
STARS transaction. In the earlier proceeding the taxpayer maintained that it
did not deduct interest on the loan because it argued that the loan interest and
the spread should be treated as though they were paid under an integrated
contract. The Tax Court bifurcated the STARS transaction into the loan and
the STARS structure, and found that the loan proceeds were available for the
taxpayer's use throughout the STARS transaction. Based on this finding the
taxpayer argued that an interest deduction should be allowed, reasoning that
the loan was not necessary for the STARS structure to produce the
disallowed foreign tax credits, and thus loan served a purpose beyond the
creation of tax benefits. The court agreed with this argument and allowed the
deduction.
b. Another STARS deal is rejected
completely. Salem Financial, Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543
(9/20/13). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Wheeler) - in a very loooong
opinion - concluded that "[n]o aspect of the STARS transaction has any
economic reality." Furthermore, because the taxpayer "was engaged in an
economically meaningless tax shelter ... the negligence accuracy-related
penalty of § 6662(b)(1) and the substantial understatement accuracy-related
penalty of § 6662(b)(2) apply, and that the defenses of reasonable basis,
substantial authority, and reasonable cause and good faith are not available
[to the taxpayer]."
c. But a different court - with a judge of Irish
descent - sees the STARS deal and grants partial summary judgment
for the taxpayer; only the Shadow [and the First Circuit] knows what
comes next. Santander Holdings U.S.A. v. United States, 112 A.F.T.R.2d
2013-6530 (D. Mass. 10/17/13). A key element in whether a STARS
transaction has a reasonable prospect for profit, and thus might not run afoul
of the economic substance doctrine, is whether the payment from Barclays
(the counterparty) to the taxpayer of an amount equal to one-half of the U.K.
taxes paid by the taxpayer effectively reduced the taxpayer's payment of the
U.K. taxes as a rebate. (We will not go into the details of the economic
analysis.) Suffice it to say that the government's position was that "the
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Barclays payment was not 'in substance' a payment by Barclays at all, but
rather it was 'effectively' a rebate of taxes originating from the U.K. tax
authorities. The theory is that Barclays was only able to make the payment
because of the tax credits it had received from the U.K." The District Court
(Judge O'Toole) found the government's argument on this point "wholly
unconvincing," and held that the Barclays payment was not in any way a
rebate to the taxpayer of U.K. taxes, citing. Reg. § 1.901-2(f)(2), which
provides: "Tax is considered paid by the taxpayer even if another party to a
direct or indirect transaction with the taxpayer agrees, as a part of the
transaction, to assume the taxpayer's foreign tax liability." Accordingly, he
ruled that the Barclays payment to the taxpayer "should be accounted for as
revenue to [the taxpayer] in assessing whether [the taxpayer] had a
reasonable prospect of profit in the transaction." He also rejected the
government's argument that the entire transaction was a "sham" "concocted
to manufacture a bogus foreign tax credit," because he found that argument
to be foreclosed by his finding that "[i]f the Barclays payment is included in
the calculation of pre-tax profitability, then there was a reasonable prospect
of profit as to the trust transaction, giving it economic substance." Finally,
Judge O'Toole concluded that under First Circuit precedent, if a transaction
that had "objective economic substance," the economic substance doctrine
could not be applied to deny the tax benefits of the transaction on
"subjective" grounds, although he acknowledged that the First Circuit might
revisit the issue and "would perhaps move a bit away from a rigid 'objective
only' test to one that is primarily objective but has room for consideration of
subjective factors where necessary or appropriate."
8. The mighty sword of economic substance strikes
down yet another tax shelter. This is getting to be really old news. Blum
v. Commissioner, 737 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 12/18/13). The taxpayer sold a
business and recognized a capital gain of approximately $45 million. KPMG,
which had already been preparing the taxpayer's tax returns for a few years,
then sold him an OPIS tax shelter to reduce his taxes. The Tenth Circuit was
unconcerned with the technical mechanics of the transaction and described
the deal as follows:
The OPIS shelter is designed to create large, artificial losses
for taxpayers by allowing them to claim a large basis in
certain assets. These artificial losses offset actual capital
gains, reducing the tax liability of the participating taxpayer.
... There are technical rules that allow certain related parties
in a financial transaction to claim a basis that, in reality, does
not reflect the amount that the party paid for the asset. In
fact, the party might not have actually purchased the asset at
all. OPIS took advantage of this technical rule to allow
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clients to pay a relatively small amount of money in order to
claim a disproportionately large basis and to use that basis to
shelter their own otherwise taxable income. See generally
Staff of S. Comm. on Gov't Affairs, Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations, 108th Cong., Rep. on U.S. Tax Shelter
Industry 5-10, 28 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter Senate
Report].
Individual components of this transaction presented
the possibility of profit. No one, however, argues that profits
were likely. Indeed, while the parties dispute the method
used to calculate the likelihood of profit, both agree profits
were unlikely. Rather, according to Mr. Blum, the small
chance of huge profits justified the risk of such an
investment.
* The court concluded as follows:
We are unconvinced [that Mr. Blum lacked the subjective
motivation to generate a profit from OPIS] and find
ourselves arriving at the same conclusion arrived at by the
IRS, the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
and the Tax Court. The OPIS transaction in this case was a
sham designed to reduce Mr. Blum's tax liability, and it
lacked any reasonable probability of generating a profit.
* A gross misvaluation penalty, as well as a
negligence penalty, was upheld. "Mr. Blum still relied on a company that was
not independent, he signed an opinion letter that he knew or should have known
contained a material misrepresentation, and he claims to have relied on advice
that he didn't receive until after he filed his taxes."
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions"
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
C. Disclosure and Settlement
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
D. Tax Shelter Penalties, etc.
1. The Tax Court now agrees with the majority of
circuits on the 40 percent gross valuation overstatement penalty, leaving
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits standing alone together. AHG Investments
LLC v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 73 (3/14/13). In a unanimous reviewed
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opinion by Judge Goeke, the Tax Court overruled its prior decisions in Todd
v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 912 (1987), aff'd, 862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988),
and McCrary v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 827 (1989), and held that a taxpayer
may not avoid a 40 percent gross valuation misstatement penalty under
§ 6662(h) by conceding a deduction or credit on grounds unrelated to value
or basis of property. The Tax Court was persuaded that in its earlier cases it
had misinterpreted a passage in the GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, which stated "The portion of a tax
underpayment that is attributable to a valuation overstatement will be
determined after taking into account any other proper adjustments to tax
liability. Thus, the underpayment resulting from a valuation overstatement
will be determined by comparing the taxpayer's (1) actual tax liability (i.e.,
the tax liability that results from a proper valuation and which takes into
account any other proper adjustments) with (2) actual tax liability as reduced
by taking into account the valuation overstatement. The difference between
these two amounts will be the underpayment that is attributable to the
valuation overstatement." Upon reconsidering the issue in AHG Investments,
the Tax Court quoted with approval the Federal Circuit opinion in Alpha I,
L.P. v. United States, 682 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2012), which stated:
The Blue Book, in sum, offers the unremarkable proposition
that, when the IRS disallows two different deductions, but
only one disallowance is based on a valuation misstatement,
the valuation misstatement penalty should apply only to the
deduction taken on the valuation misstatement, not the other
deduction, which is unrelated to valuation misstatement.
The court in Todd mistakenly applied that simple
rule to a situation in which the same deduction is disallowed
based on both valuation misstatement-and non-valuation-
misstatement theories.
* The Tax Court holding in AHG
Investments follows the rule adopted by the majority of the Circuit Courts of
Appeal. See, e.g., Fidelity International Currency Advisor A Fund LLC v.
United States, 661 F.3d 667 (1st Cir. 2011); Alpha I LP v. United States, 682
F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2012); and Gustashaw v. Commissioner, 696 F.3d 1124
(1Ith Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit and Ninth Circuit follow the rule that The
Tax Court established in Todd but repudiated in AHG Investments LLC See
Todd v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988); Gainer v. Commissioner,
893 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1990).
a. The Supreme Court will take up the
conflict between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, on the one hand, and the
Tax Court and the other Circuits, on the other hand. Woods v. United
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States, 471 Fed. Appx. 320 (5th Cir. 6/6/12), rev'd, 134 S. Ct. 557 (12/3/13).
This case presented the issue of the applicability of the valuation
overstatement penalty, more specifically whether tax underpayments are
"attributable to" overstatements of basis when the inflated basis claim has
been disallowed based on a finding that the underlying transactions lacked
economic substance. The Fifth Circuit in a per curiam opinion held that the
issue was well-settled and required no discussion in light of Bemont Invs.,
L.L.C. v. United States, 679 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 4/26/12); Heasley v.
Commissioner, 902 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1990); and Todd v. Commissioner,
862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988). The Court also added a second question for the
parties to brief: "Whether the district court had jurisdiction in this case under
26 U.S.C. § 6226 to consider the substantial valuation misstatement penalty."
This issue involves the general question under TEFRA of which issues are to
be resolved in a partner-level proceeding and which should be resolved at the
partnership level.
Any Supreme Court resolution of the 40-
percent-penalty issue will be less important for years governed by § 7701(o),
which provides for a 40-percent penalty on transactions lacking economic
substance.
b. The Seventh Circuit joins the majority.
Superior Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 728 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 8/26/13). In
an opinion by Judge Posner the Seventh Circuit applied the 40 percent gross
valuation misstatement penalty to a partnership tax shelter disregarded under
the economic substance doctrine. The court opined that "a taxpayer who
overstates basis and participates in sham transactions, as in this case, should
be punished at least as severely as one who does only the former."
2. The Supreme Court [unnecessarily?] addresses an
issue of statutory interpretation that has implications far beyond the
specific context of the case. United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557
(12/3/13). In a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held (1) that
pursuant to § 6226(f), which provides that a court in partnership-level
TEFRA proceeding has jurisdiction to determine "the applicability of any
penalty . . . which relates to an adjustment to a partnership item," the
applicability of the § 6662(b)(3) valuation overstatement penalty could be
determined at the partnership level, and (2) that the § 6662(b)(3) valuation
overstatement penalty applies to an underpayment resulting from a basis-
inflating transaction that is disregarded for lack of economic substance.
* On the jurisdictional issue, the court
noted that the TEFRA partnership-level determination maybe be provisional,
stating that:
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TEFRA gives courts in partnership-level proceedings
jurisdiction to determine the applicability of any penalty that
could result from an adjustment to a partnership item, even if
imposing the penalty would also require determining
affected or non-partnership items such as outside basis. The
partnership level applicability determination, we stress, is
provisional: the court may decide only whether adjustments
properly made at the partnership level have the potential to
trigger the penalty. Each partner remains free to raise, in
subsequent, partner-level proceedings, any reasons why the
penalty may not be imposed on him specifically.
* Turning to the substantive issue, Justice
Scalia wrote that "[t]he penalty's plain language makes it applicable here." For
the year at issue, § 6662(e)(1)(A) provides that "there is a substantial valuation
misstatement under chapter 1 if ... the value of any property (or the adjusted
basis of any property) claimed on any return of tax imposed by chapter 1 is 200
percent or more of the amount determined to be the correct amount of such
valuation or adjusted basis (as the case may be)." (Section 6662(e)(1)(A) now
has a 150 percent threshold.)
[T]he COBRA transactions were designed to generate losses
by enabling the partners to claim a high outside basis in the
partnerships. But once the partnerships were deemed not to
exist for tax purposes, no partner could legitimately claim an
outside basis greater than zero. Accordingly, if a partner
used an outside basis figure greater than zero to claim losses
on his tax return, and if deducting those losses caused the
partner to underpay his taxes, then the resulting
underpayment would be "attributable to" the partner's
having claimed an "adjusted basis" in the partnerships that
exceeded "the correct amount of such . .. adjusted basis."
* Justice Scalia rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the valuation misstatement had to be a "factual" one that
excluded threshold legal determinations, and held that "the valuation-
misstatement penalty encompasses legal as well as factual misstatements of
adjusted basis." He noted that the holding did not render superfluous the
§ 6662(b)(6) penalty for transactions lacking in economic substance that was
enacted in 2010. "The new penalty covers all sham transactions, including those
that do not cause the taxpayer to misrepresent value or basis; thus, it can apply
in situations where the valuation misstatement penalty cannot."
* Finally, Justice Scalia went out of his
way to trash the taxpayer's reliance on the Bluebook for the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, which explained in part the scope of the valuation
misstatement penalty. Although he found the particular language in the
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Bluebook to which the taxpayer had pointed to be unpersuasive, he generally
disparaged reliance on the Bluebook for anything more than its persuasive
power.
Blue Books are prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation as commentaries on recently passed tax laws.
They are "written after passage of the legislation and
therefore d[o] not inform the decisions of the members of
Congress who vot[e] in favor of the [law]." Flood v. United
States, 33 F.3d 1174, 1178 (CA9 1994). We have held that
such "[p]ost-enactment legislative history (a contradiction in
terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory interpretation."
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. _, _ (2011) (slip
op. at 17-18); accord, Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. United
States, 379 F.3d 1303, 1309 (CA Fed. 2004) (dismissing
Blue Book as "a post-enactment explanation"). While we
have relied on similar documents in the past, see FPC v.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458, 471-472
(1973), our more recent precedents disapprove of that
practice. Of course the Blue Book, like a law review article,
may be relevant to the extent it is persuasive. But the
passage at issue here does not persuade. It concerns a
situation quite different from the one we confront: two
separate, non overlapping underpayments, only one of which
is attributable to a valuation misstatement.
* This discussion of the Bluebook in the
text of the opinion is particularly notable because Justice Scalia dismissed in a
footnote the taxpayer's arguments based on legislative history. "Whether or not
legislative history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here, the
statutory text is unambiguous."
3. A total loss for this taxpayer was in the CARDS.
Kerman v. Commissioner, 713 F.3d 849 (6th Cir. 4/8/13), cert. denied, 2014
WL 102428, (1/13/14). The Sixth Circuit (Judge Ludington) decided the
substantive issues in favor of the government, and the 40 percent valuation
overstatement penalty was applied.
4. Even if Krause is sour, partners are still liable for
increased interest on substantial underpayments attributable to tax
motivated transactions. Bush v. United States, 717 F.3d 920 (Fed. Cir.
5/30/13). In an opinion by Judge Newman, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Court of Federal Claims, which dismissed the suit under § 7422(h) on the
basis that it lacked jurisdiction under the TEFRA audit rules. Bush v. United
States, 101 Fed. Cl. 791 (11/14/11). The taxpayers, who were partners of the
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Denver-based Dillon Oil Technology Partnership, challenged the IRS's
assessment of enhanced interest for tax years 1983 and 1984 pursuant to
former § 6621(c). Former § 6621(c) imposed an increased rate of interest
"with respect to any substantial underpayment attributable to tax motivated
transactions." The IRS had issued FPAAs to Dillon Oil for tax years 1983
and 1984 and to other similarly situated Denver-based partnerships
disallowing losses of the partnerships. Dillon Oil and the other partnerships
filed petitions in the Tax Court. The Tax Court proceedings were stayed
pending resolution of Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132 (1992), which
was a test case for over 2,000 related cases. In Krause, the Tax Court
disallowed losses of the partnerships under § 183 because the partnerships'
activities lacked profit objectives and upheld the imposition of increased
interest under former § 6621(c). After the Krause decision, several
partnerships in the Tax Court proceeding involving Dillon Oil moved to
compel the IRS to settle based on terms to which the IRS had agreed in some
cases prior to the Krause decision. These terms allowed the partnerships to
take deductions up to the amount of cash invested and imposed no penalties
other than increased interest under former § 6621(c) (or its predecessor
provision). (After Krause, the IRS settled by disallowing all deductions and
imposing increased interest.) The Tax Court denied these motions and noted
that it previously had concluded that partners who had not settled with the
IRS prior to Krause were bound by the Krause decision. Vulcan Oil Tech.
Partners v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 153, 154-55 (1998). The Tax Court
proceedings involving Dillon Oil ultimately were dismissed for lack of
prosecution, and the Dillon Oil partners did not appeal the dismissal. The
IRS later sent Form 4549A to the Dillon Oil partners informing them that
they would be assessed increased interest under former § 662 1(c). The Dillon
Oil partners paid the interest and brought a refund action in the Court of
Federal Claims, in which they argued that the Krause decision was "wrong
as a matter of law" and that they were not bound by it. They noted that the
Fifth Circuit, in a separate proceeding involving other partnerships, had held
(contrary to other Circuits) that the Tax Court in Krause had erred in
imposing increased interest pursuant to former § 6621(c) because the
regulations under that provision permitted increased interest when losses
were "disallowed for any period under section 183," and the deductions in
Krause were not in fact disallowed under § 183, which by its terms applies to
activities engaged in by individuals and S corporations. Copeland v.
Commissioner, 290 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002). The Federal Circuit rejected the
taxpayers' arguments and agreed with the Court of Federal Claims that the
Dillon Oil partners were bound by the Krause decision, including its
conclusion regarding the imposition of increased interest under former
§ 6621(c). The court reasoned that the Dillon Oil partners lost their
opportunity to challenge Krause when their Tax Court proceeding was
dismissed for lack of prosecution. To set aside the IRS's imposition of
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increased interest for tax motivated transactions, the court stated, would
require relitigating the Tax Court's decision to bind Dillon Oil to the Krause
decision. The court concluded that whether the Dillon Oil partnership is
bound by Krause is a partnership level issue that must be determined at the
partnership level rather than at the partner level.
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. Hock mir nicht kein CHNA!8 REG-106499-
12, Community Health Needs Assessments for Charitable Hospitals, 78 F.R.
20523 (4/5/13). These proposed amendments to Reg. §§ 1.509(r)-i through -
7 provide detailed guidance to charitable hospital organizations on the
community health needs assessment (CHNA) requirements, and related
excise tax and reporting obligations, enacted as part of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010.
* Each § 501(c)(3) hospital organization is
required to meet four general requirements on a facility-by-facility basis:
-establish written financial assistance and emergency medical care
policies;
-limit amounts charged for emergency or other medically necessary
care to individuals eligible for assistance under the hospital's
financial assistance policy;
-make reasonable efforts to determine whether an individual is
eligible for assistance under the hospital's financial assistance policy
before engaging in extraordinary collection actions against the
individual; and
-conduct a community health needs assessment (CHNA) and adopt
an implementation strategy at least once every three years. (These
CHNA requirements are effective for tax years beginning after
3/23/12.)
2. The ABA loses another tax case. ABA Retirement
Funds v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1815 (N.D. Ill. 4/25/13). The
District Court held that the ABA Retirement Funds (formerly known as the
American Bar Retirement Association), a not-for-profit corporation that
creates and maintains IRS-approved master tax-qualified retirement plans for
adoption by lawyers and law firms, does not qualify as a tax-exempt
"business league" under § 501(c)(6). To be a tax exempt business league,
8. Or, chinik. Literally, "Don't knock my teakettle!" Or, "Stop bothering
me!"
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Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-l requires that an organization be (1) of persons having a
common business interest; (2) whose purpose is to promote the common
business interest; (3) not organized for profit; (4) that does not engage in a
regular business of a kind ordinarily conducted for profit; (5) whose
activities are directed to the improvement of business conditions at one or
more lines of a business as distinguished from the performance of particular
services for individual persons; and (6) of the same general class as a
chamber of commerce or a board of trade. The court found that ABA
Retirement Funds was engaged in a business generally carried on for profit.
It competed with other retirement funds, and it "sought market share, not
market welfare." The fees for its services were paid by individuals in
proportion to the benefits they derived from those services. Most
significantly, the court found that its activities were directed principally to
individual lawyers and law firms rather than to promoting the well-being of
the legal profession generally: "The requirement to promote the welfare of
the general industry surely demands more than offering goods or services
that may enhance the individual practices of the attorneys who purchase
them."
Although the ABA lost in the Supreme
Court, United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986)
(American Bar Endowment's income from life insurance policy dividends
retained represent profits from the insurance program rather than charitable
donations from your members. The court further stated that if the members
were given a choice between allowing the American Bar Endowment to retain
the dividends and having the dividends refunded to them, then the dividends
retained might constitute charitable donations rather than unrelated business
income.), it changed its insurance arrangements to achieve the same result by
permitting cash refunds to policyholders who claimed them in writing each
year, P.L.R. 8725056 (3/25/87).
3. Will Superman9 arrive in time to share an
aperitif with Lois Lerner? Not before she took the entire fifth for herself.
IRS official admitted to using political criteria to target certain applicants for
§ 501(c)(4) status, and stated that this was known to upper-level officials in
2011. Lois Lerner is now on paid administrative leave, having reportedly
refused to resign from the IRS. Under questioning by Congress in 2012,
Commissioner Douglas Shulman denied that political criteria were used to
target certain applications, even though he attended 157 (or more, or fewer)
Easter Egg Rolls at the White House during his term as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. A TIGTA report on this practice was released.
* In a prepared statement dated 5/21/13 for
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on the following day, the
9. The person from the Planet Krypton.
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Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, J. Russell George,
concluded that the IRS has still not satisfactorily resolved the problems
identified in the report:
IRS's Response to Our Recommendations
TIGTA made nine recommendations to provide more
assurance that applications are processed in a fair and
impartial manner in the future without unreasonable delay.
The IRS agreed to seven of our nine recommendations and
proposed alternative corrective actions for two of our
recommendations. However, we do not agree that the
alternative corrective actions will accomplish the intent of
the recommendations. One of these recommendations was
that the IRS should clearly document the reason applications
are chosen for further review for potential political campaign
intervention. The second was that the IRS should develop
specific guidance for specialists processing potential
political cases and publish the guidance on the Internet.
Further, the IRS's response also states that issues discussed
in the report have been resolved. We disagree with this
assertion. Until all of our recommendations are fully
implemented and the numerous applications that were open
as of December 2012 are closed, we do not consider the
concerns in this report to be resolved. In addition, as part of
our mission, TIGTA will also determine whether any
criminal activity or administrative misconduct occurred
during this process. The attached TIGTA report includes
additional information on all nine recommendations and the
IRS's planned corrective actions and completion dates.
* Superman, using Treasury Secretary Lew
as a conduit, asked Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue Steven Miller to
resign, and Daniel Werfel was appointed as Acting Commissioner effective
5/22/13. Although he is a lawyer and worked in the Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division, Werfel has absolutely no prior tax experience.
* Included among the "two rogue agents in
Cincinnati" are Holly Paz (Acting Director of Rulings and Agreements at the
IRS's Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division, fired; replaced 6/10/13 as
acting director by Karen Schiller, who was director for exam planning and
delivery at the IRS Small Business/Self-Employed Division), Carter Hull
(Washington IRS lawyer who was overruled by Washington superiors when he
recommended making decisions on § 501(c)(4) applications without additional
scrutiny, retiring), Sarah Hall Ingram (who always seemed to be doing
something other than work her title called for), and Joseph Grant
(Commissioner of Tax Exempt and Government Entities division and Lois
Lerner's boss, retired on 6/3/13).
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a. The only scandal at the IRS is that it
appears to be knuckling under to pressure and declining to enforce the
law, and no one can force it to do what's right. FS-2013-8 (6/24/13). The
IRS announced that it is offering certain organizations that have applied for
§ 501(c)(4) status an optional fast-track method to obtain tax-exempt status.
The IRS will offer the expedited option to groups that have had their
applications pending for more than 120 days and involve possible political
campaign intervention or issue advocacy."
This "safe-harbor" option will provide certain groups an
approved determination letter granting them 501 (c)(4) status
within two weeks if they certify they devote 60 percent or
more of both their spending and time on activities that
promote social welfare as defined by Section 501(c)(4). At
the same time, they must certify that political campaign
intervention involves 40 percent or less of both their
spending and time. These thresholds apply for past, current
and future years of operation. Solely for the purpose of
determining eligibility for the expedited procedure, an
organization must count, among other things, any public
communication identifying a candidate that occurred within
60 days prior to a general election or 30 days prior to a
primary as political campaign intervention. (Emphasis
added)
* Section 501(c)(4) allows tax-exempt
status for "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare ... ." In a bit of Orwellian logic,
Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i), redefines "exclusively" as "primarily," but it
really is doubtful that the language of the regulation was intended to allow any
political activities. It most likely was intended to preserve tax-exempt status for
organizations subject to UBIT. See Ellen Aprill, The IRS's Tea Party Tax Row:
How 'Exclusively' Became 'Primarily', http://www.psmag.com/politics/the-
irss-tea-party-tax-row-how-exclusively-became-primarily-59451/. At least
some of us"o believe that if the IRS had done so at the outset - years ago - it
10. Guess which two. Ira still believes what Celia Roady said when she said
that Lois Lerner did not plant her question at the ABA Tax Section meeting because
Ellen Aprill vouched for Celia's credibility. He still believes Jay Carney when he
echoed Lois Lemer's conclusion that the entire so-called scandal consisted in the
actions of a couple of rogue agents in Cincinnati. He believes everything that Lois
Lerner and Holly Paz said, and sees no need to question either one further. He
continues to believe Elijah Cummings and Sander Levin when they said that
progressive groups were treated as badly as (or worse than) Tea Party groups, and
that Darryl Issa is blowing up the so-called scandal beyond all proportion because
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could have said zero, nada political activities allowed under the Code and
regulations language.
b. These allegations are unanswerable. Van
Hollen v. Internal Revenue Service (D. D.C., No. 1:13-cv-01276, filed
8/21/13). Representative Chris Van Hollen (D.-MD) and three nonprofit
organizations filed a complaint in a District Court for the District of
Columbia seeking declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief against the
IRS and Treasury Department for allowing tax-exempt organizations to
expend substantial sums on electoral activity, claiming it is contrary to the
plain meaning of § 501(c)(4). The introduction to the complaint summarizes
the cause of action as follows:
1. Plaintiffs Chris Van Hollen, Democracy 21, Campaign
Legal Center, and Public Citizen bring this action under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703,
704, and 706(1) & (2)(A), to compel agency action
unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed, and to set
aside agency action that is contrary to law. Defendant
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has for many years violated
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) by allowing tax-exempt
social welfare organizations to expend substantial sums on
electoral activity. The IRC provides that tax-exempt social
welfare organizations must be "exclusively" engaged in
"promotion of social welfare." IRC § 501(c)(4). The IRS's
implementing regulation recognizes that electoral activity
does not fall within the scope of activity promoting social
welfare. Treasury Regulation (TR) § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
But the IRS's regulation also purports to provide that an
organization operates "exclusively" to promote social
welfare as long as it is operated "primarily" for social
welfare purposes. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i). By redefining
"exclusively" as "primarily" in violation of the clear terms
of its governing statutes, the IRS permits tax-exempt social
welfare organizations to engage in substantial electoral
activities in contravention of the law and court decisions
interpreting it.
2. Instead of amending its rules to conform to the
requirements of IRC section 501(c)(4), the IRS has recently
taken action with precisely the opposite effect: It has issued
nothing wrong happened. Inasmuch as none of these organizations were entitled to
§ 501 (c)(4) status, what difference does it make?
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a directive providing a "safe harbor" for certain
organizations seeking exemption under section 501(c)(4) if
they spend no more than 40% of their time and expenditures
on electoral campaign activities and stating that even
organizations that expend more than this percentage on
electoral campaign intervention may qualify for tax-exempt
status under section 501(c)(4) because the IRS may consider
them to be "primarily" engaged in social welfare activities.
The IRS's new directive confirms that the IRS interprets its
regulation to allow substantial electoral campaign
intervention by section 501(c)(4) organizations --
intervention up to and in some circumstances exceeding
40% of their activity -- despite the statutory requirement that
they be exclusively engaged in social welfare activities. The
IRS's action thus makes the extent of the conflict between
its regulation and the statute even more explicit and will
injure the plaintiffs by fostering increased electoral
campaign spending without donor disclosure by ostensible
section 501(c)(4) organizations. The plaintiffs therefore
request that the Court declare the IRS's new "safe harbor"
directive unlawful insofar as it permits section 501(c)(4)
organizations to spend amounts up to and exceeding 40% of
their time and money on electoral campaign intervention.
c. The Taxpayer Advocate weighs in.
National Taxpayer Advocate, Special Report to Congress, Political Activity
and the Rights of Applicants for Tax-Exempt Status,
www.TaxpayerAdvocate.irs.gov/20140bjectivesReport (6/30/13). The
Taxpayer Advocate identified several categories of problems including,
among others: (1) the legal standard under the statute that a § 501(c)(4)
exclusively engage in promoting social welfare, interpreted as "primarily"
engaged in promoting the common good is ambiguous, and there is no
guidance as to the degree of permissible political activity, (2) unlike the case
where an application for § 501(c)(3) status is rejected, there is no process for
judicial review that might provide guidance, (3) the IRS as a tax agency may
not be the most qualified governmental agency to make inherently
controversial determinations about political activity, (4) the form 1024
application for recognition of exempt status does not include questions to
identify excessive political activity, which is difficult to assess before
operations have commenced, (5) EO failed to publically disclose its
procedures and there are no checks and balances with regard to taxpayer
rights, and (6) EO management failed to install an adequate inventory
management system and failed to ensure that requests for guidance received
a timely response.
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d. Proposed regulations to . exclude
conservative organizations from § 501(c)(4) status, while leaving
relatively undisturbed the many liberal organizations whose
applications sailed through while a couple of rogue IRS agents in
Cincinnati were playing games with applications from conservative
organizations seeking such status. REG-134417-13, Guidance for Tax-
Exempt Social Welfare Organizations on Candidate-Related Political
Activities, 78 F.R. 71535 (11/29/13). The proposed regulations would revise
Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) to state that "[t]he promotion of social welfare
does not include direct or indirect candidate-related political activity." They
state that communications which expressly support a clearly identified
candidate of a political party would be considered candidate-related political
activity, as would communications that are made within 60 days of a general
election (or within 30 days of a primary contest) and that clearly identify a
candidate or party. Contributions reportable under campaign finance laws
and grants to § 527 political organizations and other exempt entities that are
politically active also would be considered political, as would voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives, distribution of materials prepared by
or for candidates or by a § 527 organization, preparation or distribution of
voter guides that refer to candidates (or to parties in a general election), and
events a candidate attends that are held within 60 days of an election or
within 30 days of a primary.
* The preamble to the proposed
regulations says:
The Treasury Department and the IRS are considering
whether the current section 501(c)(4) regulations should be
modified in this regard and, if the "primarily" standard is
retained, whether the standard should be defined with more
precision or revised to mirror the standard under the section
501(c)(3) regulations. Given the potential impact on
organizations currently recognized as described in section
501(c)(4) of any change in the "primarily" standard, the
Treasury Department and the IRS wish to receive comments
from a broad range of organizations before deciding how to
proceed. Accordingly, the Treasury Department and the IRS
invite comments from the public on what proportion of an
organization's activities must promote social welfare for an
organization to qualify under section 501(c)(4) and whether
additional limits should be imposed on any or all activities
that do not further social welfare. The Treasury Department
and the IRS also request comments on how to measure the
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activities of organizations seeking to qualify as section
501(c)(4) social welfare organizations for these purposes.
* See, also, b., above, in which there is a
description of a lawsuit to force the IRS to adopt regulations to prohibit
§ 501(c)(4) organizations from engaging in any political activity. On 12/6/13,
the plaintiffs announced that they were dropping their unanswerable lawsuit.
4. It was really a partner of the home sellers, not a
charitable partner. Partners in Charity, Inc. v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No.
2 (8/26/13). PIC was established as a nonprofit corporation under state law
and received a determination that it was a § 501(c)(3) organization based on
its claim its primary activity was to provide down-payment assistance grants
to home buyers. PIC's "down payment assistance" program provided home
buyers with funds to use for down payments for home purchases. In practice,
however, PIC obtained those funds (along with a fee) from home sellers. PIC
provided down-payment assistance grants where the seller was not
reimbursing the down payment and paying PIC's fee in only two-tenths of
1% of its transactions. The IRS retroactively revoked PIC's tax-exempt
status on the ground that PIC was not operated exclusively for a charitable
purpose. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) upheld that revocation and held
further that the IRS did not abuse its discretion in retroactively revoking its
determination that PIC was a § 501(c)(3) organization. In its operation, PIC
failed to serve a charitable class, and a substantial amount of its activity did
not further a charitable purpose, but rather furthered instead an unrelated
business. PIC did not limit its grants to low-income home buyers. PIC
engaged in two overlapping but distinct forms of activities: (1) activities that
ultimately benefited the buyers - grants and homeowner education, and
(2) activities that ultimately benefited the sellers - providing ready buyers,
and promoting faster sales at generally higher prices. PIC's transactions with
sellers generated revenues of over $28 million in 2002 and $32 million in
2003 and were clearly substantial. Even if PIC's buyer-benefitting activities
served an exempt purpose, PIC's seller-benefitting activities failed to further
an exempt purpose and defeated the argument that PIC was operated
exclusively for a charitable purpose. "PIC's primary purpose was to broker
as many transactions as possible and thus to generate significant net profits,
regardless of whether the transactions achieved a charitable end."
5. The gymnastics booster club suffered the tax
equivalent of a fall from the balance beam. Capital Gymnastics Booster
Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-193 (8/26/13). Capital
Gymnastics Booster Club, Inc. was formed to support the activities of young
athletes from approximately 240 families. Its members were the parents of
the young athletes. The athletes were all on teams from one local private
gym, to which each family individually paid tuition and other fees. These
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teams competed in meets, which required substantial additional funds that
Capital Gymnastics collected and administered. Parents of athletes who
wanted to participate on the teams that were operated out of that private gym
were required to be members of Capital Gymnastics. Each family paid an
annual assessment to cover the entry fees to compete in the meets and to
offset the estimated expenditures for the coaches' travel. A family could
satisfy its assessment either by paying cash or by participating in Capital
Gymnastics fund-raising program. The amount that a family raised was
credited against the assessment. Fund-raising-generated net profits reduced
the assessment between 50% and 70% for the families that fund-raised.
Families that did not fund-raise paid the full assessment. In the taxpayer's
suit for a declaratory judgment that it was a § 501(c)(3) organization, the Tax
Court (Judge Gustafson) upheld the IRS's determination that Capital
Gymnastics was not operated exclusively for exempt purposes. Its net
earnings inured to the benefit of its fund-raising parent members, and it
conferred substantial private benefit on children of those fund-raising
families.
6. Vexatious litigation for personal purposes does
not serve charitable purposes, as established by multiple IRS requests
for information. Although he was entitled to a review of the IRS denial
of § 501(c)(3) status - unlike seekers of § 501(c)(4) status - Mr. Huggins
lost in the Tax Court. Council for Education v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-283 (12/16/13). Following his failure to graduate from the University
of California Santa Barbara, between 1993 and 2002 Harold Huggins
initiated a series of claims and lawsuits against the University, its Academic
Senate (which one of us twice chaired), the California Student Aid
Commission, and the Western Association of Schools and Colleges, alleging
that the defendants coerced him into withdrawing from UCSB, extorted
students loans through grade fraud and intimidation and violated RICO and
the False Claims Act. The Tax Court (Special Trial Judge Guy) pointed out
that all of these claims were dismissed and that Mr. Huggins was declared by
the Federal District Court to be a vexatious litigant. In 2006 Mr. Huggins
organized the petitioner as a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation to
investigate academic fraud with the specific purpose to investigate and report
fraudulent activities relating to student loan programs, advocate for student
loan recipients, and enforce Department of Education accreditation standards
for all students regardless of race or ethnicity. In 2008, the petitioner sought
recognition of the organization as a charitable organization under
§ 501(c)(3). Petitioner continued to file claims similar to Mr. Huggins prior
actions, and formed a "Special Committee 1868" to gather evidence that
former UC Regent Ward Connerly (who was a leading advocate of
California's proposition 209 that prohibited race and gender based
discrimination in public employment, education, and contracting) was an
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unregistered foreign agent, abused his position as a Regent and had personal
financial interest in matters before the UC Board of Regents and had
organized so-called civil rights organizations to deceive California voters.
Following multiple administrative inquiries for information regarding
petitioner's activities, the IRS denied the claim for exemption. The court
affirmed the denial. The court recognized that an organization may qualify
for charitable status where in carrying out its primary purpose the
organization advocates social or civic changes or presents opinions on
controversial issues. The court also observed that the IRS recognizes that
organizations that provide legal services or engage in litigation may serve a
charitable purpose. However, the court noted that where an individual creates
and controls the affairs of an organization without an independent board of
directors "there is an obvious opportunity for abuse." The court stated that
"[p]rominent among petitioner's shortcomings are the lack of a formal
business plan and an independent board of directors to provide operational
guidance and oversight." The court further indicated that Mr. Huggins, acting
as petitioner's sole officer, director, and employee, did not demonstrate the
skills to conduct petitioner's operations to achieve its charitable purpose to
further the public good. Indeed, the court indicated that it "would be hard
pressed to say that petitioner's operations do not more than incidentally
further Mr. Huggins' private interests."
B. Charitable Giving
1. What part of "perpetuity" don't you
understand?! Belk v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. 1 (1/28/13). The taxpayers
claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the grant of a conservation
easement on 184.627 acres of a golf course to a qualified organization.
Specifically, they agreed not to develop the golf course. However, the
conservation easement agreement permitted the taxpayers, with the donee's
consent, to remove portions of the golf course from the easement and replace
them with property not theretofore subject to the conservation easement. The
IRS disallowed the deduction, and the Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) upheld the
IRS's disallowance of the deduction. Section 170(h)(1)(A) requires the
contribution of a "qualified" real property interest, and to be a "qualified"
real property interest, § 170(h)(2)(C) requires that the conservation easement
limit in perpetuity the use that may be made of the property. Section
170(h)(2)(C) precluded the deduction because the taxpayers did not donate
an interest in real property subject to a use restriction granted in perpetuity.
Because the conservation easement agreement allowed the parties to change
the property subject to the conservation easement, it did not meet the
perpetuity requirement. The court rejected the taxpayers' argument the
deduction nevertheless should be allowed because the substitution clause
permitted only substitutions that would not harm the conservation purposes
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of the conservation easement. The court reasoned that the § 170(h)(5)
requirement that the conservation purpose be protected in perpetuity is
separate and distinct from the § 170(h)(2)(C) requirement that there be real
property subject to a use restriction in perpetuity, and the taxpayers'
conveyance failed to satisfy § 170(h)(2)(C). Satisfying § 170(h)(5) does not
necessarily affect whether there is a qualified real property interest.
Furthermore, it was argued that any substitution required the donee's
consent: "There is nothing in the Code, the regulations, or the legislative
history to suggest that section 170(h)(2)(C) is to be read to require that the
interest in property donated be a restriction on the use of the real property
granted in perpetuity unless the parties agree otherwise. The requirements of
section 170(h) apply even if taxpayers and qualified organizations wish to
agree otherwise."
The IRS was represented in this case by
one of Professor McMahon's former research assistants. The Tax Court judge
was one of Professor Shepard's former research assistants. [So there, Marty!]
a. Reconsideration denied. Belk v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-154 (6/19/13). Judge Vasquez denied the
taxpayer's motion for reconsideration. First, the taxpayer argued that the
original opinion misinterpreted § 170(h)(2)(C), arguing that the Code and
regulations do "not require the donation of an interest in 'an identifiable,
unchanging, static piece of real property."' The taxpayer argued that as long
as it "agree[d] not to develop 184.627 acres of land, the Court (and the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)) should not be concerned with what land
actually comprises those 184.627 acres." Judge Vasquez reiterated that the
court had "rejected the notion of such 'floating easements' ... and found that
section 170(h)(2)(C) requires that taxpayers donate an interest in an
identifiable, specific piece of real property." Not being bound by any rule
that arguments had to be consistent, the taxpayer's second argument was that
because the taxpayer had intended to obtain a deduction for granting the
conservation easement the court had misinterpreted the conveyance and
applicable state law as permitting a substitution. This argument also fell on
deaf ears: "Our interpretation of the parties' intention is governed by what
the parties actually included in the conservation easement agreement. It is
well settled that a taxpayer's expectations and hopes as to the tax treatment
of his conduct in themselves are not determinative." Finally, the taxpayer
argued that the original opinion "fail[ed] to consider that an element of trust
and confidence is placed in a qualified organization that it will continue to
carry out its mission to protect and conserve property." Judge Vasquez
responded, "Because the parties have agreed petitioners are able to substitute
land, there is no restriction on the golf course in perpetuity that we can trust
SMNLT to enforce."
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2. A "gotcha" for the IRS! The Tax Court just says
"no" to deductions for contributions of conservation easements on
mortgaged properties. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (4/26/10).
The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that as a matter of law no charitable
contribution deduction is allowable for the conveyance of an otherwise
qualifying conveyance of a facade conservation easement if the property is
subject to a mortgage and the mortgagee has a prior claim to condemnation
and insurance proceeds. Because the mortgage has priority over the
easement, the easement is not protected in perpetuity - which is required by
§ 170(h)(5)(A). The deduction cannot be salvaged by proof that the taxpayer
likely would satisfy the debt secured by the mortgage.
b. Plea for a mulligan is rejected! Kaufman
v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (4/4/11). On the taxpayers' motion for
reconsideration, the Tax Court (Judge Halpern) in a lengthy and thorough
opinion reaffirmed its earlier decision that the conservation easement failed
the perpetuity requirement in Reg. § 1.170A- 1 4(g)(6), because under the loan
documents, the bank that held the mortgage on the property expressly
retained a "'prior claim' to all insurance proceeds as a result of any casualty,
hazard, or accident occurring to or about the property and all proceeds of
condemnation," and agreement also provided that "the bank was entitled to
those proceeds 'in preference' to [the donee organization] until the mortgage
was satisfied and discharged." The court also disallowed a deduction in
2003, but allowed the deduction in 2004, for a cash contribution to the donee
of the conservation easement in 2003 because the amount of the cash
payment was subject to refund if the appraised value of the easement was
zero, and the appraisal was not determined until 2004. The court also
rejected the IRS's argument that the taxpayers received a quid pro quo for
the cash contribution in the form of the donee organization accepting and
processing their application, providing them with a form preservation
restriction agreement, undertaking to obtain approvals from the necessary
government authorities, securing the lender agreement from the bank, giving
the taxpayers basic tax advice, and providing them with a list of approved
appraisers. The facts in evidence did not demonstrate a quid pro quo,
because, among other things, many of the tasks had been undertaken by the
organization before the check was received.
* Finally, the court declined to uphold the
§ 6662 accuracy related penalties asserted by the IRS for the taxpayers'
overstatement of the amount of the contribution for the conservation easement,
but sustained the negligence penalty for the 2003 deduction for the cash
payment. Because the issue of whether any deduction was allowed for the
easement, regardless of its value, was a matter of law decided in the case as a
matter of first impression, the taxpayers were not negligent, had reasonable
cause, and acted in good faith.
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c. The taxpayer wins the battle in the Court
of Appeals with an excellent discussion of charitable contributions of
easements on mortgaged property, but still might lose the war. Kaufman
v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 7/19/12). The First Circuit, however, in an
opinion by Judge Boudin, disagreed with the Tax Court, holding that a
mortgagee's right to satisfy the mortgage lien before the donee of the
conservation easement is entitled to any amount from the sales or
condemnation proceeds from the property does not necessarily defeat the
charitable contribution deduction. Judge Boudin's opinion noted that "the
Kaufmans had no power to make the mortgage-holding bank give up its own
protection against fire or condemnation and, more striking, no power to
defeat tax liens that the city might use to reach the same insurance proceeds
- tax liens being superior to most prior claims, 1 Powell on Real Property
§ 1OB.06[6] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2012),
including in Massachusetts the claims of the mortgage holder."" The opinion
continued by observing that
[G]iven the ubiquity of super-priority for tax liens, the IRS's
reading of its regulation would appear to doom practically
all donations of easements, which is surely contrary to the
purpose of Congress. We normally defer to an agency's
reasonable reading of its own regulations, e.g., United States
v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220
(2001), but cannot find reasonable an impromptu reading
that is not compelled and would defeat the purpose of the
statute, as we think is the case here.
Thus, the First Circuit rejected the Tax Court's requirement that the donee of
the conservation easement have "an absolute right" (136 T.C. at 313),
holding that a "grant that is absolute against the owner-donor" is sufficient
"and almost the same as an absolute one where third-party claims (here, the
bank's or the city's) are contingent and unlikely."
* The First Circuit went on to reject the
IRS's argument that contribution also failed to qualify for a charitable
contribution deduction because a provision in the agreement between the
Kaufmans and the donee trust stated that "nothing herein contained shall be
construed to limit the [Trust's] right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the
Fagade) or to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder," citing Commissioner
v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which reasoned that such clauses
11. We include the citation to Powell on Real Property in the quotation because
Michael Allan Wolf is a colleague of Professor McMahon's, and the UF Dean
rewards faculty members based, in part, on their citation count.
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permitting consent and abandonment "'have no discrete effect upon the
perpetuity of the easements: Any donee might fail to enforce a conservation
easement, with or without a clause stating it may consent to a change or
abandon its rights, and a tax-exempt organization would do so at its peril."'
(quoting 646 F.3d at 10).
* The court also rejected various scattershot
IRS arguments that the substantiation rules had not been met.
* However, the Court of Appeals did not
necessarily hand the taxpayers a final victory. It remanded the case to the Tax
Court on the valuation issue.
When the Kaufmans donated the easement, their
home was already subject to South End Landmark District
rules that severely restrict the alterations that property
owners can make to the exteriors of historic buildings in the
neighborhood. These rules provide that "[a]ll proposed
changes or alterations" to "all elements of [the] facade, ...
the front yard ... and the portions of roofs that are visible
from public streets" will be "subject to review" by the local
landmark district commission.
Under the Standards and Criteria, property owners
of South End buildings have an obligation to retain and
repair the original steps, stairs, railings, balustrades,
balconies, entryways, transoms, sidelights, exterior walls,
windows, roofs, and front-yard fences (along with certain
"other features"); and, when the damaged elements are
beyond repair, property owners may only replace them with
elements that look like the originals. Given these pre-
existing legal obligations the Tax Court might well find on
remand that the Kaufmans' easement was worth little or
nothing.
* The court took note of the fact that in
persuading the Kaufmans to grant the easement, "a Trust representative told the
Kaufmans that experience showed that such easements did not reduce resale
value, and this could easily be the IRS's opening argument in a valuation trial."
3. The old adage "better late than never" didn't
save the taxpayer's deduction for a conservation easement on mortgaged
property. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 324 (4/3/12). In 2003, the
taxpayer contributed a conservation easement on over 180 acres of
unimproved land to a qualified organization. The property was subject to a
mortgage, but the mortgagee did not subordinate the mortgage to the
conservation easement deed until 2005. The taxpayer claimed a charitable
contribution deduction on her 2003 Federal income tax return, which the IRS
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disallowed. The taxpayer argued that she had met the requirement of Reg.
§ 1.170A- 14(g)(2) requiring subordination of a mortgage to the conservation
easement because Reg. § 1.170A- 1 4(g)(3) should apply to determine whether
the requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) had been satisfied. Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g)(3) provides that a deduction will not be disallowed merely
because on the date of the gift there is the possibility that the interest will be
defeated so long as on that date the possibility of defeat is so remote as to be
negligible. The taxpayer argued that the probability of her defaulting on the
mortgage was so remote as to be negligible, and that the possibility should be
disregarded under the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard in determining
whether the conservation easement is enforceable in perpetuity. The Tax
Court (Judge Haines) held that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard of
Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3) does not apply to determine whether the
requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2), requiring subordination of a
mortgage to the conservation easement, have been satisfied, citing Kaufinan
v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011), Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C.
182 (2010), Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, and
distinguishing Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, aff'd, 646
F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Thus, the taxpayer did not meet the requirements of
Reg. § 1.170A- 14(g)(2), and the deduction was denied. However, the
taxpayer was not liable for a § 6662 accuracy related penalty. She "attempted
to comply with the requirements for making a charitable contribution of a
conservation easement," she hired an accountant and an appraiser, but she
"inadvertently failed to obtain[] a subordination agreement" and "upon being
made aware of the need for a subordination agreement she promptly obtained
one." She acted with reasonable cause and in good faith.
a. And the subsequent First Circuit decision
in Kaufman doesn't change the result. Mitchell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-204 (8/29/13). In a supplemental memorandum opinion, the
Tax Court (Judge Haines) denied the taxpayer's motion for reconsideration.
The taxpayer argued that the Tax Court erred in relying on Kaufinan v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011) (Kaufinan II), which was affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded in part by the First Circuit in Kaufman v.
Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012) (Kaufinan III), because Kaufman III
was an intervening change in the law. In rejecting the taxpayer's argument
Judge Haines concluded that Kaufinan III addressed different issues from
Mitchell. Kaufinan III addressed the proper interpretation of the proceeds
requirement in Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6), in particular, the breadth of the
donee organization's entitlement to proceeds from the sale, exchange, or
involuntary conversion of property following the judicial extinguishment of a
perpetual conservation restriction burdening the property. But Kaufinan III
did not state a general rule that protecting the proceeds from an
extinguishment of a conservation easement would satisfy the in-perpetuity
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requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g), which was the basis on which Mitchell
was decided.
b. The Tax Court sticks by its guns on the
mortgaged property conservation easement issue. Minnick v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-345 (12/17/12). Once again, the Tax Court
(Judge Morrison) held that pursuant to Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2), no charitable
contribution deduction is allowable for the donation of a conservation
easement where a mortgage encumbering the property has not been
subordinated to the interest of the donee of the easement. The court
emphasized its holding in Mitchell v Commissioner, 138 T.C. 324 (4/3/12),
that the unlikelihood of default is irrelevant.
4. No "take backs" allowed if you want an allowable
charitable contribution. Graev v. Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 17
(6/24/13). The taxpayers contributed a facade conservation easement on
property to the National Architectural Trust (NAT), a qualified charitable
organization, along with a cash contribution. The conservation deed stated
that "nothing herein contained shall be constructed to limit the Grantee's
right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in a Protected Facade(s)) or to
abandon some or all of its rights hereunder" [Emphasis added by the court],
and NAT gave the taxpayers a letter stating: "In the event the IRS disallows
the tax deductions in their entirety, we will promptly refund your entire cash
endowment contribution and join with you to immediately remove the facade
conservation easement from the property's title." Prior to the taxpayers
making the donation, their accountants had advised them that in Notice
2004-41, 2004-2 C.B. 31, the IRS had announced increased scrutiny of
deductions for conservation easement donations, and the taxpayers asked for
and received from NAT assurance that their donation would be deductible.
However, the year after the donation was made NAT sent the taxpayers a
letter, which they had taken deliberate steps to obtain, stating that "[i]t has
recently been brought to our attention by our attorney that this offer of a
refund may adversely affect the deductibility of the cash contribution as a
charitable gift." Subsequently, the IRS disallowed the deductions of the
facade easement and the cash as conditional gifts, and the Tax Court (Judge
Gustafson) upheld the disallowance of the deductions. Under Reg. § 1.1 70A-
1(e), a contribution that might be defeated by a subsequent event will be
considered to have been "made" only if at the time of the contribution the
possibility that it will be defeated is "so remote as to be negligible." Taking
into account all of the facts and circumstances, including the enforceability
of the side-agreement letter, the likelihood it would be honored by NAT even
if it were unenforceable, the wording of the deed, and the various grounds on
which the IRS might disallow a deduction for the contribution wholly apart
from its conditionality, Judge Gustafson found that the likelihood that the
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condition would occur was not so remote as to be negligible at the time of
the contribution. The court found that Notice 2004-41 made it clear that the
contribution "would be subject to heightened scrutiny and that if any of the
Graevs' positions were susceptible to challenge, the Commissioner would
likely enforce a contrary position," and the taxpayers' communications with
NAT, which stated that his accountants "have advised [him] to be very
cautious" reflected their understanding of this possibility. Because the
condition requiring return was enforceable and NAT would act as promised
in the letter, the contribution was conditional and the deductions were
disallowed.
a. Conditionally revocable conservation
easements are no-good. Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1
(1/3/12). Conservation easements that could be extinguished by the mutual
consent of the donor taxpayer and the donee organization failed as a matter
of law to comply with the enforceability in perpetuity requirements under
Reg. § 1.170A-14(g). The easements were not protected in perpetuity and
thus were not qualified conservation contributions under § 170(h)(1).
b. And the subsequent First Circuit decision
in Kaufman doesn't change the result. Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-172 (7/25/13). Judge Haines denied the taxpayer's motion for
reconsideration. The taxpayer argued that in its earlier opinion the Tax Court
had erred in relying on Kaufinan v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011)
(Kaufinan II), which was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in
part by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Kaufinan v.
Commissioner, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012) (Kaufman III). Specifically, the
taxpayer argued that the First Circuit's emphasis on the destination of
proceeds upon extinguishment of a conservation easement in Kaufinan III,
required the Tax Court to "take an overall approach in analyzing the in-
perpetuity requirement of section 170(h)(5)(A) and section 1.170A-14(g),
Income Tax Regs., and focus on any proceeds resulting from an
extinguishment of the conservation easements." Judge Haines concluded,
however, that Kaufinan III did not support the taxpayer's argument that
"putting into the hands of the parties to a conservation agreement the
authority to determine when to extinguish the conservation easement so long
as the donee organization gets its share of the proceeds of a subsequent sale,"
because in Kaufinan III the First Circuit limited its holding to situations in
which the easement is extinguished by judicial proceeding.
5. You need an appraisal of the right property -
here stock, and not real estate. Estate of Evenchik v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-34 (2/4/13). The taxpayer donated shares of stock in a
corporation to a charity. The donated shares constituted approximately 72
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percent of the outstanding stock. The corporation's only assets were two
apartment buildings. They attached appraisals for each building to their tax
return, but never had obtained an appraisal of the stock. The Tax Court
(Judge Holmes) upheld the denial of a charitable contribution deduction
because the appraisals failed to comply with the qualified appraisal
requirement in Reg. § 1.170A- 13(c)(3)(ii). The appraisals valued the wrong
property. The stock was the property that had to have been appraised.
Furthermore the appraisals did not take into account the effect that the
contribution of less than all of the stock might have had on value of the
donated property. In addition, the appraisals failed to (1) provide a sufficient
description of the property or (2) state the date or expected date of the
contribution and the value of the property on those dates. Finally, the
substantial compliance doctrine could not save the deduction. "This is not a
case where the taxpayers provided most of the information but left out one
insignificant datum... . This is a case where the appraisals had gaping holes
of required information."
6. Quid-pro-quo can be in the favorable
governmental action. Pollard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-38
(2/6/13). The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs) upheld the denial of a charitable
contribution deduction for the conveyance to the county government of two
conservation easements with respect to a 67 acre farm property that the
taxpayer owned. The granting of the conservation easements to the county
was part of a quid pro quo exchange for the county approving the taxpayer's
subdivision exemption request that would allow him to build a second home
on the property. Statements of the county commissioners during the course
of public hearings indicated that the subdivision exemption would not have
been approved if the taxpayer had not granted a conservation easement to the
county. The approval of the subdivision exemption request was a substantial
benefit to the taxpayer. He did not convey the conservation easements "for
detached and disinterested motives but rather to secure a personal benefit."
7. Typos don't render a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment defective. Crimi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-51
(2/14/13). The taxpayer conveyed a conservation easement to a qualified
donee though a bargain purchase. After first dissecting all of the experts'
reports to expose their errors, the Tax Court (Judge Laro) determined the
value of the contribution. Turning to the question of whether the
requirements of a contemporaneous written acknowledgment required by
§ 170(f)(8) and a qualified appraisal required by § 170(f)(1 1) had been met,
the court found for the taxpayer despite imperfect documentation. The court
rejected the IRS's argument that the written acknowledgment had not been
signed by a representative of the donee, finding that the signer was an agent
of the donee. The court rejected the IRS's contention that a typographical
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error in the description of the property was grounds for denying the
deduction in light of the fact that the appraisal and the Form 8283 attached to
the return provided the accurate description of the contributed property. The
court rejected the IRS's assertion that the contemporaneous written
acknowledgment was defective because although it stated that the easement
was valued at $2,950,000, in consideration for which the donee provided a
cash consideration of $1,550,000, leaving a charitable contribution of $1.4
million, it failed to state whether the donee organization provided other
goods, services, or valuable consideration. Finally, the court applied the
substantial compliance doctrine to determine that the qualified appraisal
requirement had been met despite the fact that the appraisal was for an earlier
year because the taxpayer relied on a long-time CPA and tax advisor and had
no reason to doubt them when they told him that an updated appraisal would
not provide a different value. That a subsequent valuation prepared by the
taxpayer's expert produced a value much higher than the earlier appraisal
indicated that it was reasonable for the taxpayer to believe the earlier
appraisal "was not stale in substance and thus a good appraisal."
8. If you are both the contributor and the president
of the charity, you must send yourself a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment. Note how our attention has been shifted from ferals to
ferrets. Villareale v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-74 (3/12/13). The
taxpayer was a co-founder of NDM Ferret Rescue & Sanctuary, Inc. (NDM),
an animal rescue organization that specializes in rescuing ferrets. During the
year in issue, when she was NDM's president, she contributed $10,022 to
NDM by electronic funds transfers. Twenty-seven contributions (totaling
$2,393) were for less than $250 and 17 (totaling $7,629) were for $250 or
more. The dates and amounts of the transfers were reflected in the taxpayer's
and NDM's bank statements, but NDM never provided the taxpayer with a
contemporaneous written acknowledgment containing a description of any
property contributed, a statement as to whether any goods or services were
provided in consideration, and a description and good-faith estimate of the
value of any goods or services provided in consideration as required by
§ 170(f)(8). Accordingly, the Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) upheld the IRS's
denial of the $7,629 of contributions that were for $250 or more. The court
found it "immaterial" that taxpayer was on both sides of the transaction and
rejected her contention that as the president of NDM "' it would have been
futile to issue herself a statement that expressly provided that no goods or
services were provided in exchange for her contributions."' The deduction
for the $2,393 of contribution that were in individual amounts of less than
$250 was allowed.
* Do you remember? A touch of Cohan
[?1, with a cap, for the Cat Woman's unreimbursed charitable volunteer
expenses. Van Dusen v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 515 (2011). The taxpayer
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claimed charitable contribution deductions for out-of-pocket expenses incurred
in caring for "foster cats" as a volunteer on behalf of Fix Our Ferals, a
§ 501(c)(3) organization. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) applied the
"substantial compliance doctrine" to allow a deduction for expenses incurred by
a volunteer providing services to a charitable organization, even though the
taxpayer's records did not strictly meet the specific requirements of Reg.
§ 170A-13(a)(1). The taxpayer's documents were "legitimate substitutes for
canceled checks," because they contained all of the information that would have
been on a canceled check - the name of the payee, the date of the payment,
and the amount of the payment. Although the regulation requiring
substantiation records to reflect the name of the donee was not written with
unreimbursed volunteer expenses in mind, because the amounts expended
exceeded $250 and the taxpayer failed to satisfy requirements of § 170(f)(8)(a)
and Reg. § 1.1 70A-13(f)(1) for substantiation in the form of a contemporaneous
written acknowledgment from the charitable organization, the deductible
amount for each separate expenditure was limited to $250.
* Query whether prudent planning in the
future should be: "If it flies or floats, don't own - rent; if it barks or meows,
don't adopt - foster."
9. Quid pro quo can be very intangible. Boone
Operations Co., L.L.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-101 (4/11/13).
The taxpayer transferred fill dirt to the City of Tucson in a bargain sale and
claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the difference between the
appraised fair market value of the fill dirt and the cash purchase price. The
fill dirt was used in the process of closing a City of Tucson landfill that was
adjacent to the landfill operated by the taxpayer. The Tax Court (Judge
Marvel) upheld denial of the deduction on almost every conceivable ground.
First, the substantiation requirements of § 170(f)(8)(B) had not been met.
Although the written agreement between the taxpayer and the City of Tucson
stated the amount of cash Tucson agreed to pay for the fill, it also stated that
Tucson provided goods and services in exchange for the contribution of fill,
but lacked a good-faith estimate of the value of those goods and services.
Furthermore, the Forms 8283 did not refer to any benefits received by the
taxpayer in addition to the cash sale price. Second, the appraisal was not a
qualified appraisal because, among other deficiencies, it used the wrong
comparables and was based on the fair market value of delivered fill dirt,
including transportation, but the taxpayer had deducted the transportation,
which was the major component of the value of delivered fill dirt, as a
business expense. Third, in addition to the cash price, the taxpayer received
valuable consideration in the form of (1) a nonconforming use permit for the
continued operation of its landfill, (2) the dismissal of a pending civil suit,
(3) the City of Tucson's agreement not to pursue any criminal charges, and
(4) indirect benefits from the City of Tucson closing its landfill and
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maintaining and monitoring the methane gas system on the taxpayer's
landfill. Accordingly, the taxpayer failed to prove that the fill dirt was sold to
the City of Tucson at a bargain price.
10. If at first you don't succeed try again. If the Tax
Court got reversed in another case appealable to the same Circuit, it just
might work. Friedberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-224 (9/23/13).
The Tax Court (Judge Wells) granted the taxpayer's motion to reconsider the
court's prior decision holding that the appraisal the taxpayer obtained and
submitted in connection with a claimed deduction for the contribution was
not a qualified appraisal, T.C. Memo. 2011-238, and granted summary
judgment that the appraisal was a qualified appraisal within the meaning of
Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3). The earlier decision was based in part on
Scheidelman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-151, vacated and
remanded, 682 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2012). In Scheidelman, and in the earlier
decision involving the taxpayer, the Tax Court held that the mechanical
application of a percentage diminution to the fair market value before
donation of a facade easement does not constitute a proper valuation method
under Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3). But in vacating the Tax Court's decision in
Scheidelman, the Second Circuit held that Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(K)
does not require a specific method of valuation be used in the appraisal or
that the IRS must believe it to be reliable; the regulation's requirement is
fulfilled if the appraiser's analysis is present, even if the IRS and the court
finds it to be unconvincing. Because this case is appealable to the Second
Circuit, applying Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), the decision
of the Second Circuit in Scheidelman was an intervening change in the law.
Because the appraisal included a specific basis for the appraiser's valuation
as required by Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii)(K), it was a qualified appraisal.
Under the Second Circuit's opinion in Scheidelman, an appraisal's "accuracy
and reliability" while relevant to the court's analysis of valuation, are
irrelevant as to whether the appraisal is "qualified" under Reg. § 1.170A-
13(c)(3).
11. The facade, the whole facade, and nothing but
the facade. 61 York Acquisition, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-
266 (11/19/13). The partnership contributed to a qualified organization a
facade easement covering the portion of a building that it owned. The
partnership did not own the entire building. The Tax Court (Judge Laro)
upheld the disallowance of a charitable contribution deduction because
§ 170(h)(4)(B) provides that to qualify for a deduction a facade easement
must "include[] a restriction which preserves the entire exterior of the
building (including the front, sides, rear, and height of the building)."
(Emphasis added.) The partnership could not, and did not, grant a valid
402 [Vol. 15:5
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
easement restricting the entire exterior of the building when the partnership
did not own the entire exterior.
X. TAx PROCEDURE
A. Interest, Penalties, and Prosecutions
1. Did Owen Fiore fraudulently "welch" on his
taxes? Judge Holmes said "Yes." Fiore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-21 (1/17/13). The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) found that former estate
planning lawyer Owen Fiore filed fraudulent 1996 and 1997 income tax
returns; Fiore had pleaded guilty to evasion of 1999 taxes but claimed that he
did not owe fraud penalties for the earlier years. Fiore had total control of the
finances of his law firm and did not delegate even the most mundane tasks,
e.g., preparation of checks for signature, to anyone else, but claimed that he
simply was "a horrible recordkeeper." In a detailed and analytic opinion,
Judge Holmes decided the issue on the grounds that Fiore was short of cash
during the 1996-1997 period and admittedly engaged in "willful blindness"
to the possibility that he was underreporting his income; he also repeatedly
stalled during the IRS examination of his tax returns. His opinion concludes:
And with particular weight given to this willful blindness we
find that the Commissioner has met his burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that Fiore filed fraudulent
returns. We cannot accept that a person of Fiore's
intelligence, training, and experience was not aware when he
filed his returns for 1996 and 1997 -at a time when he
knew his need for cash was ballooning - that there was a
high probability that he was underreporting his income. And
we find that he deliberately avoided steps that would have
confirmed that underreporting, since all he had to do was
read his monthly bank statements to verify the accuracy of
his estimates of taxable income that he put on his returns.
* From the website of Owen G. Fiore, JD:
For over four decades, Owen Fiore was a tax and
estate planning lawyer in California, representing families
and business entities in developing and implementing tax
sensitive wealth succession, preservation and management
plans, including using FLPs, LLCs, corporations and trusts
in planning. He also had an active practice in tax
controversies, especially those involving gift and estate
taxes, evidenced by being lead counsel in a number of Tax
Court cases, such as Cristofani, Schauerhamer and Fontana.
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As the result of a personal income tax case leading
to a plea agreement-based conviction and subsequent 14
months incarceration, Owen now is involved as a non-
lawyer consultant to professional advisors and their clients
in tax and estate planning matters. ***
Owen lives in Syringa, ID with his wife, Mary Ann,
enjoying being on the Middle Fork of Idaho's wild and
scenic Clearwater River.
* Section 10.24(a) of Circular 230 provides
that "A practitioner may not, knowingly and directly or indirectly: (a) Accept
assistance from or assist any person who is under disbarment or suspension
from practice before the Internal Revenue Service if the assistance relates to a
matter or matters constituting practice before the Internal Revenue Service."
2. A sole shareholder gets 87 months of room and
board from the federal government for fraudulently treating as
independent contractors workers who were really employees. United
States v. Deleon, 704 F.3d 189 (1st Cir. 1/11/13). The First Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Stahl, affirmed the fraud conviction under § 7206(2), and
various other criminal statutes, of a corporation's sole shareholder. The
corporation paid most of its workers directly with checks and did not
withhold payroll taxes from their wages or report or remit such taxes to the
IRS. The shareholder told the tax preparers that the unreported payroll
workers were independent contractors for whom she was not required to
remit payroll taxes. The tax return preparers recorded the checks to
individuals on the unreported payroll as a business expense and issued a
Form 1099 to each of those workers. The shareholder will get room and
board from the federal government for 87 months.
3. Taxpayer's reliance on his CPA, who did a little
($1.2 million) embezzling on the side, was reasonable; therefore, no
penalties for underreporting income were imposed. Thomas v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-60 (2/26/13). The Tax Court (Judge
Gerber) stated the considerations for reasonable cause penalty
avoidance based upon reliance upon a tax professional as follows:
To establish reasonable cause through reliance on the advice
of a tax adviser, the taxpayer must meet the following three-
prong test, laid out in Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v.
Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 98-99: (1) the adviser was a
competent professional who had sufficient expertise to
justify reliance, (2) the taxpayer provided necessary and
accurate information to the adviser, and (3) the taxpayer
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relied in good faith on the adviser's judgment. Finally,
petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to the
defenses to the accuracy-related penalties. See Higbee v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 447 (2001).
Petitioner met and became familiar with Steeves, his
tax preparer, during 2003 when they began working together
in a real estate investment business. After working with
Steeves for some time, petitioner began his own businesses,
which involved the same type of business activity in which
he had worked with Steeves. Steeves was a certified public
accountant and had seven years of experience in the same
type of businesses as petitioner. Petitioner, having worked
with Steeves and being aware of his professional
background and experience, exclusively relied upon him to
maintain his records, handle his business financial matters,
and prepare his returns. Under these circumstances we find
that it was reasonable for petitioner to perceive Steeves as a
competent professional and to rely on him.
Petitioner was reasonable in his reliance upon
Steeves to correctly and accurately prepare his books.
Petitioner understood that those books were used in the
preparation of his 2006 and 2007 income tax returns. In
addition, petitioners provided Steeves with all other
information Steeves requested that was necessary to
complete their returns, including the amounts of mortgage
interest and interest income and Forms W-2. Accordingly,
petitioner was satisfied that Steeves had all necessary and
accurate information needed to correctly prepare petitioners'
income tax returns. We find that petitioner's efforts were
sufficient to ensure his return preparer had adequate and
accurate information.
Finally, we consider whether petitioner relied in
good faith upon Steeves' judgment. In the setting of this
case, there came a time when petitioner had doubts about the
accuracy and quality of Steeves' recordkeeping. Ultimately,
petitioner believed that Steeves was guilty of theft, fraud,
and misappropriation of his money. However, his doubts
about Steeves' ability or honesty did not arise until
sometime after the 2006 and 2007 income tax returns were
filed and respondent was conducting an audit examination of
the returns. At the outset of that examination, petitioner
continued to believe in and rely upon Steeves, to whom
petitioner gave a power of attorney to represent him before
the IRS.
2014] 405
Florida Tax Review
Under these circumstances we hold that petitioner
has carried his burden of showing reasonable reliance on the
advice of a professional as a defense to the accuracy-related
penalties for 2006 and 2007. Accordingly, petitioner is not
liable for an accuracy-related penalty on any underpayment
for 2006 or 2007.
4. CPA's incorrect advice about an estate return
extended filing deadline does not excuse the late filing penalty imposed
on the executor. Knappe v. United States, 713 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 4/4/13).
The Ninth Circuit (Judge Paez) held that reasonable cause did not exist to
abate a late filing penalty where the CPA mistakenly told the executor that he
had secured a twelve-month extension of both the filing and payment
deadlines. The extended payment deadline was correct, but an extension of
the filing deadline is limited to six months - unless the executor was out of
the country, an exception that did not apply here. Judge Paez followed
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), which held that advice about a
filing deadline was "nonsubstantive advice" which does not constitute
reasonable cause for relying upon his tax advisor's determination of the
extended filing deadline date. He quoted Boyle as follows:
Reliance by a lay person on a lawyer is of course common;
but that reliance cannot function as a substitute for
compliance with an unambiguous statute.. . . It requires no
special training or effort to ascertain a deadline and make
sure that it is met. The failure to make a timely filing of a tax
return is not excused by the taxpayer's reliance on an agent,
and such reliance is not "reasonable cause" for a late filing
under § 6651(a)(1).
* Judge Paez used a second rationale to
justify his holding:
We acknowledge that the result today imposes a heavy
burden on executors, who will affirmatively have to ensure
that their agents' interpretations of filing and payment
deadlines are accurate if they want to avoid penalties. This
burden is justified by the government's substantial interest in
ensuring that returns are timely filed. See Boyle, 469 U.S. at
249.
Moreover, any other result would reward collusion
between culpable executors and their agents. In cases like
this one, lawyers and accountants would be incentivized to
claim that they gave erroneous advice to the executor
whether or not they did in fact. The agent who fell on his
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sword would risk nothing, because the waiver of the penalty
would leave the executor without damages. Even in cases in
which executors and their agents did not actively collude to
propound a contrived misrepresentation defense, negligent
agents would be unilaterally incentivized to persist in giving
erroneous advice to their clients, even if they realized their
error.
* Note that Boyle contains strong language
permitting a taxpayer to rely on his tax advisor's substantive advice, and does
not require the taxpayer to obtain a "second opinion"
5. Sometimes actual receipt is necessary, mailing of
a notice by the IRS is not game, set, match. Lepore v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-135 (5/30/13). In this CDP review, Judge Morrison held that
the IRS improperly denied the taxpayer an opportunity to contest his liability
for § 6672 trust fund penalty taxes at the CDP hearing, finding that the
taxpayer had never had a previous opportunity to contest the liability because
he had never actually received a Letter 1153. The taxpayer testified that he
never saw the Letter 1153 or knew that it had arrived at his home, but the
IRS argued that the determination by the Appeals Office was based on the
legal conclusion that receipt by the taxpayer's son of the Letter 1153, for
which he signed, mailed to the taxpayer's house constituted receipt by the
taxpayer. Judge Morrison found the taxpayer's testimony credible, as was the
taxpayer's son's testimony that he "did not give the Letter 1153 to his father
personally and that he instead 'threw' the Letter 1153 'somewhere' in the
basement."
* Although the opinion notes that if the IRS
mails the Letter 1153 to the taxpayer's last known address (I.R.C. § 6212(b)),
the notification requirement is satisfied even if the person did not actually
receive the notice. I.R.C. § 6672(b)(1). Mason v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 301
(2009), held that unless the taxpayer deliberately refuses to accept its delivery, a
Letter 1153 will be considered as having provided a prior opportunity to dispute
liability for the underlying trust fund recovery penalty only if it is actually
received. Thus, even though the letter not only was mailed certified mail by the
IRS to the taxpayer's last known address and was delivered there and signed for
by his son, actual receipt was necessary. In essence, § 6672(b) is not relevant in
the CDP context. 12 In Mason, the IRS mailed the Form 1153 by certified mail
to the taxpayer's last known address, but the letter was returned to the IRS
undelivered and marked "unclaimed." Nevertheless, in Mason the Tax Court
allowed the taxpayer to challenge the merits of the § 6672 penalty liability. It
held: "a section 6672(b)(1) notice that was not received, but not deliberately
12. We are indebted to Professor Steve Johnson of Florida State University
School of Law for helping us with the analysis that follows.
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refused, by a taxpayer does not constitute an opportunity to dispute that
taxpayer's liability [for CDP purposes]." That sounds like an "actual receipt"
rule. The facts of Lepore were a step closer to actual receipt by the taxpayer
than the facts of Mason. Nonetheless, the Lepore facts fall short of actual
receipt.
a. But deliberately avoiding receipt of a
Letter 1153 is game, set, and match for the IRS. Giaquinto v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-150 (6/12/13). The IRS mailed a Letter
1153 and Form 2751, Proposed Assessment of Trust Fund Recovery Penalty,
to the taxpayer's last known address. The letter was returned as unclaimed.
Subsequently, the IRS sent by certified mail to the taxpayer's residence
Forms 3552, Notice of Tax Due on Federal Tax Return. The letter was
returned as unclaimed. Subsequently, the IRS sent by certified mail to the
taxpayer's residence a Letter 3172, Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and
Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (lien notice). The letter was
delivered to petitioner. The taxpayer asked for a CDP hearing, but at the
hearing was denied any opportunity to contest liability because he had a prior
opportunity to dispute it. The taxpayer sought review of the determination
sustaining the levy. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) upheld the IRS's
determination, holding that the taxpayer had a prior opportunity to dispute
the underlying liability. The taxpayer argued that he was entitled to contest
his liability for the § 6672 trust fund recovery penalties in the CDP hearing
because he never received the Letter 1153 sent to him by certified mail.
Mason v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 301 (2009), was inapplicable because on
the facts in this case, the taxpayer's failure to claim delivery of the certified
mail was deliberate. The taxpayer was fully aware that the IRS was
considering whether to assert § 6672 trust fund recovery penalties against
him, and either ignored or failed to claim at least one, and possibly two,
USPS Forms 3849 that the mail carrier left for him with respect to the
notices sent to him by certified mail.
6. You gotta get your whole act together before
filing a Tax Court petition. There's no second act in a Court of Claims
refund suit. The Cheesecake Factory, Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 686
(7/3/13). The taxpayer sought a refund of interest and late payment penalties
assessed for 2005. It previously had received a deficiency notice that did not
reference the late payment penalty, and the 2005 year had been litigated and
settled in the Tax Court. In the Court of Federal Claims, the taxpayer argued
that § 6512(a), which bars a suit for a refund or credit of income tax for a
taxable year with respect to which the taxpayer has filed a petition in the Tax
Court in response to a notice of deficiency, did not apply in this case because
the deficiency notice "had nothing to do with either of the interest and
penalty assessments." The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Hewitt) held that
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the suit was barred by § 6512(a) because, once invoked, the Tax Court's
jurisdiction "extends to the entire subject of the correct tax for the particular
year. ... It is immaterial whether 'the Commissioner issue[d] a Notice of
Deficiency with respect to the penalties [and interest] . . . which are the
subject of this Complaint."'
7. This accountant forgot the old maxim: "If
someone has to go to jail, it better be the client." United States v. Favato,
533 Fed. Appx. 127 (3d Cir. 8/5/13). The Court of Appeals upheld the
conviction of a BDO accountant under § 7212(a) for obstructing tax law
administration by knowingly preparing for a client returns that claimed
depreciation on a yacht held for personal use and that claimed false
charitable contribution deductions.
8. Negligence penalty is based on the amount the
taxpayer actually underpaid. Snow v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 6
(9/19/13), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2013-114 (4/22/13). In the earlier
proceeding a deficiency was determined and a § 6662(a) negligence penalty
was sustained. The instant proceeding involved a disputed Rule 155
computation that turned on the computation of the "underpayment" as
defined by § 6664(a) and Reg. § 1.6664-2 on which the penalty would be
computed. Based on his return, the taxpayer had received a refund of
$16,684.65 that included $5,567 of claimed withheld income tax that was
never actually withheld. The earlier proceeding determined that his tax
liability properly was $12,968. The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that the
underpayment as defined in Reg. § 1.6664-2(a) is equal to the true amount
the government was deprived of as a result of the taxpayer's return.
Accordingly, the § 6662 penalty was imposed on an "underpayment" of
$18,535 - the $12,968 tax liability plus the $5,567 that was improperly
refunded as a result of the taxpayer's erroneous return.
9. Surprising news - a deficiency is not the same
thing as an underpayment. And fraudulently claimed refundable credits
avoid a § 6662 accuracy related penalty. Rand v. Commissioner, 141 T.C.
No. 12 (11/17/13). The husband and wife taxpayers filed an income tax
return correctly reporting taxable income of zero, $144 of self-employment
taxes due, and claiming refundable EITC of $4,824, refundable child credit
of $1,447, and a recovery rebate credit of $1,200. They claimed and received
a refund of $7,327. In the course of audit and the Tax Court litigation, the
taxpayers conceded that they were not entitled to any credits. The only issue
was whether there was an "underpayment" on which § 6662 accuracy-related
adjustments could be computed. "Underpayment" as defined by § 6664(a) is
determined with reference to: (1) the "tax imposed;" (2) "the amount shown
as the tax by the taxpayer on his return;" (3) "amounts not so shown
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previously assessed (or collected without assessment);" and (4) "the amount
of rebates made." The parties agreed that the "tax imposed" was zero, the
"amounts not so shown previously assessed" was zero, and "the amount of
rebates made" was zero. The point of contention was what was "the amount
shown as the tax." The IRS argued that Reg. § 1.6664-2(c) should be
interpreted to mean that claims for the refundable credits should be included
in the computation of the amount shown as tax on their return, which would
result in a negative tax liability of $7,327. The taxpayer's argued that credits
claimed on a return are excluded from the computation of the amount of tax
shown on the return, and that as a result the tax shown on the return was
$144. Alternatively, the taxpayers argued that while the three types of credits
they claimed are part of the amount shown as tax on the return when
calculating an underpayment, the tax shown on a return cannot be negative
when calculating an underpayment because Congress expressly failed to
incorporate a provision like § 6211(b) in the definition of an underpayment.
(This position also was advanced in an amicus brief by the Cardozo Tax
Clinic.) In a reviewed opinion (10-5) by Judge Buch, the Tax Court accepted
the taxpayer's alternative argument. After first deciding that credits can
reduce the amount shown as tax on the return, it then went on to hold that for
purposes of § 6664, unlike under § 6211(b), any excess of the refundable
credits claimed as compared to the amount to which the taxpayer was
entitled is not treated as a negative tax. Accordingly, the underpayment was
limited to the amount of the taxpayers' self-employment tax that was offset
by the refundable credits. In so doing, the court refused to defer to the IRS's
interpretation of its regulations, although it noted that "our conclusion breaks
the historical link between the definitions of a deficiency and an
underpayment." Judge Buch wrote that the court's decision was further
supported by the "rule of lenity," under which "statutes that impose a penalty
are to be construed in favor of the more lenient punishment."
* Judge Gustafson (joined by Judges
Halpern and Goeke) dissented, concluding that no penalty should have been
imposed because the "tax" shown on the return should not be reduced by the
credits. The dissent concluded that no "underpayment" results from offsetting
the tax due as shown on the return with refundable credits. Under this view,
there is no § 6662 penalty for claiming credits to which the taxpayer is not
entitled.
* Judge Morrison (joined by Judge Colvin)
would have found an underpayment in the full amount of the refundable credits.
This dissent concluded that the majority's interpretation of ambiguous statutes
left an unwarranted gap in the penalty system that did not reflect congressional
intent.
The purpose of the section 6662 penalty is to deter taxpayers
from taking questionable tax return positions that they hope
that the IRS will not discover. . . . In the case of refundable
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credits, the claimants hope that the IRS will write them a
refund check (as the IRS did for Rand and Klugman). False
claims of credits on returns are as difficult for the IRS to
detect as falsely reported items of gross income or
deductions. Treating a false claim of credits as part of the
"tax shown" on the return, and treating a false claim to
refundable credits as potentially a report of negative tax, are
consistent with the purpose of section 6662.
B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. TAWs for UTPs - some protected, some not.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-5380 (D. Minn.
6/4/13). The IRS issued summonses to obtain information from Wells Fargo
and KPMG related to Wells Fargo's financial reporting and its undisclosed
tax positions. Wells Fargo turned over some information, but filed a petition
to quash the summons issued to KPMG on a variety of grounds, including
that information was protected by the work product doctrine and was subject
to attorney-client privilege. The court (Judge Tunheim) held that the IRS had
established a legitimate purpose in seeking Wells Fargo's tax accrual
workpapers. Wells Fargo's tax returns and UTPs were complex and "Wells
Fargo ha[d] claimed tax benefits from listed transactions and engaged in
other questionable tax practices in the past." Wells Fargo failed to establish
that the Schedule M-3 and Form 8886 would allow the IRS to identify all
transactions related to the UTPs, and the IRS did not have to prove that the
tax accrual workpapers were "critical" to its ability to discover Wells Fargo's
tax positions. Turning to the work product issues, the court first held that
Wells Fargo's identification of UTPs around the time it entered into business
transactions was not a task prepared in anticipation of litigation but rather an
event that occurred in the ordinary course of business. Thus, the identity of
the UTPs, and the process for identifying them, was not protected. However,
after reviewing the TAWs relating to the UTPs, the court concluded that the
recognition and measurement analysis reflected in its TAWs was prepared in
anticipation of litigation, and thus was protected. The court further held that
Wells Fargo's state and local TAWs were not relevant to its federal tax
liability and thus quashed the summonses with respect to those documents.
2. The IRS is allowed a do-over in examining the
taxpayer's documents. Action Recycling, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.3d
1142 (9th Cir. 7/9/13). In declining to quash a summons as unnecessarily
repetitive under § 7605(b), the Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the IRS already "possessed" the summonsed information
simply because a revenue agent had previously reviewed the documents.
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3. LB&I directive contains new mandatory
Information Document Request ("IDR") enforcement procedures.
LB&I-04-1113-009 (11/4/13). When a taxpayer does not timely respond to
an IDR that (1) is issue focused, (2) has been discussed with the taxpayer,
and (3) contains a response date that has been discussed with the taxpayer
(and, in most instances, had been mutually agreed upon), then a mandatory
procedure (with no exceptions) must follow, including (1) a Delinquency
Notice, (2) a Pre-Summons Letter, and (3) a Summons.
* These procedures take effect 1/2/14, but
examiners will not issue delinquency notices before 2/3/14.
* The advantage of this procedure to the
taxpayer is that the specific issues under consideration must be discussed before
IDRs are issued. The disadvantage is that there are extremely short mandatory
time limits which are triggered once the examining agent determines that the
taxpayer has not timely responded to an IDR.
4. You can't hide your foreign bank account
records behind the Fifth Amendment. M.H. v. United States, 648 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 8/19/11), cert. denied (6/25/12). M.H. was the target of a
grand jury investigation seeking to determine whether he used secret Swiss
bank accounts to evade paying federal taxes. The District Court granted a
motion to compel his compliance with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum
demanding that he produce certain records related to his foreign bank
accounts. The District Court declined to condition its order compelling
production upon a grant of limited immunity and, pursuant to the recalcitrant
witness statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826, held him in contempt for refusing to
comply. The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court order. The Court of
Appeals held that "[bjecause the records sought through the subpoena fall
under the Required Records Doctrine, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is inapplicable, and M.H. may not invoke it to resist
compliance with the subpoena's command." The records were required to be
kept pursuant to the predecessor of 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420.
* The opinion stated:
There is nothing inherently illegal about having or being a
beneficiary of an offshore foreign banking account.
According to the Government, § 1010.420 applies to
"hundreds of thousands of foreign bank accounts-over half
a million in 2009." Nothing about having a foreign bank
account on its own suggests a person is engaged in illegal
activity. That fact distinguishes this case from Marchetti and
Grosso, where the activity being regulated-gambling-was
almost universally illegal, so that paying a tax on gambling
wagers necessarily implicated a person in criminal activity.
Admitting to having a foreign bank account carries no such
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risk. That the information contained in the required record
may ultimately lead to criminal charges does not convert an
essentially regulatory regulation into a criminal one.
a. When the government asks, ya gotta pony
up the name(s) on your foreign bank accounts, the account numbers, the
name and address of the banks, the type of account, and the maximum
value of each such account during each year. In re: Special February
2011-1 Grand Jury Subpoena Dated September 12, 2011, 691 F.3d 903 (7th
Cir. 8/27/12), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (5/13/13). In an opinion by Judge
Bauer, the Seventh Circuit held that the compulsory production of foreign
bank account records required to be maintained under the Bank Secrecy Act
of 1970 does not violate a taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. The required records doctrine overrode any act of
production privilege. A grand jury subpoena seeking the taxpayer's bank
records issued in connection with an investigation into whether he used
secret offshore bank accounts to evade his federal income taxes was
enforced.
b. A third decision going the same way. In
re: Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 9/21/12). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Dennis), in reversing a district court, declined to create a circuit split
and held that the required records doctrine applied; the individual was
required to produce foreign bank records subpoenaed in the IRS's
investigation into whether he used secret Swiss bank accounts [with UBS] to
evade his federal income taxes. The court's reasoning was that the Bank
Secrecy Act's record-keeping requirement is "essentially regulatory," the
records sought are of a kind "customarily kept" by account holders, and the
records have assumed "public aspects"; this is so even though one purpose of
the BSA was to aid law enforcement officials in pursuing criminal
investigations.
c. The Second Circuit held that owners of
secret offshore foreign bank accounts are not "inherently suspect" of tax
evasion or of anything else illegal. United States v. John Doe, 2013 WL
6670733 (2d Cir. 12/19/13). The Second Circuit (Judge Wesley) held that the
required records exception to the Fifth Amendment applied, and that
production of foreign bank records was required. Judge Wesley stated:
The record keeping regulation at issue here, 31 C.F.R.
section 1010.420, targets those engaged in the lawful
activity of owning a foreign bank account. "There is nothing
inherently illegal about having or being a beneficiary of an
offshore foreign bank account." M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074.
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Doe's protestations notwithstanding, owners of these
accounts are not "inherently suspect" and the statute is
"essentially regulatory."
Doe's argument that the statute is criminally focused
has some force. The BSA [Bank Secrecy Act] declares that
its purpose is "to require certain reports or records where
they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or
regulatory investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of
intelligence or counterintelligence activities, including
analysis, to protect against international terrorism." 31
U.S.C. section 5311. It does list "criminal investigations"
first, but this multifaceted statute clearly contributes to civil
and intelligence efforts wholly unrelated to any criminal
purpose.
Although portions of the statute's legislative history
support Doe's characterization of the BSA as focused on
criminal activity, "[t]he Supreme Court has already
considered and rejected these arguments as they relate to the
BSA generally." M.H., 648 F.3d at 1074 (citing Cal.
Bankers' Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 76-77 (1974)).
Moreover, "the question is not whether Congress was
subjectively concerned about crime when enacting the
BSA's recordkeeping and reporting provisions, but rather
whether these requirements apply exclusively or almost
exclusively to people engaged in criminal activity." Grand
Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10, 707 F.3d at 1271; accord Grand
Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d at 434. Looking beyond
"Congressional subjective intent" -- if there could be such a
thing -- the BSA has considerable regulatory utility outside
of the criminal justice context.
The question becomes whether a statute with mixed
criminal and civil purposes can be "essentially regulatory"
with respect to the required records exception. We agree
with our sister circuits: the fact "[t]hat a statute relates both
to criminal law and to civil regulatory matters does not strip
the statute of its status as 'essentially regulatory."' Grand
Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10, 707 F.3d at 1270. Because
people owning foreign bank accounts are not inherently
guilty of criminal activity, the BSA's applicable
recordkeeping requirement, designed to facilitate "criminal,
tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings, or [] the
conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities," 31
U.S.C. section 5311, is still essentially regulatory. (footnote
omitted)
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* These were records that were routinely
maintained and made available to government agents upon request by those
German Jews who held secret accounts in Swiss banks during the 1930s and
1940s.
d. No circuit conflicts yet; the fifth case was
from the Fourth Circuit. United States v. Under Seal, 737 F.3d 330 (4th
Cir. 12/13/13). The Fourth Circuit (Judge Agee) agreed with the other
circuits that have dealt with this issue, and held that the required records
doctrine overrode the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
of a couple who held an account (successively) in two Swiss private banks.
C. Litigation Costs
1. When the IRS cuts the taxpayer a break in
settling a case, the taxpayer is not a "prevailing party." Knudsen v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-87 (4/1/13). On 5/14/09, the IRS denied
the taxpayer'shamilton request for § 6015(f) relief on the ground that she had
failed to seek relief within the two year period required by Reg. § 1.6015-
5(b)(1). The taxpayer sought review in the Tax Court and on 3/15/11 the IRS
stipulated that the taxpayer qualified for complete relief under § 6015(f) for
all subject years if the two-year deadline was invalid. On 7/25/11 "the IRS
announced as a policy directive that the Department of the Treasury would
expand the two-year deadline 'in the interest of tax administration and ***
not reflective of any doubt concerning the authority of the Service to impose
the two-year deadline' and that the two-year deadline would no longer be
enforced in cases docketed in [the Tax Court]." See Chief Counsel Notice
CC-2011-017 (July 25, 2011); Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 135. In
August 2011 the IRS conceded that the taxpayer was entitled to relief.
Thereafter, the taxpayer sought attorney's fees under § 7430, but the Tax
Court (Judge Thornton) denied the taxpayer's motion for attorney's fees
because she was not a "prevailing party" as required by the statute. Section
7430 provides that a taxpayer qualifies as a prevailing party only if either
(1) the taxpayer has made a "qualified offer" or (2) the IRS's position is not
substantially justified, but the taxpayer relied on only the qualified offer rule.
However, the qualified offer rule does not apply where the judgment is
issued pursuant to a settlement, § 7430(c)(4)(E)(ii)(I), and the court held that
the judgment in this case was based on a "settlement."
D. Statutory Notice of Deficiency
1. Are you "outside of the United States" if you live
in another country but are visiting the United States when a deficiency
notice is sent to your U.S. post office box? Smith v. Commissioner, 140
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T.C. 48 (2/28/13). Section 6213(a) gives the taxpayer 90 days, or if the
notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, 150 days, after the
mailing of a deficiency notice to file a Tax Court petition. Prior to August
2007, the taxpayer lived in San Francisco. In 2007, the taxpayer moved from
San Francisco to Canada and became a permanent resident of Canada.
However, she continued to own a home and maintained a post office box in
San Francisco. In late December 2007, the taxpayer returned to San
Francisco briefly to complete moving her furniture to Canada. While she was
in San Francisco, the IRS mailed a deficiency notice relating to the year 2000
to her San Francisco post office box. The respondent stated that the taxpayer
had until March 26, 2008 (i.e., 90 days), to file a Tax Court petition. The
taxpayer failed to pick up the notice before returning to Canada on 1/8/08.
On 5/2/08, the taxpayer received a copy of the deficiency notice, and on
5/23/08, she filed a Tax Court petition. The IRS filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction, contending that the petition was not timely filed. The
taxpayer objected and contended that, pursuant to § 6213(a), she was entitled
to 150, rather than 90, days to file a petition. In a reviewed opinion (7-1-5)
by Judge Foley, the Tax Court held that the 150-day period applied to the
taxpayer because at the time the deficiency notice was sent she was a
permanent resident of Canada. The majority cited Hamilton v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C. 747 (1949), which held that "the 150-day period
applies to a taxpayer who regularly resides outside the United States but who
through fortuitous circumstance happened to be physically in one of the
States of the Union on the particular day the deficiency notice was mailed to
him.
Judge Halpern, in a dissent joined by
three other judges, would have held that the petition was not timely. The dissent
reasoned that the taxpayer "was present in the United States for a two-week
period bracketing both the mailing and delivery of the notice to her address (a
U.S. address) last known to the Commissioner, and, in the light of the words
actually used by Congress and the relevant case law, that is sufficient for me to
conclude that the notice was not addressed to a person outside the United
States." The dissent concluded that "the 150-day rule applies either when the
taxpayer is out of the country or when the address on the notice is a foreign
address," and that "out of the country means 'physically located outside the
United States' Under this reasoning "residence" is irrelevant. "Absence from
the United States, resulting in delay, is what matters."
2. A website reference is as good as the address and
phone number the statute requires on a deficiency notice. The statute is
sooo 20th Century. John C. Hom and Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 140
T.C. No. 11 (5/7/13). Section 6212(a) requires that a deficiency notice
inform the taxpayer of the taxpayer's right to contact a local office of the
National Taxpayer Advocate and provide the location and phone number of
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the appropriate office. The taxpayer argued that a deficiency notice was
invalid because the inclusion of a web-site address where the address and
telephone number of the local office of the National Taxpayer Advocate may
be found did not comply with the statutory requirement. The Tax Court
(Judge Cohen) held that the deficiency notice was valid. Section 6212 does
not provide that a deficiency notice sent without the specified information is
invalid. The taxpayer was not prejudiced by the form of the deficiency notice
because the information described in § 6212(a) was made available,
"although in a manner that may not be sufficient for a taxpayer without
access to a computer or knowledge of how to access a Web site." But the
notice was not misleading, and the taxpayer was able to file, and did file, a
timely Tax Court petition.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. Don't screw up your certified mail customer
receipt. Stocker v. United States, 705 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1/17/13). On
10/15/07, the taxpayers mailed an amended return requesting a refund for
2003; their 2003 tax return had been timely mailed on 10/15/04. The IRS
acknowledged that it received the amended return on 10/25/07, but rejected
the refund claim on the ground that the request was untimely under §
6511(a), asserting that the envelope was postmarked October 19 - four days
late. The taxpayers could not avail themselves of the timely mailed, timely
filed rule of § 7502(a) because they could not produce a postmarked
envelope; this was because the IRS, by its own admission, had not retained
the envelope in which the return had been received. Nor could they present
the customer copies of a certified mail receipts, because although they
claimed to have sent the amended return by certified mail, they had - in a
tragic comedy or errors - failed to present to the post office the customers'
copy of the certified mail receipt to get them date-stamped. The Sixth
Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Rosen, held that the taxpayers were not
entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence of timely mailing of the refund
request. The court followed the decisions of other courts holding that the
exceptions provided by § 7502 are "exclusive and complete." See, e.g.
Deutsch v. Commissioner, 599 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1979), and other cases cited
therein. The court noted that in any event, the extrinsic evidence put forward
by the taxpayers did "not purport to establish the fact of significance under
§ 7502(a)(1) - namely, the 'date of the United States postmark' on their
amended 2003 return - but instead is directed at the separate factual
question of when they presented this return to the post office for mailing."
Thus, the denial of the refund was upheld.
2. You must react quickly to a jeopardy assessment
if you want judicial review. Abraitis v. United States, 709 F.3d 641 (6th
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Cir. 3/4/13). The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Cook, held that the
availability of judicial review under § 7429(b) requires that the taxpayer
either have made a timely request for administrative review or exhausted
administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review of the jeopardy
assessment. (The statute permits the taxpayer to seek judicial review within
90 days after either (1) the sixteenth day after the taxpayer's request to the
IRS for administrative review or (2) the day the IRS notifies the taxpayer of
its determination on administrative review.) Furthermore, the court held that
the requirement in § 7429(a)(2) that the taxpayer's request for administrative
review must be filed within 30 days after receiving the written statement
from the IRS explaining the jeopardy assessment is not subject to equitable
tolling.
3. A sad story about employee misclassification.
Karagozian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-164 (7/8/13). The
taxpayer's employer mischaracterized him as an independent contractor from
2002 through 2008. The taxpayer filed tax returns as an independent
contractor, paying self-employment tax. After the taxpayer filed an amended
return for 2008, treating himself as an employee, the IRS assessed liability
for the employer's share of unpaid FICA taxes for 2008 against the taxpayer.
In a CDP review, the Tax Court (Judge Kerrigan) held that the taxpayer
could not invoke equitable recoupment to reduce the 2008 liability for unpaid
FICA taxes by overpaid FICA taxes for earlier years, when he filed tax
returns as an independent contractor. Although the FICA taxes "paid in the
time-barred years were paid on the same type of transaction (i.e.,
compensation ...) as in 2008, ... the overpaid FICA taxes from 2002 through
2007 are separate transactions, separate items, and separate taxable events
from [the taxpayer's] 2008 tax deficiency."
4. The pro se taxpayer won on the jurisdictional
issue but lost on the merits. Boeri v. United States, 724 F.3d 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 7/31/13). The Federal Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Clevenger, held
that the three-year "look-back" period of § 6511(b)(2)(A) limiting the
amount of credit or refund is not a "statutory time limitation[]" but rather a
"substantive limitation[] on the amount of recovery." The look-back
provision is not jurisdictional and does not preclude the court from hearing
the taxpayer's claim. The taxpayer lost on the merits.
5. There was no statute of limitations because the
return was fraudulent, even though the taxpayer didn't know it. City
Wide Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 709 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 3/1/13), rev'g
T.C. Memo. 2011-279. The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Wesley,
held that the § 6501(c) extended period of limitations for assessing taxes due
to a willful attempt to defeat or evade tax applied where the corporation's
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accountant, who had been given a power of attorney, filed fraudulent
employment tax returns to further his embezzlement scheme. (The scheme
itself is not worth explaining.) The court explained: "The statute is agnostic
as to the attendant motivations for submitting a fraudulent return and only
requires that the Commissioner prove a fraudulent return was filed with an
intent to evade, that is avoid, paying a tax otherwise due."
* In the Tax Court proceeding, Judge
Vasquez had found that the IRS had not proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the accountant's filing of the employment tax returns was
"conduct intended to defeat or evade [the] taxes" rather than "an incidental
consequence or secondary effect of his embezzlement scheme." He accepted
the taxpayer's argument that the accountant "intended only to cover up his
embezzlement scheme and not defeat or evade petitioner's taxes."
* In an earlier case, Allen v. Commissioner,
128 T.C. 37 (2007), the Tax Court held that under § 6501(c)(1), the limitations
period remained open indefinitely regardless of whether it was the taxpayer or
the taxpayer's tax return preparer who had the intent to evade tax.
a. But the Court of Federal Claims says
"nuts" to the Second Circuit and Tax Court. BASR Partnership v. United
States, 113 Fed. Cl. 181 (9/30/13). The IRS issued an FPAA after the
§§ 6501(a)/6229 period of limitation had expired. The government asserted
that the extended period for assessment under § 6501(c)(1) for fraud applied
by reason of the fraudulent intent of the taxpayer's advisors who designed a
tax shelter transaction and one of whom prepared the return. The government
relied on City Wide Transit, Inc. v. Commissioner, 709 F.3d 102 (2d Cir.
2013), and Allen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007) in support of its
argument. In City Wide Transit, the Second Circuit held that the fraudulent
intent required to extend the statute of limitations under § 6501(c)(1) is not
limited to the taxpayer. In that case the tax preparer's fraudulent intent
triggered the extended period in § 6501(c)(1), even though the preparer's
primary motive was his own benefit rather than the taxpayer's. The Tax
Court reached the same conclusion in Allen, where it stated: "Nothing in the
plain meaning of the statute suggests the limitations period is extended only
in the case of the taxpayer's fraud. The statute keys the extension to the
fraudulent nature of the return, not to the identity of the perpetrator of the
fraud." However, in the instant case, without reaching the question of
whether the taxpayer's advisors harbored fraudulent intent, the Court of
Federal Claims rejected that proposition and held that even though there was
no question that "BASR's partnership return included false or fraudulent
items," the extended statute of limitations did not apply. Judge Barden
concluded that "the meaning of 'intent to evade tax,' as that text is used in
I.R.C. § 6501(c), is limited to instances in which the taxpayer has the
requisite intent to commit fraud." Referring to the Second Circuit's decision
in City Wide Transit and the Tax Court's decision in Allen, she said, "These
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cases, however, are not binding upon this court." Because the government
conceded that the taxpayers in this case did not have fraudulent intent, the
§ 6501(a) three-year period for assessment applied and the FPAA was time
barred.
6. What was I thinking, signing as the TMP!? An
ostensible TMP who executed consents to extend the period of
limitations on assessment of partnership items may not, in fact, have
been the TMP, but the consents were valid because he was authorized to
sign them. Peking Investment Fund, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2013-288 (12/23/13). As the Tax Matters Partner (TMP) of Peking
Investment Fund, LLC (PIF), an LLC taxed as a partnership, an individual
named Li Chien Tsai executed Forms 872-P, Consents to Extend the Time to
Assess Tax Attributable to Partnership Items, which extended until
December 31, 2008, the § 6229(a) period of limitations on assessment with
respect to partnership items for certain taxable years. On December 30, 2008,
the IRS sent a notice of final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA)
denying loss deductions claimed by PIF. Among other issues in the case, the
Tax Court (Judge Halpern) considered whether Mr. Tsai's execution of the
Forms 872-P effectively extended the period of limitations on assessment
pursuant to § 6229(b)(1)(B), which provides that the period of limitations
can be extended "with respect to all partners, by an agreement entered into
by the Secretary and the tax matters partner (or any other person authorized
by the partnership in writing to enter into such an agreement)." Mr. Tsai,
who was granted leave to participate in the case in an earlier proceeding,
asserted that the Forms 872-P he executed were invalid and did not
effectively extend the period of limitations on assessment because: (1) he
was ineligible to be PIF's TMP when he signed them because he had no
direct ownership interest in PIF and therefore was not a general partner or
member-manager of PIF, and (2) he was not otherwise authorized to sign
them. The government challenged only the second assertion. The court
concluded that a letter to the IRS from PIF's former TMP, who was the
member-manager of PIF, was sufficient authorization within the meaning of
§ 6229(b)(1)(B). In that letter, the former TMP resigned and appointed Mr.
Tsai as TMP. The court reasoned that, although the letter might not have
been effective to appoint Mr. Tsai as TMP, it nevertheless expressed the
former TMP's (and therefore PIF's) intent to authorize Mr. Tsai to exercise
the same authority as the former TMP, including the authority to execute the
Form 872-P consents. In reaching this conclusion, the court examined an
analogous situation involving a limited partnership in Investment Engineers,
Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-255. Based on the former TMP's
resignation and its holding out of Mr. Tsai as the TMP, the court also
concluded that PIF was "estopped from denying his authority as PIF's
ostensible TMP to execute the Form 872-P consents for the years in issue."
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F. Liens and Collections
1. Does this case portend that most single-member
LLCs are mere nominee owners on behalf of their single member?
Berkshire Bank v. Town of Ludlow, 708 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 1/11/13). The
First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Stahl, affirmed a District Court decision
holding that a tax lien against the owner of a single-member LLC (which was
a disregarded entity) filed in 2009 was superior to a judgment lien on land
owned by the LLC arising in 2010. On the facts the LLC was a mere
nominee for its owner: (1) the owner transferred the property to the LLC for
no consideration, (2) no one else had any interest in the LLC, made decisions
for it, or benefitted from its income, (3) the LLC operated out of its owner's
home, (4) the owner exercised total control over the LLC's property and its
development, (5) the owner had complete use and enjoyment of the property,
as evidenced by his formulation and execution of the plan to subdivide the
property and sell off the lots, (6) the LLC did not interfere with the owner's
use of the property, (7) the owner used 10 to 15 percent of the revenue from
the LLC to pay his personal expenses; (8) the owner of the LLC treated the
property as if it belonged to him, (9) the owner testified that he set up the
LLC and transferred title to the property solely to avoid legal liability "in
case somebody got hurt on the property," and (10) the LLC's bank account
was not in its own name, but in the owner's name.
2. The obligation to pay income taxes has priority
over a religious obligation to tithe. Thompson v. Commissioner, 140 T.C.
173 (3/4/13). In reviewing a CDP hearing, the Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held
that it was not an abuse of discretion for the settlement officer to reject the
taxpayer's contention that his (1) monthly tithing to his (the Mormon)
Church and (2) monthly payments for his children's college expenses should
be excluded from the monthly amount available to satisfy his unpaid tax
liabilities. The court rejected the argument that failure to allow tithing as a
necessary expense violated the taxpayer's First Amendment right to religious
freedom and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993.
The Commissioner's interest in expeditiously collecting
taxes is especially compelling given the specific facts of this
case. Petitioner has a long history of not paying his income
tax liabilities. As of the date of trial petitioner still had not
paid his income tax liabilities for the taxable years 1992,
1995, 1996, 1999, and 2000. Additionally, respondent has
assessed trust fund recovery penalties under section 6672
against petitioner for seven different tax periods.
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3. BLIPS and bankruptcy: hiding assets after
learning losses may be disallowed can make the subsequent tax liability
non-dischargeable. Vaughn v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1481
(D. Colo. 3/29/13). The taxpayer used losses from a KPMG BLIPS tax
shelter to offset gain from the 1999 sale of his interest in a cable company.
After being informed by KPMG of the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-2
C.B. 255, which identified losses in BLIPS-type tax shelters as
nondeductible, and learning that the IRS was auditing the cable company's
former CFO, who also had used BLIPS losses to offset gain, the taxpayer
purchased a $1.7 million home titled in his fianc6e's name. After KPMG
advised the taxpayer to disclose his BLIPS investment, but before he
disclosed it, the taxpayer funded a $1.5 million trust for his stepdaughter. He
also spent significant amounts on jewelry and home furnishings. The
taxpayer later filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and the IRS filed a proof
of claim in that proceeding in the amount of $14,359,592. Under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(1)(C), a tax debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy if the debtor
either made a fraudulent return or willfully attempted to evade or defeat the
tax. The Bankruptcy Court held that the taxpayer's tax liability was non-
dischargeable on both grounds. The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy
Court's determination solely on the ground that the taxpayer had willfully
attempted to evade or defeat tax. The District Court rejected the taxpayer's
contention that he could not have willfully attempted to evade or defeat tax
because there had been no assessment or quantification of his tax liability
when he depleted his assets.
4. A good reason not to be the fiduciary of any
estates or trusts that you represent. United States v. Tyler, 528 Fed. Appx.
193 (3d Cir. 6/11/13). The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Jordan,
held that 31 U.S.C. § 3713 imposes personal liability on an executor who
distributes all of the funds from an estate thereby rendering the estate unable
to pay the taxes due from the estate (including unpaid tax liabilities of the
decedent), even though such a distribution "is not, strictly speaking, the
payment of a debt," to which the statute refers. The court relied on United
States v. Coppola, 85 F.3d 1015 (2d Cir. 1996), which reached the same
result.
* To avoid this problem, executors should
consider filing Form 4810, Request for Prompt Assessment, and Form 5495,
Request for Discharge from Personal Liabilities.
5. Who says the income tax is uniform throughout
the country. Sometimes state law determines from whom the IRS can
collect. Fourth Investments, LP v. United States, 720 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
6/13/13). The Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge M. Smith, affirmed a
District Court in favor of the government in a quiet title action in which the
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plaintiff partnerships sought to remove a tax lien on properties to which the
partnerships held title. The lien was for back taxes of married individuals
from whom partnerships had received properties without consideration. The
court rejected the government's argument that nominee status was to be
determined under federal common law, and held that the relevant state law
controlled the determination of whether title to the property was held as a
nominee. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the partnerships held the
properties as nominees of the taxpayers under California law, which was the
controlling state law.
* As for the controlling law, a similar result
has been reached by other Circuits that have addressed the issue. See Berkshire
Bank v. Town ofLudlow, 708 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 2013) (clarifying that state law,
rather than federal law, provides the "substantive rules" of nominee doctrine);
Holman v. United States, 505 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the
government's argument that a "uniform federal rule should ... govern whether
the nominee theory is to apply," and remanding for application of Utah law);
Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Because there is no
indication that the district court applied [state] law before determining the scope
of the federal tax lien we must reverse.").
6. Unremitted withholding determined in criminal
tax fraud trial was credible for determining civil tax liability. Dixon v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-207 (9/3/13). In reviewing an IRS CDP
determination, the Tax Court (Judge Holmes) held that the Dixons were
entitled to a credit against their 1992 through 1995 income tax liability for
$510,896 determined in their criminal tax fraud trial to have been withheld
by their corporate employer (which they controlled) but not remitted. The
withholding had been determined as part of the tax-loss computation from
the then-still-extant books and records, even though many records
subsequently disappeared before the CDP hearing. As part of their
sentencing the taxpayers agreed to pay that sum to the corporation in 1999
and 2000, and the corporation remitted the funds to the IRS with a
designation that the funds be applied to the corporation's employment taxes
for the years in question with respect to the taxpayers as representing
withheld taxes.
a. An employer can designate which
employee's withholding taxes it has paid. Dixon v. Commissioner, 141
T.C. No. 3 (9/3/13). In a related case reviewing the same CDP determination,
the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion by Judge Lauber (11-1-3), held that
"when an employer pays in a later year the nonwithheld income tax of an
employee for an earlier year, the employee as a matter of law is not entitled
to a credit under section 31." That did not, however, resolve the matter. In
1999 and 2000 the Dixons had remitted to the employer corporation $91,233
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to be applied to their 1992 through 1995 income tax liabilities - the amount
of their income tax liabilities in excess the amounts for which the court in the
related Tax Court memorandum opinion held that the corporation had
withheld (but not remitted). The corporation remitted the funds to the IRS
with a designation that they be applied to the corporation's employment
taxes for the years in question with respect to the taxpayers as representing
withheld taxes. But the payment was outside the period prescribed by§ 6205(a)(1) for making a "proper adjustment" to under-withholding. The
IRS applied the payment to other corporate tax liabilities. Nevertheless, the
court held that the taxpayers should have received a credit of $91,223 against
their 1992 through 1995 income tax liabilities by virtue of the corporation's
designated payments. It rejected the IRS's argument that "there is no legal
basis for insisting that the IRS honor the designation of a delinquent
employment tax payment toward the income tax liability of a specific
employee." However, the taxpayer's remained liable for interest and
penalties attributable to the late payment.
* Judges Holmes, Buch, and Halpern
dissented, and would have held that the relevant statutory scheme does not
allow the corporation to designate a payment for its own benefit and also for the
benefit of the employees.
7. It's going to cost more to apply not to pay the
taxes you rightfully owe. REG-144990-12, User Fees for Processing
Installment Agreements and Offers in Compromise, 78 F.R. 53702 (8/30/13).
Proposed amendments to Reg. § 300.1(b) would increase the fee for entering
into an installment agreement. The fee before 1/1/14 is $105. The fee for
entering into an installment agreement on or after 1/1/14 would be $120.
Proposed amendments to Reg. § 300.2(b) would increase the fee for
restructuring or reinstating an installment agreement. Before 1/1/14 the fees
is $45. The fee for entering into an installment agreement on or after 1/1/14
would be $50. Proposed amendments to Reg. § 300.3(b) would increase the
fee for processing an offer in compromise. Before 1/1/14 the fee is $150. The
fee for processing an offer in compromise on or after 1/1/14 would be $186.
8. No late mandatory mulligan on an unprocessable
OIC. Reed v. Commissioner, 141 T.C. No. 7 (9/23/13). In a case of first
impression, the Tax Court (Judge Kroupa), in reviewing a CDP
determination, held that the IRS cannot be required to reopen in a CDP
hearing an offer-in-compromise (OIC) based on doubt as to collectability
when the OIC was rejected as unprocessable years before the CDP hearing
commenced. There was no abuse of discretion.
9. "Our review of the overall record leaves us with a
firm sense that petitioner has not been treated in a fair and rational
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manner." Szekely v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-227 (9/24/13). This
case was a review of a CDP determination to file a tax lien. The self-
employed taxpayer filed tax returns for 2006 through 2010 reporting his
income but making no payments. Beginning in 2011 he began making
estimated tax payments. In that year he also contacted the Taxpayer
Advocate Service to seek advice on making an offer in compromise. When
the IRS contacted him to advise him of his right to a CDP hearing, he
submitted IRS Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process or
Equivalent Hearing, and attached to his letter his previous communications
with TAS, as well as copies of checks and payment vouchers for his
estimated tax payments for 2011 in an effort to persuade the IRS to resolve
his tax liabilities for prior years. By a letter dated Feb. 3, 2012 the IRS
Appeals Office notified the taxpayer that a CDP hearing had been scheduled
and that he needed to complete and submit a Form 433-A together with
supporting documentation and three months of bank statements. The letter
form the IRS stated that collection alternatives would not be considered
unless the documents were received within 14 days from the date of the
letter. The taxpayer complied. During the CDP hearing the Appeals Officer
informed the taxpayer that he needed to submit a Form 656, Offer in
Compromise, and another Form 433-A-this time, Form 433-A (OIC)-
before a collection alternative could be considered. On Feb. 28, 2012, the
Appeals Officer sent the taxpayer a follow-up letter with the forms, asking
the taxpayer to complete and submit these forms, with supporting
documentation and the required payments by March 13, 2012. Unlike the
earlier letter, the February 28 letter did not warn the taxpayer of any negative
consequences if he failed to submit all of the required information by March
13. When the taxpayer had not submitted the forms and documentation by
March 13, the Appeals Officer concluded that the filing of the lien should be
sustained and the IRS sent a determination letter. The Tax Court (Judge
Lauber) remanded the case for a supplemental CDP hearing to consider the
taxpayer's OIC. He noted that although the Tax Court has approved allowing
a taxpayer only 14 days to submit documentation in CDP, a 14-day deadline
must be applied using a rule of reason.
The SO [Appeals Officer] knew that petitioner's liabilities
were properly reported; that he had previously worked with
TAS to receive assistance; that he was eager to work out a
compromise of his tax liabilities; that he was current on his
2011 tax liability; and that he had responded timely to her
previous requests for documents and information. Armed
with this knowledge, the SO should not have lightly
assumed, when petitioner's OIC package did not arrive on
March 13, that he had decided to walk away from his efforts
to secure a compromise. ... All that was required was a two-
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minute phone call to inquire whether petitioner needed a
little more time.
10. When the U.S.P.S. Form 3877 isn't properly
completed, it's not enough to prove that the IRS sent the deficiency
notice. Meyer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-268 (11/25/13). This case
was a review of a CDP determination to proceed with a levy. The taxpayer
had not filed a tax return and the IRS prepared a substitute for return. The
taxpayer claimed that he never received a deficiency notice. The IRS could
not produce a copy of the deficiency notice, but the Appeals Officer
conducting the hearing relied on a Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments,
Payments, and Other Specified Matters, to verify that the Commissioner had
properly assessed the tax, and a U.S.P.S. Form 3877 that listed, along with
others, the taxpayer's name and address to verify that the deficiency notice
had been properly mailed. The taxpayer argued that this determination was
an abuse of discretion, because the Appeals Officer did not meet his
obligation to verify that the IRS properly issued and mailed a notice of
deficiency to him. Citing Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197 (2008), the
Tax Court (Judge Holmes) held that "the Appeals officer could not rely on
'computerized records' like the Form 4340, ... but '[t]he Appeals officer may
be required to examine underlying documents." Examining the Form 3877
was a step in the right direction according to Judge Holmes, but because the
existence of the deficiency notice was in dispute and as a factual matter the
Form 3877 itself appeared not to have been properly completed, in this case
that one additional step did not suffice. Because the administrative record did
not show that the Appeals Officer relied on anything else to verify proper
mailing, the case was remanded to the Appeals Officer to independently
verify that a deficiency notice was properly issued and mailed.
G. Innocent Spouse
1. The significant benefit of getting to own your
home free and clear of a mortgage lien precludes equitable relief.
Haggerty v. Commissioner, 505 Fed. Appx. 335 (5th Cir. 1/3/13). The
taxpayer sought § 6015(f) equitable relief for taxes due with respect to her
late husband's premature IRA withdrawal that was reported on their joint
return for the year of his death. She had no knowledge of the withdrawal and
the use of the funds to pay off a second mortgage lien on their home, which
as a result of his death she owned outright, until after her husband's death. In
a per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit upheld denial of relief. Because the
taxpayer signed and filed the return after her husband's death and the income
tax liability was properly reported but not paid, she knew that her husband
would not pay the tax liability. The key to the holding, however, was that the
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taxpayer received a significant economic benefit when her husband paid off
the second mortgage against their home.
2. APA, schmay PA! The Tax Court's review of
§ 6015(f) relief denial is de novo and new evidence is admissible. Wilson
v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1/15/13). The Ninth Circuit in a
divided opinion (2-1) by Judge Thomas, held that, in reviewing the IRS's
denial of § 6015 innocent spouse relief, the Tax Court properly considered
new evidence outside the administrative record and correctly applied a de
novo standard of review in determining the taxpayer's eligibility for
§ 6015(f) equitable relief. The court reasoned as follows:
Section 6015(e)'s jurisdictional grant to determine whether
equitable relief is warranted in a § 6015(f) case must be read
alongside subsection (f)'s mandate to consider the totality of
the circumstances before making an equitable relief
determination. "Taking into account all the facts and
circumstances" is not possible if the Tax Court can review
only the evidence available at the time of the
Commissioner's prior determination.
The majority also rejected the IRS's
argument that the Administrative Procedure Act applied to limit the Tax
Court's review. The court reasoned that the "extensive legislative history of
[§§ 6015(e) and (f)] demonstrates that the special procedures enacted by
Congress displace application of the APA in innocent spouse tax relief cases,
and the APA does not apply." The court emphasized that at no time prior to the
Tax Court proceeding is there a formal administrative procedure at which the
taxpayer can present the case before an administrative law judge; and at no time
during the administrative process is the taxpayer afforded the right to conduct
discovery, present live testimony under oath, subpoena witnesses for trial, or
conduct cross-examination. These procedures are available only in the Tax
Court. Finally, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "a de novo scope of
evidentiary review is incompatible with an abuse of discretion standard," but
concluded that "the nature of equitable relief... favors de novo review."
The Tax Court must be able to compile a de novo record if it
is to consider "all the facts and circumstances" when
deciding whether a taxpayer is entitled to relief from joint
liability under § 6015(f), but it is pointless to do so if it can
only review the Commissioner's denial of equitable relief
for an abuse of discretion. The only way for the Tax Court to
proceed de novo when hearing petitions for relief under
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§ 6015(f) is by applying both a de novo standard and scope
of review.
* Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court's decision granting relief.
* Judge Bybee dissented, arguing that the
Administrative Procedure Act applied, and the Tax Court as a reviewing court
is limited to the administrative record and a review for abuse of discretion by
the IRS.
* In Commissioner v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262
(11th Cir. 2009), the Eleventh Circuit, the only other circuit that has considered
the scope of the Tax Court's review in § 6015(f) cases, reached the same
conclusion as the Ninth Circuit majority.
a. The IRS throws in the towel on another
innocent spouse procedural rule. CC-2013-011 (6/7/13). This Chief
Counsel Notice provides that IRS attorneys will no longer argue (1) that the
Tax Court should limit its review of § 6015(f) determinations to abuse of
discretion or (2) the Tax Court should limit its review to evidence in the
administrative record.
* This reflects the IRS's acquiescence in
Wilson v. Commissioner, 705 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2013), affg T.C. Memo. 2010-
134, in AOD 2012-07; 2013-25 I.R.B. i.
3. Innocent spouses have longer to seek equity than
to prove their innocence. REG-132251-11, Relief From Joint and Several
Liability, 78 F.R. 49242 (8/12/13). The Treasury Department has published
proposed amendments to Reg. §§ 1.66-4 and 1.6015-5 that would enshrine in
the regulations the relief provided by Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 125,
providing that the otherwise applicable two-year deadline for seeking § 6015
relief (or the equivalent under § 66(c) with respect to income from
community property) does not apply to equitable relief under § 6015(f) (or
the equivalent under § 66(c)). Prop. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(2) provides that if a
requesting spouse files a request for equitable relief under Reg. § 1.6015-4
within the period of limitations on collection, the IRS will consider the
request, but any relief in the form of a tax credit or refund depends on
whether the limitation period for credit or refund was also open as of the date
the claim for relief was filed and the other requirements relating to credits or
refunds are satisfied. In cases in which the limitation period for credit or
refund is the longer of the two periods and is open when a request for
equitable relief is filed, the request can be considered for a potential refund
or credit of any amounts collected or otherwise paid by the requesting spouse
during the applicable look-back period of § 6511(b)(2), even if the collection
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period is closed. If a request for equitable relief is filed after the expiration of
the period of limitations for collection of a joint tax liability, the IRS is
barred from collecting any remaining unpaid tax from the requesting spouse.
Similarly, if a request for equitable relief under Reg. § 1.6015-4 is filed after
the expiration of the limitation period for a credit or refund, § 6511(b)(1)
bars the IRS from allowing, and a taxpayer from receiving, a credit or
refund. The IRS will not consider an individual's request to be equitably
relieved from a tax that is no longer legally collectible. The proposed
regulations have no effect on the two-year deadline to elect relief under
§ 6015(b) (and Reg. § 1.6015-2) or § 6015(c) (and Reg. § 1.6015-3).
4. The IRS is attempting to be more equitable in
granting innocent spouse relief. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309 (1/6/12).
This notice provides a proposed revenue procedure that will supersede Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, which provides guidance regarding
§ 6015(f) relief from joint and several liability. The factors used in making
§ 6015(f) innocent spouse relief determinations will be revised "to ensure
that requests for innocent spouse relief are granted under section 6015(f)
when the facts and circumstances warrant and that, when appropriate,
requests are granted in the initial stage of the administrative process." The
revenue procedure expands how the IRS will take into account abuse and
financial control by the nonrequesting spouse in determining whether
equitable relief is warranted, because when a requesting spouse has been
abused by the nonrequesting spouse, the requesting spouse may not have
been able to challenge the treatment of any items on the joint return, question
the payment of the taxes reported as due on the joint return, or challenge the
nonrequesting spouse's assurance regarding the payment of the taxes.
Furthermore, a lack of financial control may have a similar impact on the
requesting spouse's ability to satisfy joint tax liabilities. Thus, the proposed
revenue procedure provides that abuse or lack of financial control may
mitigate other factors that might otherwise weigh against granting § 6015(f)
equitable relief. The proposed revenue procedure also provides for certain
streamlined case determinations; new guidance on the potential impact of
economic hardship; and the weight to be accorded to certain factual
circumstances in determining equitable relief.
* Until the revenue procedure is finalized,
the IRS will apply the provisions in the proposed revenue procedure instead of
Rev. Proc. 2003-61 in evaluating claims for equitable relief. But if a taxpayer
would receive more favorable treatment under one or more of the factors
provided in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 and so advises the IRS, the IRS will apply those
factors from Rev. Proc. 2003-61, until the new revenue procedure is finalized.
a. The Tax Court tells the IRS that even if it
wants to make a taxpayer favorable change to a Revenue Procedure, it
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needs to finalize it, not just publish a proposed Revenue Procedure.
Deihl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-176 (6/21/12). The Tax Court
(Judge Marvel) declined to apply the provisions of the proposed revenue
procedure set forth in Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, in determining
whether the taxpayer was entitled to equitable relief under § 6015(f) and
instead applied Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, "in view of the fact
that the proposed revenue procedure is not final and because the comment
period under the notice only recently closed." It did, however, note "how the
analysis used in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 ... would change if the proposed revenue
procedure in Notice 2012-8 ... had actually been finalized." But on the facts
the proposed changes did not affect the conclusion that relief was not
warranted.
b. More equitable and streamlined equitable
relief is finally here! Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397 (9/16/13). The
IRS has finalized, with some changes, the revenue procedure proposed in
Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309 to modify and supersede Rev. Proc. 2003-
61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, to provide guidance regarding equitable relief under
(1) § 6015(f) from joint and several liability, and (2) § 66(c) from income tax
liability resulting from the operation of community property law to taxpayers
domiciled in a community property state who do not file a joint return. The
factors used in making the determinations have been revised "to ensure that
requests for innocent spouse relief are granted under section 6015(f) when
the facts and circumstances warrant and that, when appropriate, requests are
granted in the initial stage of the administrative process." The revenue
procedure expands how the IRS will take into account abuse and financial
control by the nonrequesting spouse in determining whether equitable relief
is warranted, because when a requesting spouse has been abused by the
nonrequesting spouse, the requesting spouse may not have been able to
challenge the treatment of any items on the joint return, question the payment
of the taxes reported as due on the joint return, or challenge the
nonrequesting spouse's assurance regarding the payment of the taxes.
Furthermore, a lack of financial control may have a similar impact on the
requesting spouse's ability to satisfy joint tax liabilities. Thus, the revenue
procedure provides that abuse or lack of financial control may mitigate other
factors that might otherwise weigh against granting § 6015(f) equitable
relief. The revenue procedure also provides for certain streamlined case
determinations for both understatement, as well as underpayments, of tax;
new guidance on the potential impact of economic hardship; and the weight
to be accorded to certain factual circumstances in determining equitable
relief. Very significantly, any significant benefit a requesting spouse may
have received from the unpaid tax or understatement will not weigh against
relief (will be neutral) if the nonrequesting spouse abused the requesting
spouse or maintained financial control and made the decisions regarding
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living a more lavish lifestyle. A request for equitable relief under § 6015(f)
or § 66(c) must be filed before the expiration of the period of limitation for
collection under § 6502 to the extent the taxpayer seeks relief from an
outstanding liability, or before the expiration of the period of limitation for
credit or refund under § 6511 to the extent the taxpayer seeks a refund of
taxes paid.
* Rev. Proc. 2013-34 is effective for
requests for relief filed on or after 9/16/13. It also is effective for requests for
equitable relief pending on 9/16/13 with the IRS, Appeals, or in a docketed
case.
* Notice 2012-8 provided that until the
revenue procedure was finalized, the IRS would apply the provisions in the
proposed revenue procedure instead of Rev. Proc. 2003-61 in evaluating claims
for equitable relief. But if a taxpayer would have received more favorable
treatment under one or more of the factors provided in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 and
so advised the IRS, the IRS would apply those factors from Rev. Proc. 2003-61,
until the new revenue procedure was finalized.
H. Miscellaneous
1. This case is just like Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), except that, instead of freeing interracial same sex couples from
discriminatory marriage laws, it is about freeing marginal tax return
preparers from discriminatory competence testing. Loving v. IRS, 917 F.
Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 1/18/13). The District Court (Obama appointee Judge
Boasberg) enjoined the IRS from regulating otherwise unregulated "tax-
return preparers" because they are not "representatives" and do not
"practice" before the IRS and are not covered under 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)
(authorizing the regulation of "the practice of representatives of persons
before the [IRS]"). The regulation of tax-return preparers under Circular 230,
including registration, payment of fees, passing a qualifying exam, and
completing continuing education courses annually, fails the Chevron step
one test because preparation of tax returns does not require that a
"representative demonstrate ... (D) competency to advise and assist persons
in presenting their cases," 31 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2)(D), on the ground that "[a]t
the time of filing, the taxpayer has no dispute with the IRS; there is no 'case'
to present." Judge Boasberg also noted that the "unstructured independence
by the IRS [under Circular 230] would trample the specific and tightly
controlled penalty scheme in Title 26" (emphasis added).
* Note that there is neither privilege nor
work product protection for communications to a tax return preparer, which
arises only when there is a realistic possibility of "controversy."
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a. The injunction is modified, but not
stayed. Loving v. IRS, 920 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2/1/13). On the IRS's
motion to stay the injunction, Judge Boasberg - while refusing to stay the
injunction - modified it to make clear that its requirements were less
burdensome than the IRS claimed. The requirement that each tax return
preparer obtain a PTIN (and pay related fees) is authorized under
§ 6109(a)(4), so it may continue, except that the "IRS may no longer
condition PTIN eligibility on being 'authorized to practice' under 31 U.S.C.
section 330." Therefore, "the requirements that tax return preparers (who are
not attorneys, CPAs, enrolled agents, or enrolled actuaries) must pay fees
unrelated to the PTIN, pass a qualifying exam, and complete annual
continuing-education requirements" continue to be enjoined.
b. Government's motion for a stay pending
appeal was denied summarily. Loving v. IRS, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1384
(D.C. Cir. 3/27/13). The IRS appealed these two opinions and orders to the
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia Circuit, 2/20/13. That court
refused to stay the District Court's injunction on the ground that the IRS
failed to satisfy "the stringent requirements for a stay pending appeal."
c. And the D.C. Circuit affirms the freedom
of marginal tax return preparers to ply their trade free from
discriminatory competence testing. Loving v. I.R.S., Fed . 2014
WL 519224 (D.C. Cir. 2/11/14).
2. Ryan loses its constitutional challenge to Circular
230's contingent fee rule. Ryan, LLC v. Lew, 934 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. D.C.
3/29/13). The plaintiffs challenged § 10.27 of Circular 230 that generally
limits the use of contingent fee arrangements in connection with the
preparation and filing of refund claims with the IRS. More specifically, they
mounted three distinct attacks against Circular 230: (1) Ryan, LLC and Mr.
Ryan argued that Circular 230 violates their rights under the Petition Clause
of the First Amendment (Count I); (2) Mr. Ryan argued that Circular 230
violates his Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights (Count II); and (3) Mr.
Ridgely brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5
U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq., arguing that the IRS exceeded its statutory authority
in promulgating Circular 230 (Count III). Plaintiffs sought a declaratory
judgment that Circular 230's restrictions of contingent fee arrangements in
the context of "ordinary refund claims" is unconstitutional and exceeds the
scope of the IRS's authorizing statute, and they sought a permanent
injunction barring the enforcement of Circular 230's restrictions on the use
of contingent fee arrangements for "ordinary refund claims." The District
Court (Judge Wilkins) dismissed Counts I and II on the grounds that: Count I
failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and Mr. Ryan
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lacked standing under Count II to pursue a Due Process claim so that claim
lacked jurisdiction.
* With respect to an issue he didn't address,
Judge Wilkins stated:
In pressing for the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claim, the
Government first argues that the Petition Clause does not
protect "a taxpayer's right to file an administrative claim for
refund" with the IRS. (Defs.' Reply at 7). The Court finds
this proposition dubious. Not only has the Supreme Court
explicitly held that Petition Clause guarantees citizens the
ability to seek relief with courts, but it has also made clear
that these protections extend to "other forums established by
the government for the resolution of legal disputes."
Borough of Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2494. The Court has also
explained that "[t]he same philosophy governs the approach
of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies
(which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the
executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government."
Cal. Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508, 510 (1972) ("Certainly the right to petition extends to
all departments of the Government. The right of access to
the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.").
Insofar as the Internal Revenue Service is an administrative
agency established by the Government, the Court believes
that the Petition Clause would protect citizens' rights to file
claims with the IRS, as Plaintiffs suggest. On balance,
however, the Court need not directly pass on this issue
because, even assuming that the right to file a refund claim
with the IRS does fall within the ambit of the Petition
Clause's protections, Plaintiffs fail to allege any
constitutionally cognizable violation or impingement of such
a right.
3. New nationwide rollout of fast track settlement
("FTS") program for small businesses and self-employed individuals
("SB/SE") means settlement opportunities for taxpayers. IR-2013-88,
2013 TNT 216-10 (11/6/13). FTS uses alternative dispute resolution
techniques to help taxpayers save time, so audit issues can usually be
resolved within 60 days - and, taxpayers who choose this option do not
forfeit their appeal rights if the FTS process is unsuccessful. Normally, the
Appeals representative acts as mediator between the taxpayer and
representatives from SB/SE's Examination Division.
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* Any time the IRS initiates a new
program, those administering the program want to see it work. Therefore,
taxpayers who utilize the program in its early days have settlement
opportunities unavailable elsewhere. Compare "decisions in aid of jurisdiction"
in the Court of Federal Claims.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Tax refunds in a bad economy set up another
deference conflict among the circuits. In Re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d
605 (6th Cir. 9/7/12), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 49 (10/1/13). In November
2001 Quality Stores closed 63 stores and 9 distribution centers and
terminated the employment of all employees in the course of Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases. Quality Stores adopted plans providing severance pay to
terminated employees. The company reported the severance pay as wages for
withholding and employment tax purposes then filed claims for refund of
FICA and FUTA taxes claiming that the severance pay represented
supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUBs) that are not
wages for employment tax purposes. Disagreeing with the contrary holding
by the Federal Circuit in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), the Sixth Circuit held that the SUBs were exempt from
employment taxes. The court examined the language and legislative history
of § 3402(o)(1), which provides that SUB payments "shall be treated as if it
were a payment of wages" for withholding purposes, to conclude that by
treating SUB payments as wages for withholding, Congress recognized that
SUB payments were not otherwise subject to withholding because they did
not constitute "wages." Then, under Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S.
247, 255 (1981), the court concluded that the term "wages" must carry the
same meaning for withholding and employment tax purposes. Thus, if SUBs
are not wages under the withholding provision (because they must be treated
as wages by statutory directive), the SUBs are not wages for employment tax
purposes. The court also rejected the IRS's position in Rev. Rul. 90-72,
1990-2 C.B. 211, that to be excluded from employment taxes SUBs must be
part of a plan that is designed to supplement the receipt of state
unemployment compensation. The court declined to follow the Federal
Circuit's holding in CSX Corp., which adopted the eight part test of Rev.
Rul. 90-72, stating that, "We decline to imbue the IRS revenue rulings and
private letter rulings with greater significance than the congressional intent
expressed in the applicable statutes and legislative histories." The court also
stated that it could not conclude that the opinion in Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011),
eroded the holding of Rowan Cos. v. United States, which compelled the
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court to interpret the meaning of "wages" the same for withholding and
employment tax purposes.
2. Proposed regulations define employment tax
liabilities of agents designated by an employer to pay employment taxes.
REG-102966-10. Designation of Payor as Agent to Perform Acts Required
of an Employer, 78 F.R. 6056 (1/29/13). Proposed regulations under § 3405
would provide rules regarding obligations for all employment tax under an
agreement between an employer and a third party payor that is designated as
an agent to perform the acts of the employer. The proposed regulations
would provide that all provisions of the law, including penalties, are
applicable to the payor, and that the employer for which the payor is
designated as agent also remains liable for all provisions of the employment
tax. The preamble indicates that consistent with the IRS position on
administering the § 6672 trust fund penalty, the employment tax liability of
an employer will be collected only once whether from the payor or the
employer. The agency designation does not apply to (1) a payor that is itself
the common law employer of a person performing services for a client, (2) a
payor that has legal control over the payment of wages under § 3401(d)(1)
(and is thus the liable employer), and (2) a payor who is a payroll service
provider that reports employment taxes under the employer's EIN.
3. Advances to keep employees are wages. The
Vancouver Clinic, Inc. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-1571 (W.D.
Wash. 4/9/13). The clinic provided "advances" to newly hired physicians
that were subject to repayment if the physician did not continue to work for
the clinic for a period of five years. The advances were not reported on Form
W-2. Instead, the clinic reported on Form 1099 the subsequent forgiveness of
the advances. The court granted summary judgment to the IRS on the clinic's
suit for refund after paying employment taxes assessed by the IRS. The court
rejected the clinic's assertion that the advances were loans principally on the
finding that at the time the arrangements were entered into neither the clinic
nor the physicians intended that the advances would be repaid. The court
characterized the repayment obligation as liquidated damages payable by the
physicians on breach of a contractual obligation to remain at the clinic for
five years compelling the conclusion that the advances were compensation
for services and thus subject to employment taxes and wage withholding.
4. "The self-employment tax provisions are
construed broadly in favor of treating income as earnings from self-
employment." Old McDonald had a farm and on his farm he collected
federal subsidies that were self-employment income. Morehouse v.
Commissioner, 140 T.C. No. 16 (6/18/13). In a reviewed opinion (15-0-0),
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the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) overruled its prior decision in Wuebker v.
Commissioner, 110 T.C. 431 (1998), rev'd, 205 F.3d 897 (6th Cir. 2000),
and held that payments under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) are self-employment income subject
to self-employment taxes. The taxpayer owned farm land in South Dakota,
which he had rented to tenant farmers. The taxpayer entered into a CRP
contract with the USDA under which in exchange for annual payments the
taxpayer agreed to (1) maintain already established grass and legume cover
for the life of the contract; (2) "[e]stablish perennial vegetative cover on land
temporarily removed from agricultural production", including pubescent or
intermediate wheatgrass, alfalfa, and sweet clover; and (3) engage in "pest
control and pesticide management" for the life of the contract. The taxpayer
hired a former tenant farmer to carry out most of the work, but the taxpayer
supervised the operation, purchased materials needed to implement the
conservation plans, gathered documentation necessary to the CRP payments,
arranged for individuals to hunt on some of the properties, and visited the
properties several times during the tax years involved. The court held that
these activities were sufficient to constitute a trade or business carried on by
the taxpayer the income from which was subject to self-employment taxes
under § 1402(a)(1). The court indicated that regardless of whether the
taxpayer's activities qualified as farming, the taxpayer was directly and
through his agent "engaged in the business of participating in the CRP and
that he enrolled, maintained, and managed multiple properties subject to
CRP contracts with the primary intent of making a profit."
* The court indicated that the analysis in a
proposed revenue ruling published in Notice 2006-108, 2006-2 C.B. 118, that
would have treated CRP payments as self-employment income, while not
controlling, was nevertheless well-grounded and consistent with the court's
holding in the case.
* The court also held that the CRP
payments were not rental income excluded from self-employment tax by §
1402(a)(1). Although the payments were described as rental in the contract, the
court found that the payments were not received in exchange for use or
occupancy of the land by the USDA.
5. S corporation distributions to sole shareholder
sole employee were wages. Glass Blocks Unlimited v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-180 (8/7/13). The IRS classified an S corporation as the
employer of Frederick Blodgett, who was its sole shareholder and president.
Blodgett advanced funds to the corporation to cover operating expenses
during years of financial difficulty. In each of 2007 and 2008 the corporation
distributed $31,000 to Blodgett as repayment of loans. The corporation paid
no salary to its shareholder/employee. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern)
sustained the IRS's deficiency for employment taxes payable on the
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distributions. The S corporation did not object to the IRS's characterization
of the shareholder as an employee and thus the court held that, "[b]ecause
Mr. Blodgett was petitioner's employee for the periods at issue and
performed substantial services for it yet it did not pay him a salary, its
distributions to him are deemed wages and thus are subject to Federal
employment taxes." The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
advances from the shareholder were loans citing the absence of notes or
other instruments, the taxpayer's failure to treat the transfers as loans, and
the absence of any interest payments. The court also rejected for lack of
evidence the S corporation's assertion that treating the distributions as wages
would result in unreasonable compensation to the shareholder. Finally, the
court sustained penalties under §§ 6651(a) and 6656 for failure to file
employment tax forms and make required deposits.
a. This lengthy summary opinion
determines reasonable compensation for an S corporation shareholder.
Sean McAlary Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2013-62
(8/12/13). McAlary was the sole shareholder and employee of a moderately
sized real estate brokerage operated as an S corporation. McAlary and the
corporation entered into a compensation contract providing for a $24,000
annual salary. Most of the corporation's gross receipts were attributable to
commissions generated by McAlary. The corporation did not issue a W-2 to
McAlary nor claim deductions for salary paid to him. The corporation did,
however, distribute $240,000 to McAlary. The IRS expert determined, based
on a statistical evaluation of similar sized real estate brokerages that
McAlary should earn $48.44 per hour and assessed employment taxes on an
annual compensation of $100,755, which reduced the corporation's profit
margin to slightly in excess of the industry average and represented 19.4
percent of the corporation's gross receipts, again close to industry averages.
The court (Special Trial Judge Guy) rejected the contract between the
corporation and McAlary as controlling because McAlary sat on both sides
of the table during the negotiation. The court also was not persuaded by the
IRS expert's statistical analysis noting that reasonable compensation
depended on the facts and circumstances identified though a multifactor
analysis. Ultimately the court concluded that $40 per hour was reasonable
compensation and assessed employment taxes on the basis of $83,200. The
court also sustained additions to tax under §§ 6651(a)(1) and 6656 for failure
to file and pay employment taxes. The court rejected the taxpayer's assertion
of reasonable reliance on a tax professional, indicating that the taxpayer
failed to present evidence that he investigated the background or
qualifications of his return preparer/advisor to confirm that the advisor was a
competent professional.
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6. The minister of his own church under a vow of
poverty must still file the right forms. Rogers v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2013-177 (8/1/13). The taxpayer performed ministerial duties for a
church he formed. As compensation the church paid the taxpayer's home
mortgage (although the taxpayer deducted home mortgage interest against
other income), personal credit card bills, and utility payments. The Tax Court
(Judge Paris) held that the payments were income includible under § 61 and
wages subject to employment tax. The taxpayer was ineligible to claim
exemption from employment taxes under § 1402(c)(4) due to his failure to
timely file the mandatory exemption certificate required by § 1402(e)(3). The
taxpayer was also not allowed to exclude mortgage payments as a rental
allowance under § 107 because of the absence of an employment agreement
designating payment of a rental allowance as remuneration for services.
Finally the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the payments were not
includible under the taxpayer's vow of poverty.
7. Squeezing blood from a turnip? The taxpayer is
enjoined to pay taxes and follow the law. United States v. Petrie & Sons,
Inc., 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-5760 (E.D. Wash. 8/7/13). On findings that the
taxpayer failed to file employment tax returns, pay employment taxes, lacked
sufficient assets to satisfy outstanding tax liabilities of more than $750,000,
the IRS was likely to prevail on the merits, and would suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the taxpayer was enjoined from
hindering tax law enforcement and specifically to withhold from employee
wages as required by law, deposit withholdings in a bank within 72 hours,
and was further enjoined from making any other payments or property
transfers until it made payments to the IRS. In addition, the taxpayer was
ordered to inform employees with check writing authority of the injunction
and each such employee was required to provide a written acknowledgment
to the IRS.
* We have not seen such an action in the
years we've been doing this outline and we wonder whether an injunction to
follow the law will change the taxpayer's behavior (especially the one of us
who is related to a deceased tax protestor).
8. Employed and self-employed at the same time.
This status exists for all U.S. citizens working for foreign consulates in
the United States. Rosenfeld v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-110
(5/23/11), aff'd, 112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-5638 (9th Cir. 8/8/13) (unpublished
opinion). The taxpayer, who maintained a consulting business advising
clients on marketing, accepted a three year full-time appointment with the
British Consulate General (BCG) to perform services similar to those
provided by the taxpayer to private clients. The Tax Court (Judge Dean) held
that the taxpayer was an employee of the consulate for withholding purposes
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and not entitled to separately report income from the engagement on a
Schedule C. The court found employee status based on the facts that the
taxpayer worked under the control of the BCG, the taxpayer received a fixed
salary for his services, and the taxpayer's services furthered BCG's goals.
The court described as "neutral" the facts that, although BCG provided an
office (whether or not the taxpayer used the office was irrelevant) the
taxpayer incurred many costs associated with his work, the taxpayer's three
year contract was not defined as long term, and either party could terminate
the relationship without cause. The court also rejected the taxpayer's
arguments that he was self-employed because the parties defined the
relationship as an independent contractor relationship that specifically
provided that the BCG would not withhold taxes, and the taxpayer received
no employee benefits and concluded that the taxpayer was a common law
employee of BCG.
9. Husband and wife in a community property state
are liable for self-employment tax on their separate activities. Fitch v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-244 (10/28/13). Donald and Barbara Fitch
were married taxpayers in California, a community property state. Donald
worked as a CPA and reported net losses from his accounting practice on a
schedule C. Barbara worked as a real estate agent and reported her income
on a separate schedule C. In a rule 151 computation from a prior Tax Court
case, Fitch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-358, the IRS separately
calculated self-employment tax liability for Donald as zero, and calculated
positive self-employment tax liability for Barbara based on her real estate
business income. In a supplemental opinion, the Tax Court (Judge Vasquez)
agreed with the IRS that the taxpayers were not permitted to net the
individual self-employment income to determine the combined self-
employment tax due on their joint return. Section 1402(a)(5)(A) provides
that in a community property state income derived from a trade or business
that is community property is treated as the gross income (and deductions) of
the spouse carrying on the trade or business. The provision adds that if the
trade or business in jointly operated, the gross income and deductions are
treated as the gross income and deductions of each spouse on the basis of
their respective shares of gross income and deductions. The court found that
the real estate business was conducted by Barbara alone and that Donald was
not a participant in the business. The court also rejected the taxpayers'
assertion that under Reg. § 1.1402(a)-8(a) gross income from a business in a
community property state is treated as the income of the husband, pointing
out that the regulation pre-dates the 2004 enactment of § 1402(a)(5)(A) and
had not been updated to reflect the revised statutory language.
10. T.D.9649, Section 3504 Agent Employment Tax
Liability, 78 F.R. 75471 (12/12/13). Final regulations include Federal
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Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) withholding taxes within the scope of
current regulatory authority that allows employers to meet their FICA tax
obligations for domestic in-home services through an agent as provided in
§ 3401. The agent files a single return for multiple employers using the
agent's employer identification number.
a. Rev. Proc. 2013-39, 2013-52 I.R.B. 830
(12/12/13). The IRS has described and updated procedures for filing Form
2678 for an employer of a provider of domestic in-home services to
designate an agent under Reg. § 31.3504-1(a) to file employment taxes.
B. Self-employment Taxes
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2013.
C. Excise Taxes
1. The price of a tan goes up even in disregard of
the hazard from which the owner is protected. T.D. 9596, Disregarded
Entities and the Indoor Tanning Services Excise Tax, 77 F.R. 37806
(6/25/12). Temp. and Prop. Reg. § 1.1361-4T(a)(8)(iii) adds the 10 percent
excise tax on indoor tanning services of § 5000B to the list of excise taxes
for which disregarded entities (QSub or single owner business entity) are
treated as separate entities.
a. The price of skin cancer is increased by
the excise tax on tanning services. T.D. 9621, Indoor Tanning Services;
Excise Tax, 78 F.R. 34874 (6/11/13). Final Regulations § 49.5000B-1 are
promulgated for collection of the 10 percent excise tax on indoor tanning
facilities under § 5000B enacted as part of the Affordable Health Care Act.
The tax is imposed on amounts paid for indoor tanning services. The final
regulations generally adopt provisions in the proposed and temporary
regulations. The regulations include an exemption for Qualified Physical
Fitness Facilities, the predominant business or activity of which is to serve as
a physical fitness facility that does not charge separately for indoor tanning
services available at the facility. For other purveyors of indoor tanning, the
tax applies to amounts actually paid for indoor tanning services that are
provided at a reduced rate. The tax does not apply to services that are
obtained by redemption of points through a loyalty program. Where tanning
services are bundled with other goods and services, the final regulations set
out a formula to determine the amount reasonably attributable to indoor
tanning services. With respect to gift cards, the tax is imposed when the card
is redeemed specifically to pay for indoor tanning services and not when the
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card is purchased. The tax is also imposed on prepaid monthly membership
and enrollment fees regardless of the services actually provided.
2. The medical devices excise tax sticks to the
manufacturer. Chemence Medical Products, Inc. v. Medline Industries, Inc.,
112 A.F.T.R.2d 2013-7245 (N.D. Ga. 12/5/13). In a declaratory relief action,
the court held that the 2.3 percent tax on medical devices imposed under §
4191(a), enacted as part of the Affordable Care Act, falls on the
manufacturer rather than the distributor. Before enactment of the ACA,
Chemence Medical Products entered into a contract to supply adhesives to
Medline, a distributor of medical supplies. Chemence sought declaratory
relief that it could pass the tax onto the supplier as a price increase,
notwithstanding the fact that price increases were limited under the
agreement between Chemence and Medline. The court found that the
language of § 4191 and Reg. § 48.4191-1(c) are clear that the incidence of
the tax falls on the manufacturer when the manufacturer is taxable. The court
rejected arguments by the manufacturer that language in the statute imposing
the tax at the highest wholesale price, imposing the tax on distributors when
the manufacturer, producer, or importer is "untaxable", or that pass-through
provisions in the statute indicate the ultimate burden of the tax should fall on
the entity that bears the tax permit shifting the tax from the manufacturer.
The court also found that provisions in the sales agreement prohibited
Chemence from passing the tax to Medline as a price increase.
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. For this he needs an Act of Congress? H.R. 3458,
the Fallen Firefighters Assistance Tax Clarification Act of 2013, P.L.
113-63 was signed by President Obama on 12/20/13. This Act exempts from
income payments from public charities under §§ 509(a)(1) and (2) to
firefighters [formerly, firemen] injured in a 12/24/12 ambush, or to the
spouses or dependents of firefighters who were killed, when responding to a
fire in Webster, NY. Payments between 12/24/12 and 1/19/14 will qualify for
the exemption.
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